

British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry

Day 16

Testimony of Joseph B. Ismay

Source: <http://www.titanicinquiry.org/BOTInq/BOTIndx01.php#a>

Examined by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

18224. Mr. Ismay, are you a member of the firm of Ismay, Imrie and Company; they are the managers of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited?

- Yes.

18225. And that Company was the owner of the "Titanic"?

- Yes.

18226. You are also, I think, Managing director of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited?

- Yes.

18227. I do not want to go in elaborate detail into the constitution of the Company or the American company, but I must ask you just one or two questions so that my Lord may understand how this matter stands. It is a little complicated. But apparently the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited, is an English company, is it not?

- Yes.

18228. With its registered office at Liverpool?

- With its registered office at Liverpool.

18229. And the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company owns all the White Star Line steamers?

- Yes, the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company is the legal name of the Company.

18230. That is the Company, and it owns the vessels which are generally spoken of as the White Star Line?

- Yes.

18231. The White Star Line runs from New York to Liverpool, does it?

- Yes.

18232. And New York to Southampton?

- Yes, and to many other ports as well.

18233. And also from Liverpool to Australia?

- Yes.

18234. And from Liverpool to New Zealand?

- Yes, and to Canada.

18235. I was going to ask about that - and also the mediterranean?

- Yes.

18236. And from Boston to the mediterranean?

- Yes.

18237. And from Montreal to Liverpool?

- Yes.

18238. Then there is the mississippi and Dominion Line. Has that anything to do with the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company?

- No.

18239. That is another?

- It is a separate company altogether.

18240. That is another company controlled by what I may call for convenience, the American Shipping Trust?

- Yes.

18241. Is the International Mercantile marine Company the name of the American company?

- Yes.

18242. What one speaks of for convenience as the American Shipping Trust?

- Yes.

18243. I do not mean to suggest that it is a Trust - there is some objection, I believe, in America to calling it a Trust, but I only want to get the fact so that we may see where we are about it. That is the American company?

- Yes.

18244. Is the share capital of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company held by the American combination?

- Yes.

18245. That I have referred to for convenience to save a long name as the American Trust. Are the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company's shares a most important branch of the American Company's assets?

- Yes.

18246. I think it represents very nearly half the total tonnage controlled by the American Trust?

- Very nearly.

18247. Then the American Trust also controls the mississippi and Dominion Line, does it not?

- Yes.

18248. It runs from Montreal to Liverpool?

- And from Avonmouth to Canada.

18249. Then there is the British North Atlantic?

- Yes.

18250. Does that also run from Liverpool to Canada?

- Yes.

18251. Is that also an English company the shares of which are held by the American Trust?

- Yes.

18252. Then I think there is also the Atlantic Transport Company, is there not?

- Yes.

18253. And are the shares held in the same way by the American Trust?

- Yes.

18254. The Atlantic Transport Company is an English registered company?

- Yes.

18255. And that also runs from London to New York?

- From London to New York and from the Continent to Baltimore and between London and Philadelphia also.

18256. I think, with the exception of some American lines, and one other which I am about to call attention to, the Leyland Line, that represents substantially the shipping controlled by the American Trust, does it not?
- There is the American Line and the Red Star Line.

18257. I said with the exception of the American Lines?
- Yes.

18258. There is one other Company which I must refer to, because it will interest my Lord in reference to this Enquiry; the American Shipping Trust also controls the Leyland Line, does it not?
- It holds a controlling interest in the Leyland Line.

18259. (*The Attorney-General.*) My Lord, the Leyland Line, you will remember, would be the owners of the "Californian," that is the point of it. (*To the witness.*) And you have mentioned the Red Star, which was an American Line, which is also owned by the American Trust?
- Yes, the American Line running between Southampton and New York.

18260. (*The Commissioner.*) How many lines of steamers does the American Trust control?
- Do you mean how many companies, My Lord, or how many different lines?

18261. I mean how many companies altogether - British companies?
- Five, I think it is.

18262. How many American companies does it control?
- Two.

18263. Then the American company holds substantially, though not completely, all the share capital in these different companies?
- Yes, with the exception of the Leyland Line.

18264. You told me they had a controlling interest?
- Yes, there is a controlling interest in the Leyland Line.

The Attorney-General:
In the Leyland Line it is only a controlling interest, as I understand.

The Commissioner:
That is to say, they hold the majority of the shares.

18265. (*The Attorney-General.*) That is it, My Lord. (*To the witness.*) Does the tonnage of these vessels owned or controlled by the American Trust in the way you have described represent about a million tons altogether?
- I think it is rather less than a million tons, but very nearly a million tons.

18266. In round figures it is a million tons?
- Yes, in round figures it is a million tons.

18267. But the White Star Line and these other vessels which are owned originally by British companies still run under the British flag, do they not?
- Yes.

The Commissioner:
They are registered, I suppose?

The Attorney-General:
They are registered as belonging to the English company. The only point of that is, that it is not the Company but the shares of the Company that are held by the trust.

The Commissioner:

Although these ships, including the "Titanic," are registered under the British flag, they are in fact American property?

The Witness:

A certain amount of the stock in the International Maritime Company is held in this country, but to what extent I have not the slightest idea.

18268. But the American company, as I understand, is an American company constituted according to the laws of America.

The Attorney-General:

Your Lordship is perfectly right in the questions you have put, with this qualification, that a number of the shares in the American company are held by persons in this country who I suppose were the original owners of shares in the various English companies.

The Witness:

Very likely so.

18269. (*The Commissioner.*) Some of the shares may be owned by Frenchmen, I suppose?

- Certainly.

18270. I should like you to tell me what is the object of an American company managing its affairs through the English Laws affecting English companies; why do they do it?

- I am afraid I cannot answer that question, My Lord.

18271. I should think you ought to know. You know that in substance the "Titanic" was an American-owned ship?

- That is true.

18272. In substance, and I want to know why an American company should manage its ships, or why it registers its ships under english management or under the English flag?

- Those ships could not be registered under the American flag.

18273. Why not?

- Because the ships are built, I suppose, in this country.

18274. Then according to the laws of America can no ship that is not American-built be registered there?

- No; you cannot register a foreign ship; you cannot get the American flag for a foreign-built ship. She must be built in the country.

18275. Now, will you tell me where the business of this American company is transacted; is it in New York, or in London, or Liverpool, or in Southampton?

- I am president of the American company, and it is worked in Liverpool; we have a committee in London, a British committee.

18276. And there are no American gentlemen on the board?

- In America, yes; there is a Board of Directors in America. The Chairman of the board of Directors is an American, and there are a great many Americans on the board, and English people.

18277. (*The Attorney-General.*) I suppose it works out in this way, that the shares are held by the English company, and the ship is registered in consequence as a British ship?

- Yes.

18278. Then the shares in the company which owns the ship are the shares which are held by the American Trust?

- That is true.

18279. Now, I want you just to tell me about the building of the "Olympic" and the "Titanic," two sister vessels. I am not going to ask you the details of the construction, I am going to keep that for skilled Witnesses, and those who have had more to do with it and who know - but generally speaking, first of all, have you any financial interest by way of shareholding or otherwise in the firm of Harland and Wolff?

- Absolutely none.

18280. Or any of those which take an active part in the management of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company?

- I do not quite follow you there. For instance, Lord Pirrie, who is a Director of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, is also a Director of Harland and Wolff, but he is the only gentleman that has an interest in both the Company and the shipbuilding yard.

18281. That is what I thought. Now one other general question with regard to the construction of vessels by Harland and Wolff; are they constructed under contract at a lump sum in the ordinary course, or are they constructed at cost price plus a percentage?

- Cost price, plus a percentage. We build no ships by contract at all.

18282. So that what it amounts to, if I follow you correctly, is, that there is no limit placed by you upon the cost of the vessel?

- Absolutely none. All we ask them to do is to produce us the very finest ship they possibly can; the question of money has never been considered at all.

18283. Do you give your orders for the construction of a vessel in writing?

- Yes.

18284. Then substantially it is as you say?

- We simply pass a letter between us. Messrs. Harland and Wolff would write us a letter, and we would confirm it.

18285. To the effect that you are to pay them a certain commission or percentage upon the cost price?

- Yes, that is referred to in the letter.

18286. And is that the system practically upon which Messrs. Harland and Wolff have constructed your steamers for the White Star Line?

- Yes, practically the whole fleet has been built upon those terms.

18287. And the "Olympic" and "Titanic" were both built upon those terms?

- Exactly.

18288. The plans would be drawn and submitted, of course, to you or your company?

- Yes, and discussed between us and then settled on.

18289. Will you give me approximately what the cost of the "Titanic" was?

- A million and a half sterling.

18290. Now you were on board the "Titanic" on this voyage?

- I was.

18291. You sailed in her as a passenger?

- I did.

18292. You joined her first, I think, at Southampton?

- Yes.

18293. Then you went to Cherbourg, and from Cherbourg to queenstown?

- Yes.

18294. As we know, she left Queenstown on the 11th April?

- Yes.

18295. She carried mails as well as passengers?

- Yes.

18296. That was under contract which you had with the British Government?

- Yes.

18297. That contract is, of course, in writing?

- Yes.

18298. Can you produce it?

- I have not got it here, but it can be produced.

18299. I am not asking you for it at the present moment, but you will produce it for inspection either by the Court or by anyone who is interested in the Enquiry represented here who thinks it may be of value?

- Yes.

18300. I only want to ask you one question with reference to it. Under that contract are you bound to keep up a certain rate of speed?

- No.

18301. What I wanted to know was whether there was any such condition in the contract that your vessels must be constructed to steam at 20 knots or anything of that kind?

- That I am not quite clear about. There is some reference in the contract. I think we are allowed to run a ship with mails even at 18 knots.

18302. I think you said in America 16, but we will look at the contract and see how that is?

- It is down in writing.

18303. But the substance of it is that you are not bound to proceed at any rate at anything like the speed at which your vessels can go?

- No, there is no penalty for not making a certain speed; in other words, we get paid a lump sum.

18304. Now, on Sunday, the 14th April, do you remember dining in the evening?

- I do.

18305. With the Doctor?

- Yes.

18306. On this very fateful day?

- Yes.

18307. Did the Captain dine with you?

- He did not.

18308. (*The Attorney-General.*) My Lord, you appreciate why I ask that?

- The Doctor dined with me; there was nobody else at our table.

18309. But the Captain was in the restaurant dining, I think, with somebody else?

- Yes, I believe he was; in fact, I know he was.

18310. At all events, you say he was not dining with you that evening?

- No, I never spoke to him at all; I had nothing to do with him at all.

18311. You were a passenger on the vessel, but I suppose you travelled as a passenger because of your interest in the vessel and in the company which owned it?

- Naturally I was interested in the ship.

18312. I mean, you had nothing to do in New York; you travelled because you wanted to make the first passage on the "Titanic"?

- Partly; but I can always find something to do.

18313. I mean to say, you were not travelling in the "Titanic" because you wanted to go to New York, but because you wanted to travel upon the maiden trip of the "Titanic"?

- Yes.

18314. Because in your capacity as managing director or as President of the American Trust you desired also to see how the vessel behaved, I suppose?

- Naturally.

18315. And to see whether anything occurred in the course of the voyage which would lead to suggestions from you or from anybody?

- We were building another new ship, and we naturally wanted to see how we could improve on our existing ships.

18316. That was the real object of your travelling on the "Titanic"?

- And to observe the ship.

18317. What I want to put to you is that you were not there as an ordinary passenger?

- So far as the navigation of the ship was concerned, yes.

18318. That I will ask you some questions later on about. I am not suggesting that you controlled the navigation, but what I suggest to you is that it would not be right to describe you as really travelling on that ship as an ordinary passenger, because of the interest you had in the "Titanic," and because of your natural watchfulness as to the behaviour of the "Titanic" on her first voyage?

- I looked upon myself simply as an ordinary passenger.

18319. You have told us in what capacity you were travelling across the Atlantic?

- Yes.

18320. (*The Commissioner.*) Did you pay your fare?

- No, I did not.

18321. (*The Attorney-General.*) You recognise, do you not, that my Lord's question is one which rather disposes of the ordinary passenger theory, does it not; however, I will not press it?

- I think if I had crossed on any other ship going across the Atlantic, I should have travelled exactly on the same terms.

18322. (*The Commissioner.*) If you had travelled in a Cunarder you would not have paid?

- No.

18323. (*The Attorney-General.*) Now I think we understand what you mean when you say you were travelling as a passenger. Now on this day, on the 14th, did you get information from the Captain of ice reports?

- The Captain handed me a Marconi message which he had received from the "Baltic" on the Sunday.

18324. He handed you the actual message as it was delivered to him from the "Baltic"?

- Yes.

18325. Do you remember at what time it was?

- I think it was just before lunch.

18326. On the Sunday?
- Yes, on the Sunday.

The Attorney-General:

Your Lordship remembers the message from the "Baltic." I am going to hand up to you a little later a document which gives the messages in their proper order of dates, but this is the one I am referring to now - I will read it. It is sent at 11.52 a.m. to Captain Smith, "Titanic": "Have had moderate, variable winds and clear, fine weather since leaving. Greek steamer 'Athenai' reports passing icebergs and large quantity of field ice today in latitude 41.51 N., longitude 49.52 W." If your Lordship will take this list you will see how convenient it is (Handing up a copy.) We will have some more printed to hand up to the assessors.

The Commissioner:

Yes, it would be very convenient for all my colleagues to have a copy of this before them.

The Attorney-General:

Yes; we have got them printed. Strictly speaking, of course, we shall have to prove these, and they will be proved. If your Lordship will look at page 2, or, perhaps, it would be better if you will look at page 1 first to see how this is compiled. First of all, you have the copies of messages received by the "Titanic" between midnight of the 11th April, 1912, up to the 14th of April, 10.25 New York time, when her distress signals were first received. That is what I said we would have done before we adjourned. If your Lordship will look at page 2 you will see the message of the "Baltic" in the middle. It is referred to as the message book No. 77. You see it is to "Captain Smith, 'Titanic.'" You have it, no doubt.

The Commissioner:

Yes.

The Attorney-General:

That is the one which contains a further reference after the figure which I just gave you, "Greek steamer 'Athenai' reports passing icebergs and large quantity of field ice today in latitude 41.51 N., longitude 49.52 W. Last night we spoke German Oil Tank 'Deutschland,' Stettin to Philadelphia. Not under control. Short of coal, latitude 40.42 N., longitude 55.11." Now if your Lordship would like to complete this whilst you have got it before you, you will find, if you turn to the bottom of page 4 of the same document, the answer, "Time received 12.55 p.m. To Commander of 'Baltic.' Thanks for your message and good wishes. Had fine weather since leaving - Smith." Your Lordship will recollect that both these messages are said to be New York time. According to the description we have got here of the message sent and the message received, that is according to the evidence you have already got from the marconi Company, New York time.

The Commissioner:

I have got it marked in my own note that the message was sent out by the "Baltic" at 3.19.

The Attorney-General:

I think that is too late. You say, sent out by the "Baltic."

The Commissioner:

Yes.

The Attorney-General:

That would be too late; it must be rather before two, anything from one to before two.

The Commissioner:

Two o'clock. Your opening was not quite in accordance with what we know today.

The Attorney-General:

The statement in the affidavit, I agree, is not quite the same as we have now got it.

The Commissioner:

There is a substantial difference.

The Attorney-General:
Yes, we know the facts now.

The Commissioner:
I rather gathered from the Solicitor-General's examination that the difference was of no consequence, but it seems to me to make a substantial difference. There was only one message from the "Baltic."

The Attorney-General:
That is all as far as we know, and we have been examining into it because of what was said originally by the Captain of the "Baltic" upon affidavit, upon which the statement was made if your Lordship remembers.

The Commissioner:
However, this is the printed message in this document.

18327. (*The Attorney-General.*) Yes, that is quite right. I rather think my learned friend did say something with regard to it. He agreed that it made a difference, of course, because it did not agree with the statement in the affidavit, and we mentioned that we would enquire into it, and we have got it now. Of course, there is the message, and, as you will appreciate, we attribute very great importance to that particular message; we think it is of very great importance. (*To the witness.*) Now what I want to understand from you is this - that message was handed to you by Captain Smith, you say?

- Yes.

18328. Handed to you because you were the managing director of the company?

- I do not know; it was a matter of information.

18329. Information which he would not give to everybody, but which he gave to you. There is not the least doubt about it, is there?

- No, I do not think so.

18330. He handed it to you, and you read it, I suppose?

- Yes.

18331. Did he say anything to you about it?

- Not a word.

18332. He merely handed it to you, and you put it in your pocket after you had read it?

- Yes, I glanced at it very casually. I was on deck at the time.

18333. Had he handed any message to you before this one?

- No.

18334. So that this was the first message he had handed to you on this voyage?

- Yes.

18335. And when he handed this message to you, when the Captain of the ship came to you, the managing director, and put into your hands the marconigram, it was for you to read?

- Yes, and I read it.

18336. Because it was likely to be of some importance, was it not?

- I have crossed with Captain Smith before, and he has handed me messages which have been of no importance at all.

18337. Surely he had had other reports which, as far as I follow from your evidence, he had not said anything about?

- Not a word.

18338. He had had other Marconigrams during this voyage, at any rate?
- I daresay he had, and I had no knowledge of them.

18339. So I understand. Therefore he singled out this one apparently to give to you for you to read it?
- Yes.

18340. And, as I understand you, you took it from him and read it?
- Yes.

18341. And you kept it for the time being?
- Yes, I put it in my pocket.

18342. Where was the message handed to you by Captain Smith?
- On deck.

18343. Were you alone?
- No, I was not.

18344. Were there other passengers present?
- There were.

18345. Did you read the message to them?
- I did not.

18346. Did you say anything to the passengers about it?
- I spoke to two passengers in the afternoon. At that time I did not speak to anybody.

18347. (*The Commissioner.*) When you say the afternoon, what time was it that the Captain handed you this message?
- I think it was just before lunch.

18348. (*The Attorney-General.*) That would be somewhere near 2 o'clock?
- I should think it would be somewhere about 20 minutes past one. No, I am wrong; I think it would be about 10 minutes to one.

18349. I rather think you must be making a mistake about that. When you were examined in America you said, "It is very difficult to place the time. I do not know whether it was in the afternoon or immediately before lunch. I am not certain." - I think I was rather trying to place the time by the time we had lunch. I know it was immediately before we had lunch, and now when I come to think of it, when we go west, we have lunch at 1 o'clock, and coming east we have lunch at half-past one, so that it must have been half-past one when he handed me the marconigram. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief.

18350. I suggest to you that probably what you said in America was accurate, that you were not certain whether it was in the afternoon or immediately before lunch?
- I am practically certain it was before lunch.

The Commissioner:
Now, just think. The information that we have at present is that this telegram, or whatever it is called - the marconigram - arrived on the "Titanic" at about 2 o'clock.

The Attorney-General:
1.40 really.

The Commissioner:
11.52, as I understand, by New York time.

The Attorney-General:

That is right. According to the evidence we have got that would be about 1.40 or 1.45.

The Commissioner:

Very well, that is 20 minutes to 2, and then he says 20 minutes past 1.

The Witness:

It was the hour of lunch I was trying to fix the time by.

18351. (*The Attorney-General.*) Very well. Now let us take it that you received it immediately before lunch. You said nothing about it then, as I understand you?

- No, I did not.

18352. But having read it, you put it in your pocket?

- Yes.

18353. And did you then go down to lunch?

- Yes, I went down to lunch.

18354. Were you alone at lunch?

- I was.

18355. You lunched alone?

- Absolutely.

18356. Then you spoke about it in the afternoon to two lady passengers?

- Yes.

18357. Will you tell me to whom you spoke?

- I spoke to Mrs. Thayer and Mrs. Ryerson. [Mrs. Marion Thayer and Mrs. Emily Ryerson.]

18358. Will you tell us what you said?

- I cannot recollect what I said. I think I read part of the message to them about the ice and the derelict - not the derelict, but the steamer that was broken down; short of coal she was.

18359. Did you understand from that telegram that the ice which was reported was in your track?

- I did not.

18360. Did you attribute any importance at all to the ice report?

- I did not; no special importance at all.

18361. Why did you think the Captain handed you the marconigram?

- As a matter of information, I take it.

18362. Information of what?

- About the contents of the message.

18363. The ice report?

- About the contents of the message. He gave me the report of the ice and this steamer being short of coal.

18364. It conveyed to you at any rate that you were approaching within the region of ice, did it not?

- Yes, certainly.

18365. Did Mrs. Ryerson say anything to you about slowing down in consequence of this ice report?

- I have no recollection of it at all.

18366. Will you pledge yourself that she did not?

- Yes, I think I can.

18367. Up to this time had you been increasing the number of revolutions?

- I believe the revolutions were increased from 70 to 72 and up to 75.

18368. You had begun at 70, I suppose?

- We began at 68.

18369. Was that when you left Queenstown?

- When we left Southampton.

18370. When you left Southampton you began at 68?

- Yes.

18371. What would that give in knots?

- I cannot tell you; it is easily worked out.

18372. Then we know, I think, that 75 gives between 21 $\frac{3}{4}$ and 22 knots; we have got that in evidence already?

- Yes.

18373. You started, you said, at 68. Did you then get to 70?

- I believe she went at 70 from Cherbourg to queenstown.

18374. When was it you first got to 75?

- I really have no absolute knowledge myself as to the number of revolutions. I believe she was going 75 on the Sunday.

18375. But really, Mr. Ismay, if you will just search your recollection a little. Remember that this question of speed interested you very materially. You, as Managing Director of the Company, were interested in the speed of the vessel?

- Naturally.

18376. And when the report was made to you, as I suppose it was, that she had increased to 75 revolutions, you were aware, I think, that it was not quite her full speed?

- 78 I believe was her full speed.

18377. Seventy-eight was her full speed, and she had got to 75?

- Yes, that is right.

18378. Your intention was, was it not, before you reached New York, to get the maximum speed of 78?

- The intention was that if the weather should be found suitable on the Monday or the Tuesday that the ship would then have been driven at full speed.

18379. Which would be 78?

- Yes, 78.

18380. So that your intention was to increase the speed at which she was travelling already on the Sunday of 75 revolutions, if the weather was satisfactory, to 78 on the Monday or the Tuesday?

- Yes, to increase the speed to 78 if the conditions were all satisfactory.

18381. When she was proceeding at 75 revolutions were all her boilers on?

- I believe not. I have no knowledge of that myself.

18382. Were the single-ended boilers on?

- I have no knowledge of it myself. I was told they were not - at least, I have heard they were not.

18383. That none of the single-ended ones were on?

- That is as far as I know.

18384. Then I will just refer you to what you said in America with regard to this?

- As far as I know the single-ended boilers were not on on the Sunday.

18385. "The full speed of ship is 78 revolutions?" - Yes.

18386. "She worked up to 80. As far as I am aware she never exceeded 75 revolutions. She had not all her boilers on, none of the single-ended boilers were on. It was our intention if we had fine weather on Monday afternoon or Tuesday to drive the ship at full speed." Is that correct?

- Yes, quite.

18387. With whom would you discuss this question of driving her at full speed on the Monday or Tuesday?

- The only man I spoke to in regard to it was the Chief Engineer in my room when the ship was in Queenstown.

18388. Is that Mr. Bell?

- Yes.

18389. The Chief Engineer?

- Yes.

18390. Can you tell me on what day it was that she first made the 75 revolutions on this voyage?

- I think it would be on the Saturday.

18391. And when was it that you discussed the question of putting her at full speed on the Monday or the Tuesday?

- On the Thursday when the ship was at anchor in Queenstown Harbour.

18392. Will you explain that. It is not quite clear why you should discuss the question in Queenstown?

- The reason why we discussed it at Queenstown was this, that Mr. Bell came into my room; I wanted to know how much coal we had on board the ship, because the ship left after the coal strike was on, and he told me. I then spoke to him about the ship and I said it is not possible for the ship to arrive in New York on Tuesday. Therefore there is no object in pushing her. We will arrive there at 5 o'clock on Wednesday morning, and it will be good landing for the passengers in New York, and we shall also be able to economise our coal. We did not want to burn any more coal than we needed.

18393. Never mind about that, that does not answer the question I was putting to you. I understand what you mean by that, that you did not want to get there till the Wednesday morning at 5 o'clock, and that therefore it was not necessary to drive her at full speed all the time?

- No.

18394. But the question I am putting to you is this, when was it that you discussed putting her at full speed on the Monday or the Tuesday?

- At the same time.

18395. You have not told us about that?

- That was when Mr. Bell was in my room on Thursday afternoon, when the ship was at anchor at Queenstown.

18396. But what was said about putting her at full speed?

- I said to him then, we may have an opportunity of driving her at full speed on Monday or Tuesday if the weather is entirely suitable.

18397. Then you did know on the Sunday morning that in the ordinary course of things between that and the Monday evening you might be increasing your speed to full speed?

- I knew if the weather was suitable either on the Monday or the Tuesday the vessel would go at full speed for a few hours.

18398. And I suppose you knew that in order to get the full speed of the vessel, the maximum number of revolutions, it would be necessary, presumably, to light more boilers?

- I presume the boilers would have been put on.

18399. Do you know in fact that they were lighted on the Sunday morning?

- I do not.

The Attorney-General:

Your Lordship will remember that evidence; I will give the reference to it, but we have got the evidence I think that they were lighted at eight o'clock on Sunday morning, the five single-ended boilers?

Mr. Laing:

No, no.

The Commissioner:

Were they lit at the time of the collision?

The Attorney-General:

I do not think the single-ended ones were, but I think you will find that more boilers were lit on the Sunday morning; that is the point, but I think not the single-ended ones.

The Commissioner:

Where is the reference to these particular ones that you suggest were lit on the Sunday morning?

The Attorney-General:

I think your Lordship will find it at page 69, in Barrett's evidence, Question [2217](#), where he was asked, "Then, as far as you know, there was no reduction in speed?" And your Lordship will see that the answer to that is: "There were two main boilers lit up on the Sunday morning, but I could not tell you whether they were connected with the others or not. (Q.) You mean two main boilers which had not been lit up before? - (A.) Yes, they were lit up. (Q.) That is extra? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) On the Sunday morning. - (A.) Yes. (Q.) That is why you told me that there had been eight boilers out, and afterwards you thought there were only five or six out, is that it? - (A.) Yes." Then your Lordship says: "What he said was five boilers, certainly, and perhaps eight." Then it is cleared up at Question [2222](#): "(The Solicitor-General.) That is what you said, Barrett - you said five boilers were out, certainly, and perhaps eight. Now just explain why you say that?" And he said, "When you light a boiler up it will take twelve hours before you can connect it with the others to get steam on as a Rule in a merchant ship as far as my experience goes."

Then he is asked, "These three, the difference between the five and the eight, were they lit up? - (A.) Those three were lit up on the Sunday morning." Then at Question [2226](#) he was asked, "Do you know in which section they were? - (A.) In the after section - the next one to the after section. That would be No. 2 section." Now, the aftermost section your Lordship will see is the one in which there are the single-ended boilers. He is not referring to those. He is referring to the after boilers in No. 2 boiler room, which are the double-ended.

The Solicitor-General:

He is referring to those. (*Pointing to the plan.*)

The Commissioner:

That is a double-ended boiler.

The Solicitor-General:

Yes, that No. 2 is a double-ended boiler.

The Commissioner:

The other ones, further aft, are single ones.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, My Lord, that is right; and those were never lit. But if your Lordship will now look at Question [2232](#), you

will see that Barrett was asked, "Can you tell me when those two or three main boilers were lit on the Sunday morning - about what time? - (A.) As near as I could say, 8 o'clock in the morning. (Q.) Then they may have been connected that same night? - (A.) Yes." There is some other evidence about it, but as far as I know there is no suggestion that this evidence is not correct. What it amounts to is that it took 12 hours apparently before they were connected. They were lit at 8 o'clock on the Sunday morning. That was the reason the question was put by the Solicitor-General, "Then they may have been connected that same night?" and the answer is "Yes." That is how the evidence stands.

The Commissioner:

This man is what is called a leading fireman.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, My Lord. He was a very important witness. He was a leading stoker.

The Commissioner:

He describes himself as a leading stoker.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, My Lord, I think that is right.

The Commissioner:

I do not know what the "a" means.

The Attorney-General:

In one particular section, I think.

The Commissioner:

How many leading stokers are there?

The Attorney-General:

I could not say, My Lord, but I imagine it means a leading stoker in a particular section; probably that is what it means.

Sir Robert Finlay:

He was the leading stoker in No. 6 Boiler room.

The Commissioner:

Can you tell me which is No. 6 Stokehold?

The Attorney-General:

Quite the foremost one of all, My Lord. We have had evidence about water going in there.

The Commissioner:

Quite the foremost?

The Attorney-General:

Yes, My Lord; it is described there as No. 6 Boiler room.

The Commissioner:

Was that the stokehold where he was located?

The Attorney-General:

Yes, that was Barrett's.

The Commissioner:

He was not located in this stokehold where the boilers were lit up?

The Attorney-General:
No, My Lord.

Sir Robert Finlay:

There is just one other question, Barrett was asked at [2358](#) on page 66: "With regard to the revolutions, did you keep the same revolutions all Sunday, so far as you know? - Yes."

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:

If, Mr. Attorney, they kept the same revolutions all the Sunday, which I understand means up to the time of the collision, then these three boilers had not begun to operate upon the engines, apparently?

The Attorney-General:
Probably not.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I understand that, even if the boilers were connected, it would not follow that there were more revolutions. That would depend upon what was done in the engine room.

The Attorney-General:
That would not follow.

The Commissioner:

I suppose, Sir Robert, the object of lighting up extra boilers is to get additional speed.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Not entirely, My Lord. The thing may work easier. Greater speed can be attained if they choose, but as a matter of fact the evidence is that they did not exceed the 75 revolutions, which the witness said they got on the Sunday, up to the time of the collision.

The Commissioner:

It leads me to think that Barrett, or whatever his name was, may be inaccurate about the time when these additional boilers were lit.

Sir Robert Finlay:

It may have been a little later, your Lordship means?

The Commissioner:
Yes.

Sir Robert Finlay:

It would probably take 12 hours before they could be connected.

The Commissioner:

You see, according to the evidence of Mr. Ismay, they would not want the additional speed until Monday or Tuesday.

Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes.

The Commissioner:

It is evident from Mr. Ismay's evidence that they did want additional speed. If the weather was clear and the circumstances favourable, they would want additional speed on Monday and Tuesday.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes, and coal being the object at the time one would suppose they were not lit up quite so hurriedly.

The Commissioner:

Well, I am not quite so sure. This was the first voyage of a new ship.

The Attorney-General:

Monday was very close at hand, after all.

Sir Robert Finlay:

But you do not want more than 12 hours.

18400. (*The Attorney-General.*) Very well. (*To the witness.*) At least we know this, Mr. Ismay, that certainly there was no slowing down of the vessel after that ice report was received?

- Not that I know of.

18401. You knew, of course, that the proximity of icebergs was a danger; you knew that much, did not you?

- There is always danger with ice - more or less danger with ice.

18402. I suppose you are familiar with the reason of the different tracks which are marked upon the charts?

- Perfectly.

18403. Different tracks for different seasons of the year?

- Yes.

18404. And that is for the purpose of avoiding ice, is it not?

- Not entirely.

18405. I will not argue with you about entirely, but, at any rate, it is an important factor?

- It is.

18406. And for that reason you get, I think, I am right in saying, a more southerly track during a certain period of the year?

- That is true.

18407. Had you no curiosity to ascertain whether or not you would be travelling in the region in which ice was reported?

- I had not.

18408. (*The Commissioner.*) I thought you said just now that you knew that this was the point at which you were approaching the region of ice?

- I knew we were approaching the region of ice, yes.

18409. (*The Attorney-General.*) How did you know that?

- How did I know what?

18410. How did you know that you were approaching the region of ice?

- By this Marconi message.

18411. The marconi message which you had received from the "Baltic"?

- Yes.

18412. And you knew, did you not, that you would be in the region of ice some time on that Sunday night?

- I believe so, yes.

18413. Now, I should like to understand who told you that?

- I think the information I got was from Dr. O'Loughlin, who said we had turned the corner.

18414. That is the doctor with whom you had dined that night in the restaurant?

- Yes.

18415. Was he the doctor who always travelled with the ship?

- He had been in the service over 40 years.

18416. As a doctor?

- Yes.

18417. But did you tell him about the marconigram?

- I did not.

18418. I do not quite understand then how you mean what he said to you?

- He made the remark at dinner, "We have turned the corner."

18419. Did you know what turning the corner meant?

- Yes, I knew that.

18420. You knew, I suppose, that you would alter your course then?

- Yes, I knew that.

18421. And you would alter your course, I think, More to the northward?

- Yes.

18422. And you knew that that would bring you nearer to the region of ice which had been reported to you?

- I could not say exactly where the ice was. I do not understand latitude and longitude.

18423. Do you mean that? You are giving evidence here in the Court. Would you reconsider that statement, that you do not know the meaning of latitude and longitude?

- I said the marconi message did not convey any meaning to me as to the exact position of that ice.

18424. Did it not convey to you that it was possible to ascertain whether the latitude and longitude designated in that Marconigram would be a track that you would have to cross?

- For me to ascertain that?

18325. Yes?

- No. That is for the Captain of the ship. He was responsible for the navigation of the ship. I had nothing to do with the navigation.

18426. Yet you were the managing Director and he thought it of sufficient importance to bring you the first Marconigram which he had shown to you on this voyage and to give it you, and then you put it in your pocket?

- Yes.

18427. And you, of course, appreciated that that report meant to you that you were approaching ice, as you told us?

- Yes.

18428. And you knew also that you would be approaching ice that night?

- I expected so, yes.

18429. And that you therefore would be crossing the particular region which was indicated in that Marconigram that night?

- I could not tell that.

18430. About that region?

- Yes, I presume so.

18431. And therefore that it behoved those responsible for the navigation of the ship to be very careful?
- Naturally.

18432. And more particularly if you were approaching ice in the night it would be desirable, would it not, to slow down?
- I am not a navigator.

18433. (*The Commissioner.*) Answer the question.
- I say no. I am not a navigator.

The Attorney-General:
You are not quite frank with us, Mr. Ismay.

Sir Robert Finlay:
The Attorney-General will forgive me; I do not think there is the slightest justification for that remark.

18434. (*The Attorney-General.*) You have told me now what your answer is. What was your answer?
- I should say if a man can see far enough to clear ice, he is perfectly justified in going full speed.

18435. Then apparently you did not expect your Captain to slow down when he had ice reports?
- No, certainly not.

The Commissioner:
That is the evidence of one of the witnesses.

The Attorney-General:
Yes, My Lord, I know.

The Commissioner:
Of course, if you had got a perfect look-out and there is nothing to prevent you from seeing, then there is no occasion to slow down.

The Witness:
I should say none at all.

18436. You could see the ice then a long way off, and it would not be necessary to slow down for icebergs?
- Presumably so, yes.

18437. (*The Attorney-General.*) What is the object of continuing at full speed through the night if you expect to meet ice? Why do you do it?
- What is the use of doing it?

18438. Yes?
- I presume that the man would be anxious to get through the ice region. He would not want to slow down upon the chance of a fog coming on.

18439. So that, of course, the object of it would be to get through it as fast as you could?
- I presume that if a man on a perfectly clear night could see far enough to clear an iceberg he would be perfectly justified in getting through the ice region as quickly as he possibly could.

18440. Now, I want to put a statement to you. Do you know a Mrs. Douglas?
- I do not.

18441. Do you know a Mrs. Ryerson, of Philadelphia?
- Yes, I met her on board the ship.

18442. And she, I gather from what you said just now, was one of the two lady passengers to whom you mentioned the marconigram in the afternoon?

- That is true.

18443. You showed her the wireless message, did you not?

- I read it to her, I think.

18444. Now, I want to put to you this: Did she say to you (I am speaking now of what took place on the Sunday. I will put the whole conversation to you, and see if it helps your recollection.): "Of course you will slow down," and did you reply, "Oh, no; we will put on more boilers to get out of it"?

- Certainly not.

18445. It seems to have been rather in accordance with your view, that the faster you could get out of the region the better?

- Assuming the weather was perfectly fine, I should say the Captain was perfectly justified in going full speed.

18446. That means that your view is not only would he be justified in going the 75 revolutions, but he would be justified in going the 78?

- If the weather conditions had been satisfactory.

18447. And, according to your view, what do you say as to the weather conditions?

- So far as I could judge, it was a perfectly fine, clear night.

18448. So that on a perfectly fine, clear night, with the expectation that you are coming within the region of ice, your view is that the Captain would be justified in increasing his speed?

- I do not see any reason why he should not, so long as he could see sufficiently far to clear the ice.

The Commissioner:

I suppose if you had a perfectly good and reliable look-out and could see the ice at a sufficient distance to enable you to steer clear of it that would be sufficient.

The Attorney-General:

Assuming the "ifs" which your Lordship has put, yes.

The Commissioner:

Yes, that is what I mean. Those are the "ifs" he assumes.

The Attorney-General:

Quite so. Assuming that you can see far enough to get out of the way at whatever speed you are going you can go at whatever speed you like. That is what it comes to.

The Witness:

Assuming you can see far enough to clear the ice.

18449. I want to get at what your view was with regard to it; whether it is right or wrong is a question, of course, which the Court will decide. But it seems to me that what you have just told us in your answer is not very different from what I put to you, or not substantially different from what I put to you, from the conversation you had with Mrs. Ryerson?

- I did not have any such conversation with Mrs. Ryerson.

18450. I will not argue it further, so long as you have admitted the view that it would be best to go as fast as you could to get out of the region of ice?

- I say he was justified in going fast to get out of it if the conditions were suitable and right, and the weather clear.

18451. I think we understand. Now, did you have any conversation with Captain Smith at all, between the time of his giving you the wireless message and the impact with the iceberg, about ice?

- The only conversation I had with Captain Smith was in the smoking room that night. As he walked out of the smoking room he asked me if I had the marconi message, and I said, Yes, I had, and I gave it to him.

18452. What time would that be?

- I think it was 10 minutes or a quarter-past seven.

18453. (*The Commissioner.*) You had not been on the bridge?

- I had never been on the bridge during the whole trip.

18454. (*The Attorney-General.*) Did he say why he wanted you to give him back the message?

- He said he wished to put it up in the Officers' chart room.

18455. (*The Commissioner.*) What would be the object of putting the marconigram up in the chart room if good navigation dictated going on at full speed?

- I presume he put it up for the Officers' information, My Lord.

18456. According to you, it did not matter?

- Not if the weather was clear.

18457. As it was?

- As it was.

18458. (*The Attorney-General.*) Then, when the Captain asked you for the message and you gave it back to him, did you have any conversation with him then?

- No further conversation at all.

18459. Did you not ask him whether your vessel would come at all within that latitude and longitude indicated in the "Baltic" Marconigram?

- I did not.

18460. And he said nothing to you about it?

- He did not.

18461. But you understood that you would be there during that night?

- Yes, I understood that we would get up to the ice that night.

18462. Now, the thing that is not clear to me is why it was that you understood that you would get to the ice that night if it was not from the marconigram, and that you understood what the latitude and longitude there indicated meant?

- The doctor told me we had turned the corner, and I knew, when we had turned the corner, we must be getting towards the ice region.

18463. (*The Commissioner.*) How did you know that?

- Because we were going directly up North.

18464. No. You were turning almost directly West?

- No. You come down to a point and then you go up.

18465. You did not go up North. You went straight west?

- It is what is always known as turning the corner.

18466. You seem to know a good deal about this navigation of the Atlantic?

- I am afraid I do not.

18467. (*The Attorney-General.*) What is the latitude and longitude of turning the corner?

- I do not know.

18468. Have you no idea?

- No, I have not.

18469. Have you never looked?

- I may have looked, but I have no idea of the latitude and longitude.

18470. (*The Commissioner.*) I want to have it quite clear from you. Is your position this, that in clear weather, whether it be day or whether it be night, there should be no reduction or need be no reduction in the speed, although the master of the ship knows that he is in the ice region?

- That is right.

18471. That is your case?

- Yes. If the conditions are all perfectly satisfactory, and he can see far enough to clear the ice.

18472. (*The Attorney-General.*) When you speak of the region of ice I want to be quite clear that we mean the same thing. You said that when the doctor told you that you had turned the corner you understood you would get to the region of ice that night?

- That we must be approaching the ice region.

18473. Do you mean by the ice region, the region which is indicated on the chart?

- I could not tell, because I had not got the chart. After you turn the corner I should think it is anywhere about - I really could not tell, but of course I know where it was we struck the ice.

18474. Would you have ordinarily have expected to have come into the region of ice on that Sunday night; was that what you expected would happen?

- I expected that we would be in the region of ice on the Sunday night.

18475. Before you had seen the marconigram?

- Oh, no.

18476. Then, if I follow you, it was because of the marconigram that you expected to come into the region of ice that night?

- Oh, yes.

The Attorney-General:

Your Lordship will see why I asked him the question. He might have meant something else, but he does mean on account of the marconigram.

The Commissioner:

Yes.

18477. (*The Attorney-General.*) Now I want to be quite clear about this. Is it your statement to my Lord that from first to last on that Sunday you never had any conversation with Captain Smith about ice?

- Absolutely.

18478. Or with any other Officer?

- Or with any other Officer.

18479. Including the Chief Engineer?

- Including the Chief Engineer.

18480. Or, as I understand you, with Dr. O'Loughlin?

- No, nor with him.

18481. Or with anybody, if I correctly appreciate your evidence, except for the statement that you made to Mrs. Ryerson and another lady?

- That is true.

18482. When you told them the substance of the marconigram?

- That is true.

18483. (*The Commissioner.*) I want to ask a question. You have told the Attorney-General that it was the marconigram which led you to the conclusion that after you had turned the corner you would be approaching the ice region?

- Yes. I knew when we had turned the corner that we would be approaching the ice region.

18484. I want to have this quite clear. I understood you to say to the Attorney-General that you came to that conclusion because of what was in the marconigram?

- Largely.

18485. Then the marconigram was unintelligible to you, was it not, unless you understood the latitude and longitude?

- It was unintelligible to me as far as latitude and longitude were concerned.

18486. But the latitude and longitude were the things which would tell you where the ice was?

- Yes.

18487. And the only things in the marconigram which would tell you where the ice was?

- Yes.

18488. Then I am quite at a loss to understand why it is you say that you came to the conclusion that you would be in the ice region because of the marconigram?

- Because of the marconigram and having turned the corner.

18489. Is it both?

- Yes, the two together.

18490. Now what information in the marconigram led you to the belief that you were approaching the ice region?

- Because I presumed the man would not send the marconi message to us unless the ice was there and that we were approaching it. He knew where we were.

18491. Then what you mean is this, that you presumed the "Baltic" had sent a message, without knowing whether it was right or wrong, apprising you of ice in your track?

- Yes, or it must have been very close to the track.

18492. Near it?

- Yes.

18493. Is that what you mean to say?

- Yes.

(After a short adjournment.)

18494. (*The Attorney-General.*) You occupied a cabin on B deck?

- Yes.

18495. Did you occupy a suite there?

- I did.

18496. That is on the port side of the vessel?

- The starboard side, I think.

18497. No, it is the port side - at least, I think so, if it is the one I mean. Do you remember the number?

- I think it was 52 or 56, or something like that.

18498. Will you just look at the plan and you will see. (The witness examined the plan.) I will remind you of what you said in America. At one time you were not quite sure of the number. You thought it was 52?

- I think some other gentleman said he had that room.

18499. That is right; some other gentleman said he had it?

- Yes, but I still think I had 52. The passenger plan would show that. The plan of the accommodation in the office would show which room I had.

18500. It is not very important. If your Lordship will look at B deck, it is on the port side - what is called the bridge deck. You will see the staircase which is marked there, and then "First class," and then there is a boiler casing amidships, and then on the port side you will see b 52, 54, and then a bathroom, and then 56. It is either 52 or 56, I understand that you occupied?

- Or the corresponding rooms on the other side.

18501. (*The Commissioner.*) You do not mean on the other side of the ship?

- Yes; I am not certain which side it was - the corresponding rooms.

18502. (*The Attorney-General.*) Very well. I do not think it matters much. At the time of the impact you were in bed and asleep?

- I was.

18503. You were awakened by the impact?

- Yes.

18504. Did you realise what had happened?

- I did not.

18505. Did you then get up?

- I stayed in bed a little time, and then I got up. I really thought what had happened was we had lost a blade off the propeller.

18506. You got up, and where did you go?

- I went along the passageway out of my room and I met a steward.

18507. Did you ask him what had happened?

- I asked him what had happened.

18508. What did he say?

- He told me he did not know.

18509. Then what did you do?

- I went back to my room and I put a coat on, and I went up on to the bridge.

18510. Was Captain Smith there?

- He was.

18511. Then did you ask him what had happened?

- I did.

18512. And what did he tell you?

- He told me we had struck ice.

18513. Did you ask him anything further?

- I asked him whether he thought the damage was serious, and he said he thought it was.

18514. What did you do then?

- I then went downstairs again; down below.

18515. Did you meet Mr. Bell, the Chief Engineer?

- I met the Chief Engineer at the top of the staircase.

18516. Did you have some conversation with him - will you tell us what it was?

- I asked him whether he thought the ship was seriously damaged, and he said he thought she was, but, as far as I remember, he thought the pumps would control the water.

18517. This is what you said in America. Is this right? You were asked by Senator Smith: "Did the Chief Engineer of the 'Titanic' state to you the extent of the damage? - (A.) He said he thought the damage was serious, but that he hoped the pumps would be able to control the water"?

- I do not know whether he said "he hoped" or "he thought"; it is to the best of my recollection. I cannot remember every word he said.

18518. I think in an earlier passage there is a statement made somewhat to that effect, that he thought the pumps would be able to control the water, but I am reading now from your own words given in answer: "He hoped the pumps would be able to control the water." What did you do then?

- I think I went back to my room for a short time, but I am not absolutely certain.

18519. Did you hear any order given by captain Smith?

- I went up after that on to the bridge, and I heard Captain Smith give an order; I am not quite certain whether it was to lower the boats or to get the boats out; it was in connection with the boats.

18520. When you heard that order given on the bridge, what did you do next?

- I went along the deck, and I think I spoke to one of the Officers.

18521. You do not remember which Officer it was?

- No. I do not remember which Officer it was.

18522. Did you help to get the boats out?

- I rendered all the assistance I could.

18523. And to put the women and children in?

- To put the women and children in.

18524. That was on the boat deck?

- That was on the boat deck.

18525. And did you stay there until you left the ship?

- Yes, practically. I do not think I ever left that deck again.

18526. Can you tell us at all how long it was after you felt the impact that you heard the order given by Captain Smith to get the boats out, or to lower the boats?

- No, I really could not tell; it is very difficult indeed; it might have been 20 minutes, but it is very difficult to judge time.

18527. Did you see some of the boats lowered?

- I did.

18528. On which side of the deck were you?

- On the starboard side.

18529. When you were assisting with the boats?

- Yes.

18530. Was there any confusion?

- I saw no confusion at all.

18531. Did you see any attempts by men to force their way into the boats?

- I did not.

18532. Or to get into the boats?

- I did not.

18533. Were there a number of women and children on the deck?

- There were.

18534. Did all those who were on the deck get away in boats?

- All the women that I saw on deck got away in boats.

18535. Did you realise that they were not all the women and children who were on board the ship?

- I did not.

18536. Did you know at all what was happening on the port side?

- I did not.

18537. Did you hear any reports of the ship making water?

- I did not.

18538. You were not told about that?

- I was not.

18539. Did you notice any list?

- When I left the ship she had a list to starboard.

18540. To starboard?

- To port, I beg your pardon.

18541. Did you notice whether she had any list to starboard?

- No, I did not.

18542. With regard to the four boats that you saw lowered, did you see whether they were full?

- No, I could not tell that; I saw 3, 5, 7, and 9 lowered.

18543. How long did you remain on the "Titanic" after the impact?

- I should think, as I said in Washington, an hour and a half, or perhaps longer than that.

18544. And meanwhile did you notice that the vessel was going down by the head?

- I did.

18545. That, of course, increased as time went on?

- It did.

18546. Did you think it was in a very serious condition?

- As time got on I did.

18547. And that the ship was sinking?

- I did.

18548. Did you tell anybody that?

- I did not.

18549. So far as you know, were any of the passengers told that the vessel was sinking?

- Not so far as I know.

18550. Do you remember the collapsible boat on the starboard side being lowered?

- I do.

18551. You were present then?

- I was.

18552. And were you assisting in helping the women and children in?

- I was.

18553. Were there any other passengers there, I mean passengers other than women and children?

- No, not that I saw.

18554. Was there any other boat on the starboard side; was there any boat left when the collapsible was being lowered?

- I believe there was another collapsible on the top of the Officers' house.

18555. But, except the collapsibles, had every boat been lowered?

- Every wooden boat was away.

18556. All the eight on that side?

- Yes.

18557. Did you see how many passengers were put into this collapsible?

- No, I did not see at the time.

18558. Did she appear to be full?

- She was very fairly full.

18559. Would you tell us what happened after you got the women and children in?

- After all the women and children were in and after all the people that were on deck had got in, I got into the boat as she was being lowered away.

18560. There was no order to you to get in?

- No, none.

18561. Did any other passenger get in?

- One.

18562. That is a Mr. Carter?

- Mr. Carter.

18563. Am I right, then, in this, that there were women and children and some members of the crew to man the boat and two passengers, yourself and Mr. Carter?

- Yes, and four Chinamen were in the boat.

18564. Four Chinamen who, we have heard, were discovered after the boat was lowered?

- Yes.

18565. That, your Lordship will remember, is Rowe's evidence. Did you see Mr. Andrews at all between the time of the impact and your leaving the vessel?

- I did not.

18566. Before you got into the boat was any attempt made to call up other passengers to come up on to the boat deck?

- That I do not know; I was never off the boat deck.

18567. You do not know?

- I do not.

18568. Am I right then, Mr. Ismay, that you did not hear any such order given and you did not enquire whether any such order had been given?

- Of passengers coming up from down below?

18569. Yes?

- No, I did not.

18570. And you did not inquire whether any such order had been given?

- I did not.

18571. Did you think then when you left the vessel that she was rapidly going down?

- I did.

18572. Before you left the vessel did you see the rockets being sent up?

- I did.

18573. That went on for some time?

- For some time.

18574. When you got into the boat and she was lowered, how were you sitting?

- I was sitting with my back to the afterend of the boat.

18575. Facing the bow?

- Facing the bow.

18576. And did you assist with the oars?

- I did.

18577. Did you see any light?

- We saw a light a long way from us, which, I think, was a little bit on our starboard side.

18578. That is a little bit on the starboard side of the "Titanic" or your boat?

- Of both.

18579. You were heading the same way?

- Yes.

18580. Did you pull towards it?

- We did.

18581. But without success?

- We thought we gained on her, and then she seemed to draw away from us again.

18582. Then the light disappeared?

- In daylight, yes.

18583. I say the light of the vessel disappeared?

- Yes, when daylight came.

18584. Not till daylight came?

- If you will excuse my saying so, I do not think it was a steamer at all; I think it was a sailing ship we saw.

18585. (*The Commissioner.*) Am I to understand that you do not think it was the "Californian"?

- I am sure it was not.

18586. I am rather sorry to hear that?

- This was on the starboard side of the ship. I understand the "Californian" was seen on the port side of the ship - or the ship that was supposed to be the "Californian." This light I saw was on the starboard side.

18587. Never mind about what side it was at all; have you come to the conclusion that the vessel whose lights were seen for so long a time was not the "Californian"?

- No, Sir.

18588. I thought you said you had come to that conclusion?

- No, I said that the light that we pulled for I do not think was the "Californian's" light.

18589. Then was there more than one light visible?

- The only light I saw was the one we rowed for.

18590. Was there any other light visible?

- I saw no other light. This was one plain, white light.

18591. (*The Attorney-General.*) There was very little wind that night?

- Very little.

18592. Practically a dead calm, we have been told?

- Yes, up to a certain hour in the morning, when the wind did get up.

18593. A sailing vessel would not have been making any way at all, or practically none?

- Well, very little.

18594. The "Californian" is of course a vessel under the control of your company, the company of which you are president?

- Financially, yes; so far as the management of the company is concerned I have nothing to do with it.

18595. I did not suggest you had, but it is one of those in the Leyland Line, the controlling interest of which is in the American Trust?

- Quite.

18596. Did you continue pulling towards it all the time?

- Yes, for a very long time.

18597. Did you continue pulling towards it till daylight?

- No.

18598. Do you mean you gave it up?

- We gave it up because the wind got up; a little sea got up and we were making no progress at all.

18599. Did you see the lights of the "Carpathia" before daylight?

- No.

18600. You only saw her when day broke?

- Yes.

18601. Can you tell me how long it would take to stop the way of the "Titanic"?

- No, I could not tell you that, but I think we have the information with regard to the "Olympic."

18602. What is it?

- I could not tell you.

18603. Then we will get it from somebody else. Have you considered the use of binoculars at all for your look-out men?

- Yes, I have.

18604. You did use them, and supplied them, on the "Oceanic," I think?

- I believe we did; I cannot speak from any absolute knowledge.

18605. We have heard that they were supplied?

- Yes.

18606. And that they were supplied also on the "Titanic"?

- I believe they had them on the run round from Belfast to Southampton; but I am simply repeating what I have seen in the papers, in the evidence.

18607. Had your company come to the conclusion that binoculars were of assistance to the look-out men?

- I believe up to the year 1895 we used to supply look-out glasses to the look-out men, and since that date I think it has been left to the discretion of the commander whether he gives them look-out glasses or not.

18608. But if he elects to do it then you supply them?

- We certainly would if they are asked for.

18609. Have you considered the use of searchlights?

- I have not.

18610. That has never been considered by you?

- It has never been considered by us at all.

18611. Do you give any special instructions to your captains with respect to what they should do when approaching ice?

- No, we give them a general instruction that the safety of the lives of the passengers and the ship is to be their first consideration.

18612. Yes, those are your general instructions?

- General instructions which are contained in our book of Regulations.

18613. But there are no special instructions, if I understand you correctly, with reference to the approach of ice?

- No, not that I know of, not that I can think of.

18614. Have you also considered in your company the question of the track that the vessels should follow?

- Yes, we follow the track which has been agreed to by all the various steamship companies, which, I think, was agreed to in 1895 - I really do not remember the year.

18615. Those are the tracks indicated on the chart?

- Yes.

18616. And you always follow those?

- We do.

18617. Do you get any special reports from your captains if they meet with ice on those tracks?

- Yes, they would report it.

18618. There is a letter which it is simpler I should read upon this. There is a letter from your firm, Ismay, Imrie and Co., of April 26th of this year, to the assistant Secretary of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade: "Sir, - We beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 25th instant advising us of the question to be asked by Mr. Rowlands in the House of Commons on the 29th idem regarding Track Rules in the North Atlantic, and have to say that definite routes, according to the season of the year, have been agreed upon by the principal companies concerned, both British and otherwise, and that in abnormal times a variation of these routes

is arranged by mutual assent. The details are circulated by Lloyd's for general information, and we think you are aware that the idea is not only to avoid ice as far as practicable, but also to obviate risk of disaster by keeping outward and homeward steamers on separate tracks. At the end of each voyage Commanders furnish us with a Track Chart, which is checked by our Marine superintendent, and any deviation from the Rule has to be explained, but when such deviation has been in the interests of safety, their action is always approved, and the only cases we can bring to mind where they have been censured is when other reasons, such as shortening the distance have obtained." I suppose that correctly states your view?

- Quite true.

18619. I notice in that letter you say "in abnormal times a variation of these routes is arranged by mutual assent"?

- I think on two occasions, when ice has been reported on the southern track we have adopted a more southern route, gone further south. I think it has been done on two occasions.

18620. So that I mean when ice is reported apparently what you do is to go further south, to get away from it?

- Yes, if a great deal of ice is reported on the track then we should go further south. That would be done by mutual consent of all the steamship companies interested in the tracks.

18621. That would mean this that when you have a report of ice upon the tracks which you usually follow you give directions then to your captains to go further south?

- No; I mean if there was a small quantity of ice reported on the track we certainly would not do it; if there was an abnormal quantity of ice reported on the track then we probably would, in conjunction with the other steamship companies, agree to follow a more southern route.

18622. Do you mean that is only done if the other companies assent?

- If any one steamship company suggested going a more southern route it would be very difficult indeed for any of the other steamship companies to decline to fall in with that suggestion. But that would only be done in the event of an abnormal quantity of ice being reported.

18623. The more southern route being taken then to avoid the ice that is reported?

- That is right.

18624. (*The Attorney-General.*) Your Lordship will remember there was one question (it is a small point.) which we said we would put to Mr. Ismay when he came, about the marconigram. It is at page 384. I said I would put it to him. I think it is pretty clear what is meant. If your Lordship will look at page 384, Question 17165, there was a Marconigram produced which contained these words: "Mr. Ismay's orders olympic not to be seen by 'Carpathia'"?

- Captain Rostron came into my room on board the "Carpathia" and told me he had received a Marconigram from Captain Haddock that the "Olympic" was coming to us as quickly as possible. He suggested that it was very undesirable that our passengers on board the "Carpathia," who were just settling down, should see the "Olympic," as it would only probably harrow their feelings; the "Olympic" coming to us could do no good whatever, and I therefore entirely agreed with his suggestion that it was undesirable the ship should come to us.

The Attorney-General:

I believe the whole of the marconigram is at Question [17158](#). I attribute no importance to it. The explanation seemed fairly obvious, but we said we would ask Mr. Ismay so that he could explain.

18625. (*The Commissioner.*) Are any sailing orders given to your captains before they leave England?

- No special orders.

18626. No sailing orders are given to them before they sail on a voyage?

- No. We always receive a letter from the Commander of the ship from his last port, to say that everything is satisfactory on board the ship.

18627. (*The Attorney-General.*) There are letters which are sent, as I understand, by the firm to their captains giving them general directions. I have not referred to them?

- That is when they are put in command.

18628. I mean, there is nothing in any of these letters, so far as I have seen, which have been supplied by you, relating specifically to ice?

- No, certainly not; those are general instructions.

18629. They are general instructions that they must regard the safety of passengers?

- It is a general letter given to all our commanders when they are first appointed to the command of a ship.

18630. As far as I know, those are the only instructions which are given, at any rate in writing?

- Those are all.

The Attorney-General:

I did not trouble your Lordship with them, because I did not think they assisted as they do not relate to ice.

Examined by Mr. SCANLAN.

18631. Is it the case that since the disaster to the "Titanic" a more southern route, both Westward and Eastward, has been agreed to by the companies?

- Yes, it is.

18632. And at the present time are your ships and other liners in the Atlantic taking a more southern route than the one which was taken at the time the accident happened to the "Titanic"?

- They are.

18633. I think the difference in mileage which this alteration makes is about 150 miles?

- I could not tell you that.

The Commissioner:

What do you mean by that; does it lengthen the voyage by 150 miles?

Mr. Scanlan:

Yes, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

How much further south is it?

Mr. Scanlan:

I was going to ask that question, My Lord.

The Witness:

I could not tell you that.

The Commissioner:

I am told they would get to a point about 180 miles South; that is to say, the turning point is about 180 miles further south than the turning point in the old route.

18634. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) I suppose working on this track, you would be out of the region of the disaster to the "Titanic"?

- Yes; but I think I am correct in saying that ice has been reported on this track.

18635. Since?

- I believe so.

18636. But of your own knowledge you do not know?

- No.

18637. (*The Commissioner.*) How much further south would you have to go to sight the azores?

- I am afraid I could not answer that, My Lord.

18638. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Did your Company or did you yourself move in having this route altered?
- I do not know what was done; I was in America at the time the alteration was made.

18639. (*The Commissioner.*) But have not you asked?
- No, I have not.

The Commissioner:
Is there anyone who can tell us, Sir Robert?

The Witness:
Yes, Mr. Sanderson will be able to tell you.

Sir Robert Finlay:
Mr. Sanderson will tell us.

The Commissioner:
What does he say? Who was it suggested the alteration?

Mr. Sanderson:
The matter was under discussion amongst the British lines, and about that time a telegram came from the Germans and asked if we would join with them in adopting a more southern track, and we then got together and agreed on a Southern track, which has subsequently been altered again.

The Commissioner:
That is while Mr. Ismay was in America?

The Witness:
I was in America at the time.

Mr. Scanlan:
I have the route map showing the alteration.

The Commissioner:
I have it; I have the altered route.

18640. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) During the voyage had you any conversation with the Captain as to speed?
- I had no conversation with the Captain with regard to speed or any point of navigation whatever.

18641. Or as to the time of landing?
- Or as to the time of landing.

18642. And you gave him no instructions?
- Absolutely none.

18643. On either of those points?
- No.

18644. When you had the conversation with reference to speeding up, who was present?
- Mr. Bell only and my secretary.

18645. Mr. Bell, your secretary, and yourself?
- Yes.

18646. What is the name of your secretary?
- Mr. Harrison.

18647. Is he a survivor?

- He is not.

18648. I think it was decided then that some day in the course of the voyage you would run the ship up to her full speed?

- It was.

18649. And you expected then to take 28 knots out of her?

- I beg your pardon!

18650. You expected then that she would do 78 revolutions?

- Yes.

18651. Who suggested that it was possible for you to arrive in New York on Tuesday?

- Nobody.

18652. I thought you said in answer to the Attorney-General, that Mr. Bell said that you could arrive on Tuesday night?

- That we could not arrive - we could not arrive in New York on Tuesday.

18653. Did you fix with him the time it was suitable to arrive?

- I told him I thought we should arrive at the ambrose lightship about 5 o'clock on Wednesday morning.

18654. Had you made any calculations to enable you to come to this conclusion?

- I had not.

18655. Now, Mr. Ismay, I want to ask you this question: What right had you, as an ordinary passenger, to decide the speed the ship was to go at, without consultation with the Captain?

The Commissioner:

Well, I can answer that - none; you are asking him something which is quite obvious; he has no right to dictate what the speed is to be.

Mr. Scanlan:

But he may as a super captain.

The Commissioner:

What sort of a person is a "super captain"?

Mr. Scanlan:

I will tell you as I conceive it, My Lord. It is a man like Mr. Ismay who can say to the chief engineer of a ship what speed the ship is to be run at.

The Commissioner:

I do not know that he did. You know the Captain is the man who must say all those things.

Mr. Scanlan:

I daresay, My Lord, but I think it is important that this conversation and this decision was not arrived at with regard to the speed of the ship in the presence of the Captain, but was arrived at at a meeting between this gentleman and the Chief Engineer.

The Commissioner:

I suppose the Captain would or ought to know hour by hour what his ship is steaming?

Mr. Scanlan:

I should think, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Never mind, we will not argue about it. The question you put to him is answered by me. You take my answer that he had no right at all to do anything of the kind.

Mr. Scanlan:

I will take it that that would be his answer, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

I do not know whether it would.

18656. (*Mr. Scanlan - To the witness.*) Were the designs for the "Titanic," the plans and designs, submitted to you?

- They were.

18657. The builders' plans?

- They were.

18658. Those plans included the plans for the davits and lifeboats?

- Yes, they would be on the plan.

18659. Did you examine those yourself?

- I could not say whether I did or not.

18660. I want to draw your attention to a statement which appeared in the "Daily Mail" of April 18th. Let me put this to you: Is it correct to state that in the original plans and designs there was provision made for having four lifeboats on each pair of davits for the "Titanic," which would have meant a total of over 40 boats?

- I have no recollection of it whatever.

The Commissioner:

What is that? Is this the "Daily Mail's" statement?

Mr. Scanlan:

It is, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Do tell me again what it is, because I do not understand it.

Mr. Scanlan:

This is a statement of an alleged interview - I can see your Lordship does not believe everything the "Daily Mail" says -

The Commissioner:

There is a great deal that I believe.

Mr. Scanlan:

We all believe a great deal in it, My Lord - of an alleged interview between a representative of this paper and the designer of the "Titanic," the Right Honourable a. M. Carlisle, who was the late general manager of Messrs. Harland and Wolff, who built the "Titanic" and partly designed her. If your Lordship allows me to submit this point to the witness, I think it is of very great consequence. Amongst other things in this newspaper it was stated: "In working out the designs of the 'Olympic' and the 'Titanic' I put my ideas before the davit constructors and got them to design me davits which would allow me to place, if necessary, four lifeboats on each pair of davits, which would have meant a total of over 40 boats."

The Commissioner:

A total of what?

Mr. Scanlan:
Forty lifeboats.

The Commissioner:
I do not know what is the meaning of it. I thought you said four lifeboats.

Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
How are four lifeboats equal to 40?

18661. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) I mean, to place four lifeboats on each pair of davits, which would have meant a total of over 40 boats. (*To the witness.*) Did you personally examine the designs for the lifeboats?

- I did not.

18662. Who of your Company did examine the designs?
- The design would be submitted to us by the shipbuilders.

18663. Will you tell me who, amongst your officials, would be responsible for accepting or rejecting a design of this kind?

- I never saw any such design and I do not know that anybody connected with the White Star Line saw such a design.

18664. If there was a question of accepting or rejecting a design which provided for greater lifeboat accommodation than you had on the "Titanic," I want to ask you whether it is you yourself or some subordinate of yours, or some associate of yours -?

- It would be done jointly between the shipbuilders and the managers of the White Star Line.

18665. Evidently you were not the manager who was responsible for examining this design?

- I saw the design I have no doubt; I saw the design with the rest of the ship.

18666. I suggest to you that a design was submitted which would have provided sufficient lifeboats to take off everybody on board, and was rejected by the White Star Line?

- I tell you I have never seen any such design.

18667. (*The Commissioner.*) Have you ever heard of it before?

- No, I have not.

18668. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Of course, I take it this is what you say, that you have no recollection of seeing the design at all?

- No; I have no recollection of seeing any design which showed the "Titanic" fitted up for 40 boats.

18669. Or the fitting up of boats at all?

- Oh, yes.

18670. You did see it?

- Oh, yes.

Mr. Scanlan:
Very well.

18671. (*The Commissioner.*) But I want to know. (*To the witness.*) Have you ever until today heard that there was a design for the "Titanic" by which she was to be provided with 40 lifeboats?

- No, My Lord.

18672. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) I take it your statement is, you personally have not seen it. Can you give any explanation of this circumstance that, while the boat capacity, according to your calculation and that of the Board of Trade, was to give accommodation to 1,178 passengers and crew, there were only 703 in all saved?

- Can I give any explanation?

18673. Yes; what do you attribute it to?

- I presume that the people were not put into the boats.

18674. Whose fault was that; whom do you blame for that?

- I cannot blame anybody for it.

18675. Why were they not put into the boats?

- That I cannot answer.

18676. I think the information you had from those you consulted on the ship before leaving her was that the ship was not likely to sink?

- I had no conversation with anybody in regard to the ship sinking.

18677. In regard to whether or not the ship was likely to sink?

- No.

18678. You had no such conversation?

- No.

18679. When you were examined in America were you asked with regard to this. It is on page 924. Senator Smith asked you: "Did the Chief Engineer of the 'Titanic' state to you the extent of the damage?" - (A.) He said he thought the damage was serious, but that he hoped the pumps would be able to control the water. (Q.) How long was it after the impact? - (A.) I should think it would be perhaps half-an-hour afterwards - 35 or 40 minutes." I want to know, were you told at any time before you left the ship, by the Chief Engineer or the Captain, or by any of the Officers of the ship that the ship was doomed?

- No, I was not.

18680. We have heard a good deal in the course of this Enquiry of people being unwilling to leave the ship in the lifeboats. Do not you think if those in charge of the ship knew that she was doomed, and was about sinking, that they should have given this information to all the passengers?

The Commissioner:

That is not a question to ask him. That is a question for me.

18681. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) So far as you know, I take it from your evidence that there was no general intimation conveyed to the passengers that the "Titanic" was sinking, and could not be kept afloat?

- Not that I know of.

18682. You have ordered additional lifeboat accommodation for all your ships, I understand?

- Yes.

18683. That is one of the first things you did on reaching America, according to your statement over there?

- We have.

18684. And do you now in all your ships provide sufficient lifeboat accommodation to accommodate every passenger and every member of the crew?

- Yes.

18685. Have you made any alteration in the manning of your ships in order to provide a greater number of men to lower and navigate your lifeboats?

- I have no knowledge in regard to it.

18686. Do you know whether or not this has been done?

- I do not.

18687. Does it not strike you, being a large shipowner and a man of great experience in shipping, that, seeing it took your crew on the "Titanic" over two hours to lower nineteen boats, including the collapsibles, and to give accommodation to 703 people, in order to have adequate provision for taking away say 2,500 people, you would require drastic alteration in the crew?

- Naturally.

18688. (*The Commissioner.*) Will you paraphrase "naturally," and tell me exactly what you mean by it?

- If you wanted to get the same number of boats out in the same length of time you would naturally want a greater number of crew to do it.

18689. If you wanted what?

- If you wanted to get the extra boats out in the two hours you would want more men to do it.

18690. Are you talking about a possible 40 boats?

- Yes, or whatever extra number of boats you put on.

18691. Then your "naturally" comes to no more than this, that it takes more men to work more boats?

- Yes, if you want to put them out in the same length of time.

18692. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Do you mean extra deckhands?

- I do not think it is absolutely necessary to have a deckhand to lower a boat.

18693. To lower or man the boats?

- Yes.

18694. You think that would require a greater number of men experienced in the manning and lowering of boats?

- For the number of boats we had on board the "Titanic"?

18695. No. You state now that you have altered your system. Formerly you provided accommodation for a limited number. In the case of the "Titanic" it was for 1,100. The "Olympic" is a boat of the same size, and you had, I daresay, a similar provision on her, and now you have provision for 3,000, say - 2,500 to 3,000 - on the "Olympic." Do you agree with me in this, that it is necessary to have a larger number of trained men to look after those boats?

The Commissioner:

This question, again, is put in the interests of your union.

Mr. Scanlan:

If I may respectfully say so, it is put in the interests of this Enquiry, and to assist your Lordship.

The Commissioner:

You know you are asking a question that does not assist me; it does not assist me at all. It is quite obvious that if you have more boats, you must have more skilled men to attend to them. You are asking something that is quite obvious.

18696. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) I will ask another question, My Lord, which, I think, will show the justification of my insisting on the point. (*To the witness.*) You have doubled the boat accommodation on the "Olympic," is not that so?

- I do not know whether it has been doubled or not; I know it has been considerably increased.

The Commissioner:

Are you going to ask whether they have doubled the men on that?

Mr. Scanlan:

I am not going to put it just that way, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

That is what it is leading to, and it has nothing to do with this Enquiry.

18697. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) If I may respectfully say so, My Lord, it is not just that that I am going to ask. (*To the witness.*) Can you tell my Lord what alteration, if any, has been made in the crew of the "Olympic" and your other ships to correspond with the increase you have made in boat accommodation?

The Commissioner:

I will not have that question asked. I am not going to inquire into any such matter.

18698. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Very well, My Lord. (*To the witness.*) We have had it from a captain of a ship of the Canadian Pacific Railway fleet, the "Mount Temple," that his company issue instructions in regard to ice-fields that their captains are not to enter an ice-field under any conditions. I am reading from page 194 of the examination of James Henry Moore?

The Commissioner:

"Those instructions we usually get, that we are not to enter field ice, no matter how light it may appear." That is it?

18699. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) Yes, My Lord. (*To the witness.*) I take it you do not issue any similar instructions to your captains?

- We do not.

18700. He is also asked at Question 9264, "When you got warning there was ice ahead, what precautions did you adopt?" And then, at Question [9267](#): "Do you make any change in the look-out?" and the answer is: "If we expect to see ice we always double the look-out." You do not give any similar instructions to your captains about that. May I ask how many men they have on the look-out?

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes; I think the next two questions should be read on that.

Mr. Scanlan:

"On this occasion, in daylight, when you were warned there was ice ahead, did you double the look-out? - (A.) No, because I made sure I could pass that ice. (Q.) At night, even going at 11 knots, do you double the look-out? - (A.) No, unless we expect to see ice."

Sir Robert Finlay:

No; but it is the next question. "If you expect to see ice, do you double the look-out? - (A.) Oh, yes. (Q.) When you double the look-out, just explain to my Lord what you do. (A.) Put an extra hand on the forecastle head, besides the look-out in the crow's-nest. (Q.) In ordinary circumstances, have you two men in the crow's-nest? - (A.) Only one. (Q.) And one on the forecastle head. - (A.) Yes, or on the forward bridge. We have a look-out on the forward bridge. (*The Commissioner.*) Not in ordinary circumstances. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) No. (*To the witness.*) In ordinary circumstances have you any man stationed at the forecastle head? - (A.) No. (Q.) Supposing there was ice ahead of you, would you double the look-out? - Certainly! There was only one man on the look-out."

18701. (*Mr. Scanlan - To the witness.*) You do not issue any similar instructions to your captains?

- We carry two look-outs always.

18702. (*The Commissioner.*) In the crow's-nest?

- Yes.

18703. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) But you do not issue instructions; you carry two look-outs for fair weather and foul weather?

- Yes.

18704. Who are there constantly day and night?

- Yes.

18705. What I am trying to get from you is this: Do you take any extra precautions in circumstances of danger such as the proximity of ice?

- No.

18706. You do not?

- No.

18707. I put it to you that it would be a reasonable precaution and justified by your recent experience, to give such an order?

- That is a matter which is entirely in the hands of the Commander of the ship; he can put extra look-outs if he wishes to, at any time.

18708. But do not you think it is a matter on which you might give instructions to your Captains?

- I think it is unnecessary to give those instructions.

18709. You think the Captains should do it themselves?

- If they think it necessary.

18710. And double the look-out?

- If he thinks it necessary.

18711. Did you know that on the night of the accident the weather conditions made it difficult to keep the look-out and to see ice? Did you know that?

- I did not.

18712. And that the state of the weather was giving considerable anxiety to the Captain, or giving some anxiety to the Captain and to Mr. Lightoller?

- I did not.

The Commissioner:

Does Mr. Lightoller say the weather was giving him any anxiety?

Mr. Scanlan:

He describes the weather conditions as being quite abnormal, My Lord.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, because it was so good.

The Commissioner:

My recollection is that he said you could see perfectly well.

Mr. Scanlan:

He states this, My Lord, if your Lordship will look at page 303, at Question [14197](#): "Can you suggest at all how it can have come about that this iceberg should not have been seen at a greater distance? - (A.) It is very difficult indeed to come to any conclusion. Of course, we know now the extraordinary combination of circumstances that existed at that time which you would not meet again once in 100 years; that they should all have existed just on that particular night shows, of course, that everything was against us." Then your Lordship asks: "When you make a general statement of that kind, I want you to particularise. What were the circumstances? - (A.) I was going to give them, My Lord. In the first place there was no moon. (Q.) That is frequently the case? - (A.) Very - I daresay it had been the last quarter or the first quarter. Then there was no wind, not the slightest breath of air. And most particular of all, in my estimation, is the fact, a most extraordinary circumstance, that there was not any swell. Had there been the slightest degree of swell I have no doubt that berg would have been seen in plenty of time to clear it." Then, again, your Lordship continues: "Wait a minute. No moon, no wind, no swell? - (A.) The moon we knew of, the wind we knew of, but the absence of swell we did not know of. You naturally

conclude that you do not meet with a sea like it was, like a table -top or a floor, a most extraordinary circumstance, and I guarantee that 99 men out of 100 could never call to mind actual proof of there having been such an absolutely smooth sea. (Q.) But the swell got up later on? - (A.) Yes, almost immediately; after I was in the water I had not been on the raft, the upturned boat, More than half-an-hour or so before a slight swell was distinctly noticeable." At other points of his evidence also, My Lord, this point is brought out. Of course, he does state, in spite of that, that it was easy to see; but what I suggest is that this statement from Mr. Lightoller, taken in conjunction with the evidence of the three men who have spoken to a haze, shows that it was very difficult to see that night.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I must point out that Mr. Lightoller is there speaking by the light of what he knew.

The Commissioner:

I know. As I understand, Mr. Lightoller, if you had put fifty men on the look-out in those peculiar abnormal conditions that he talks about, this berg would not have been seen.

The Attorney-General:

That is so, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

That is right, is it not?

Mr. Scanlan:

I do not think it is, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Well, two could not see it - three could not see it, because there was a man on the bridge - and according to him they could not see it because it could not be seen; therefore, it seems to me to follow that if you put 50 men on the look-out they would not have seen it.

Mr. Scanlan:

I wish to recall this to your Lordship's recollection. One man saw it - that is the man in the crow's-nest, Fleet.

The Commissioner:

He saw it when it was too late.

Mr. Scanlan:

He stated to your Lordship that if he had had glasses he could have seen it in sufficient time to have made the difference.

The Commissioner:

I know. At present my opinion about glasses, and I may tell you at once (I may have to change it.) is that they are intended to examine things which the eyesight has already picked up.

Mr. Scanlan:

Yes, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

That is my notion about binoculars.

Mr. Scanlan:

That is exactly the position I am instructed to take up, but in the evidence of Fleet, what he said in America and what he said here practically - he was not the most communicative witness we had.

The Commissioner:

Who was this?

Mr. Scanlan:
Fleet, the man who looked at us all - the suspicious man.

The Commissioner:
Yes, I remember.

Mr. Scanlan:
He said in America that when this object was first sighted by him it was about the size of two tables. What he said to me on that point was that it appeared a very small object.

Sir Robert Finlay:
But he also said that the moment he saw it he reported it as an iceberg.

Mr. Scanlan:
I do not know.

Sir Robert Finlay:
Yes, he did.

Mr. Scanlan:
What I submit is that a man of this kind -

The Commissioner:
What kind?

Mr. Scanlan:
Like fleet, a man in Fleet's position would not report this as an iceberg until he had looked at it for some time, and if he had had glasses when the small object appeared to him he could have decided earlier that it was an iceberg, and given warning.

The Attorney-General:
He says he did report directly he saw the object.

The Commissioner:
These men in the crow's-nest were to ring three bells directly they saw anything ahead.

The Attorney-General:
He says he did.

The Commissioner:
They were not to stop to look at it through glasses or do anything of the kind. What they were to do was to ring a warning bell and report what they saw.

Mr. Scanlan:
In any case if your Lordship is not with me on that point, let me emphasise this; the people on the bridge did not see the iceberg at all. The man in the crow's-nest did. It might be that if the look-out had been doubled, and if there had been a man on the bows that he could have seen it.

The Commissioner:
Well, you were crying in aid Lightoller, and my notion of the effect of Lightoller's evidence is that no number of men on the look-out would have made any difference.

Mr. Scanlan:
He was not asked the question, like that, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
No, he was not.

The Attorney-General:
That is his evidence.

The Commissioner:
That is what his evidence comes to. I will not say what I think of Mr. Lightoller's evidence at present.

Mr. Scanlan:
If there was any difficulty whatever experienced that night in seeing ahead, do not you think it would have been the proper thing to have doubled the look-out.

The Witness:
I am quite certain it would have been done.

18713. Do not you think, as ice was reported in your track, and as you expected to be in the presence of ice, that the look-out should have been doubled?
- I do not.

18714. Is it still your view that your captains and Officers are discharging their duty in crossing the Atlantic, when ice is reported to them, in going ahead at full speed and taking no extra precautions?
- So long as they can see the object far enough ahead to be able to avoid it.

18715. So long as they can see the object far enough ahead?
- To be able to clear it.

18716. To be able to avoid it. Now, if you accept this statement from Lightoller that this was not a good night for seeing ahead, but that these circumstances he mentioned to my Lord, prevented anyone from seeing ahead, do not you think it would have been a wise precaution, at all events, to slacken speed?

Sir Robert Finlay:
I must object to the question being put in that form. Mr. Lightoller did not say it was known at the time it was not a good night; he says they afterwards found out when they got down to the water that it was a dead calm.

The Commissioner:
Well, I see no objection to the question.

Sir Robert Finlay:
But it involves an assumption as to what Mr. Lightoller said. But I leave that in your Lordship's hands.

18717. (*Mr. Scanlan.*) If it was the fact on the night of the collision that it was impossible to see ahead with certainty a sufficient distance to enable you to turn the course of the ship in order to escape this iceberg and the ice which you were warned of as being in your track, do not you think the speed of the ship should have been slackened?
- If it was certain they could not have cleared the object in going at that speed, certainly the speed ought to have been reduced.

18718. There are two or three topics I want to ask you about. You remember the "Baltic" telegram communicating the fact of the ice?
- Yes.

18719. And you remember you told us Captain Smith asked you to give it back to him and that you understood it was for the purpose of being put up in the Chart Room?
- That is right.

18720. I think a doubt arose in my Lord's mind, and in some of our minds why that was to be done, if nothing was to be done, if the speed was not to be slackened. I do not know whether this has occurred to you as an explanation that it was to inform the Officers what they were to keep a look-out for - namely, ice?
- Certainly.

18721. That is a possible explanation. We know, I think, from Mr. Lightoller, that those were the instructions he left when he went off watch - to keep a sharp look-out for ice. That leads me to another matter. I understood you to say that you thought at the time there was no occasion to slacken speed if ice could be seen at a sufficient distance, but I want you to distinguish, if you will, what you thought then and what might be thought now as the result of experience?

- So far as the speed of the ship is concerned, I would not think of interfering with the Captain. It is a matter for him.

18722. Of course, you would not interfere on the spot; but, of course, it is open for your company to give general instructions to your Commanders as to what they are to do under particular circumstances, including the vicinity of ice?

- Yes.

18723. That is the topic I want you to bring your mind to. Of course, it all depends, if you are going full speed, on the look-out?

- Yes.

18724. That is obvious; it all rests on the look-out. A great distinction arises between daylight and night with regard to look-out, does it not?

- I should think it would be easier to see things in the daylight than at night.

18725. Naturally, and particularly with regard to unlit objects, such as ice, your range of visibility at night must be comparatively small?

- I should say that is so.

18726. And it is obvious from Mr. Lightoller's evidence that if the sea be smooth one of the main elements of safety, the power of seeing waves or surge breaking upon ice, is lacking. Now I want you to tell me whether your Company has considered the advisability of giving instructions now, in the light of events which have happened, in regard to the navigation of your ships when ice is in the vicinity.

The Commissioner:

What has that to do with it?

18727. (*Mr. Roche.*) I have made the suggestion. It is obvious it is more for your Lordship than for the witness, but I wish to put the point. Have you considered that, or perhaps you have not had time?

- I have not.

18728. It is a matter which, perhaps, you will take into consideration. Now, one other matter. You know, I suppose, from your knowledge of the general conduct of the business of the Company, that there are boat station lists on every ship?

- Yes.

18729. And I daresay you know that the general scheme is that in a boat such as the "Titanic," which has 16 boats, two engineers are allotted to each boat?

- I could not tell you how the boats' crews are picked out.

18730. We have been told so?

- I could not tell you.

18731. You know, of course, that in this case of some 30 odd engineers not one was saved?

- Yes.

18732. That, of course, renders it obvious that no engineers went in the boats, and that we know. Now, assuming that there is an increase of boat capacity so that all may be saved, passengers and engineers alike, it is clearly proper that the engineers should have a fair chance of getting to their boats, the boats to which they are allocated?

- Yes.

18733. Have any general instructions been given at all by your Company that warning shall be given to those in the engine room enabling them to come up and get their places in the boats?

- Not that I know of.

18734. That also would be a matter which it would be desirable, in the light of events which have happened, to consider?

- Certainly.

Examined by Mr. HARBINSON.

18735. Is it a fact that there is a condition in the passenger contracts of the White Star Line that the Company shall not be liable for the careless or unskillful or negligent navigation of their servants or Officers?

- That I could not answer.

18736. You do not know that?

- No.

18737. If there was such a condition, would you consider that a reasonable condition?

The Attorney-General:

Oh!

The Commissioner:

There must be some limit to this sort of examination. You will be enquiring into bills of lading next.

18738. (*Mr. Harbinson.*) My object in putting the question is that, if there is such a condition, and probably it may be proved before the Enquiry is finished that there is, that might have a bearing upon the sense of the responsibility of the Commanders of the vessels. (*To the witness.*) You ship, I think, a different crew for each voyage; do you sign on a different crew for each voyage that one of your ships make across the Atlantic?

- I suppose it hardly ever happens that the entire crew goes back in the same ship.

18739. They are signed on, as I understand - you will correct me if I am wrong - a few days before the vessel starts?

- As a Rule.

18740. Do not you think it would be a better system if you could have continuous crews who understand the vessel, and, of course, who understand their boat stations, and so on?

- Undoubtedly.

18741. Have you as yet given any consideration to the possibility of modifying the existing system and introducing the system I have suggested?

- I think that is a matter which entirely rests with the men themselves.

18742. Do you think if that modification were made, and as far as possible continuous service crews employed?

- What modification? I do not understand.

18743. That is the modification in favour of continuing the crews from voyage to voyage - longer service?

- But there is nothing to prevent crews, when they are paid off, signing on again. They are paid off and signed on at the same time.

The Commissioner:

Are you suggesting that all the crews should be compelled to remain on?

Mr. Harbinson:

Yes, My Lord, in this way: My suggestion is that if crews were retained on boats -

The Commissioner:

Supposing a man says he will not stay on, what are you going to do with him? He is landed at New York, and he says, "I am going to leave this ship." Do you suggest there should be some law or regulation to force him to come back to the ship?

Mr. Harbinson:

No, My Lord; my suggestion is not that, but my suggestion is that if the men were not paid off they probably would remain on; and a further reason I say is this that they would not be paid off probably if there was work for them to do. Such things as shore gangs I understand are employed, and my suggestion is instead of being paid off these men should be kept while the boat lies in the harbour as a shore gang.

The Commissioner:

But supposing they do not choose to remain, what is to happen then?

Mr. Harbinson:

As I understand, the option is not given them.

The Commissioner:

That may be, but I do not know what it is you want. If the men will not remain, is there to be some law to make them remain?

Mr. Harbinson:

No, I could not go so far, and under the existing law I understand it cannot be done.

The Commissioner:

No, I assure you it cannot be done. But are you suggesting such a law should be passed?

Mr. Harbinson:

No, but an inducement should be held out by the Company for them to remain, and so far as possible to continue in the service on the same boat. That would make for greater safety in the case of emergency, because the crews would understand the ship and also their stations in the boats, and be able to act with more dispatch.

The Commissioner:

Your suggestion is that the Company should take reasonable and practicable steps to secure the same crew for a considerable time to keep the same men employed on the vessel?

Mr. Harbinson:

As far as possible, My Lord; that is so.

The Commissioner:

That, of course, would be a good thing.

The Witness:

Yes, and a certain number of men are retained; a certain number are kept on board every ship during the time she is in port to do the ship's work, and they go on what is called port pay.

18744. That is something less?

- No, they get more, because we do not feed them on board the ship. But I do not think it would be feasible for a steamship company to keep the whole crew in port for three weeks and keep all those men on pay, because naturally the men want to go back to sea again; they would not wait to go back in the ship for three weeks.

Mr. Harbinson:

On the question of feasibility, I read a letter written by a very distinguished Admiral quite recently, and he said it was quite feasible that these shore gangs could be recruited from the men who were actually employed on the ships when those men would come ashore. Is that possible?

- And not have any regular shore gang?

18745. And not have any regular shore gang, but recruit them from the men who travel backwards and forwards, when these men, for a time, want to remain on shore?

- I am afraid it would be very difficult.

18746. Have you considered the suggestion?

- No, I have not.

18747. If I gave you the date of the letter in the "Times" from this Admiral of the fleet would you give it your consideration?

- Certainly.

18748. I gather from you, in answer to the Attorney-General, that you yourself gave the instructions for the building of the "Titanic" and the "Olympic"?

- Yes.

18749. I think to Harland and Wolff?

- Yes.

18750. These ships constituted a departure as regards magnitude?

- They did.

18751. Did your company carefully consider this new departure?

- Certainly.

18752. And, of course, in considering them you considered the question of the flotability of these ships in cases of accident or emergency?

- We did.

18753. And also, of course, the accommodation that they would provide for an additional number of passengers?

- Yes.

18754. Did you give any special consideration to the question of providing additional lifeboat accommodation to cope with the additional number of passengers that you proposed to carry?

- I do not think any special attention was given to that.

18755. Would not that have been a consideration that should have specially engaged you?

- I think the position was taken up that the ship was looked upon as practically unsinkable; she was looked upon as being a lifeboat in herself.

18756. That is owing to the transverse bulkheads?

- No; to the bulkheads and the power of flotation she had in case of accident.

18757. I understand that you considered that either of these steamers would float with two adjacent watertight compartments full?

- Two of the largest compartments full.

18758. If that were so, and you considered those boats practically as lifeboats themselves and unsinkable, on that theory it was not necessary to carry any lifeboats at all?

- Yes, because we might have to use them to pick up a crew from another ship.

18759. It was practically for that purpose you carried lifeboats?

- Or landing, in the case of the ship going ashore.

18760. You did not consider having them for the purpose of saving the crew and passengers carried?

- No, I do not think so.

18761. (*The Commissioner.*) Supposing there was a fire on board, Might not you want lifeboats then?
- Yes, if the passengers had to leave the ship on account of fire you would need lifeboats.

18762. I think your suggestion that lifeboats were only required for the purpose of saving the crews of other vessels is -?
- Or, I said, of landing passengers in the case of the ship going ashore.

The Commissioner:
I do not think that is right.

18763. (*Mr. Harbinson - To the witness.*) Do you know if the builders; Messrs. Harland and Wolff - had you discussed the question with them?
- No.

18764. Do you know whether or not, they accepted the view which you have now expressed?
- No.

18765. Did you at that time consider the question when you were considering the construction of these boats, of launching lifeboats from a height, roughly speaking, of about 70 feet above the water?
- No.

18766. You did not consider that question in conjunction with the builders?
- No.

18767. Or the difficulties that might attend it?
- No.

18768. You know now, of course, that it has come out in the course of this Enquiry that, except under the conditions which prevailed at the time of the "Titanic" accident, it would have been a very difficult operation to launch those boats?
- In the case of a sea way?

18769. Yes?
- It would have been difficult if we had only to lower them thirty feet.

18770. Yes, in heavy weather. Have you given any consideration to this question of launching the boats generally from a height further down?
- We have not yet; we have hundreds of suggestions as to how we can lower boats.

18771. Instead of lowering them from davits seventy feet high?
- Yes, we have had hundreds of suggestions how it could be done.

18772. Whether it would be feasible to launch them in a heavy sea from another part of the boat?
- Yes; that we have not gone into. We have these plans.

18773. The collapsible boat that you left the ship in was launched from the davits on the starboard side that No. 1 boat was launched from.
- Was it No. 1?

18774. Yes, I think it was?
- I think it was No. 2.

The Attorney-General:
No. 1, on the starboard side.

18775. (*Mr. Harbinson - To the witness.*) Did you see No. 1 boat launched?
- I did not.

18776. Were you on the boat deck?

- Yes, practically the whole time. I did not see No. 1 go.

18777. At the time prior to your boat being launched, did you know whether or not messages had been sent round the ship to rouse all the passengers?

- I did not know it.

18778. And you did not know whether all the passengers had got off at the time you left the ship?

- No.

18779. You had a crew of five, I think, in the boat you left by?

- I thought there were four.

18780. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that the No. 1 boat had a crew of seven?

- I know nothing about No. 1 boat; I never saw it at any time.

The Attorney-General:

There were five in the collapsible.

18781. (*Mr. Harbinson.*) Thank you, Mr. Attorney. (*To the witness.*) And seven in No. 1?

- I do not know how many.

18782. You may take it from me that it has been given in evidence that there were?

- Yes, but I know nothing about it.

18783. It does not strike you as a curious coincidence that those two boats should have respectively crews of five and seven when some of the other boats had not so many?

- No.

18784. You told my Lord about this telegram that Captain Smith showed to you on the afternoon of Sunday, the 14th?

- Yes.

18785. As a matter of fact you had discussed this question of speed with Mr. Bell in Queenstown. Now, would I be stating what was accurate if I said you were more or less partly responsible for the speed the "Titanic" was making going across the Atlantic?

- I was not responsible for the speed of the ship in any degree.

The Commissioner:

That is not a question to put to him.

18786. (*Mr. Harbinson.*) I will put it to him in this way, if I may. (*To the witness.*) Did you say in America on the first day of the proceedings: "It was our intention, if we had fine weather on Monday afternoon or Tuesday, to drive the ship at full speed"? You say there, "It was our intention." You mean, I presume, it was the intention of yourself and the Captain?

- It was the intention to run the ship for about four hours at full speed.

18787. You say, "It was our intention." It was the intention?

- Yes.

18788. I suggest to you, you were one of those who were responsible for controlling the speed and generally directing it?

- No, I was not.

The Commissioner:

Oh, no; he was not responsible, and he had no business to interfere in such matters.

Mr. Harbinson:

Perhaps I would be more accurate if I put it in this way.

The Commissioner:

What I think you want to suggest is that he took upon himself to ask that it should be done. Apparently he did.

18789. (*Mr. Harbinson.*) It was his influence that was responsible for it, perhaps not actively for carrying it out, but he instigated it. (*To the witness.*) You used the word "our" there, you notice?

- It was the intention.

18790. And you say this further on page 3 in answer to a question. The question was put: "You spoke of the revolutions on the early part of the voyage?" - (A.) Yes, Sir. (Q.) Those were increased as the distance was increased? - (A.) The "Titanic," being a new ship, we were gradually working her up." You see you use the same personal pronoun "we," incorporating yourself?

- I could not say I was gradually working her up.

18791. You could have said "the Captain"?

- I daresay I could.

18792. You said "we"?

- Perhaps I should have said: "She was being gradually worked up."

The Commissioner:

I have often been on these steamers, or similar steamers, and I have said to another passenger, "We are doing so many miles a day"; but I never imagined that I was interfering in the navigation or was responsible for it.

18793. (*Mr. Harbinson.*) No, My Lord, I should think your Lordship is much too good a maritime lawyer to ever dream of doing so. (*To the witness.*) There is one suggestion I should very much like to make to you, Mr. Ismay, and it is this: It did strike you as rather an exceptional thing the Captain showing you this Marconigram with regard to the ice, the message that he had received from the "Baltic"?

- No, it was not an exceptional thing.

18794. I suggest to you that the Captain in doing so, in showing this Marconigram to you, the managing Director, was inviting an expression of opinion from you on the question of the speed that the vessel should take?

The Commissioner:

Really, you must not ask such a question. Ask questions about facts, and then when you come, if you ever do come (I do not know we shall ever reach it.) to the time when you make a speech, then you can make these suggestions to me, but at present confine yourself to asking the witness about facts. Have you any other question?

Mr. Harbinson:

No, My Lord, I think not.

Examined by Mr. CLEMENT EDWARDS.

18795. Were there any financial relations at all except those for building the ship, between the International Mercantile marine and Harland and Wolff, the builders?

- Absolutely none.

The Commissioner:

I do not know whether you have exhausted that question?

Mr. Edwards:

My Lord, I have not.

The Commissioner:
Very well, I will wait.

18796. (*Mr. Edwards - To the witness.*) Had the International Company, or have the International Company, any shares in Harland and Wolff?
- None.

18797. Have Harland and Wolff any shares in the International?
- That is a matter which I know nothing whatever about.

The Commissioner:
That is not what you want to ask.

18798. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) I am only laying the foundation, My Lord, for a certain other question. (*To the witness.*) None of your boats are classed with either of the registration societies, are they?
- They are not.

18799. Had they been classed with Lloyd's or the other registration societies, there would have been an independent survey by the surveyors of those societies?
- I believe that is so.

18800. Before the "Titanic" sailed, was there any independent survey of her at all?
- That I do not think I can quite answer, but I think she would have been surveyed by the Board of Trade.

18801. Except by the Board of Trade, do you know of any other survey?
- No, not that I know of.

The Commissioner:
Are any of the other big liners such as the Cunarders surveyed by any body except the Board of Trade?

Mr. Edwards:
My instructions, My Lord, are that they are so surveyed.

The Commissioner:
By whom?

Mr. Edwards:
And that they are surveyed by the particular registration society by whom they are classified.

The Commissioner:
Are the Cunarders classified?

Mr. Edwards:
My instructions are that they are.

The Commissioner:
Then are the steamers of the White Star Line the only steamers that are not classified?

Mr. Edwards:
Of great lines I believe that is so, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
Is that so, Sir Robert?

Sir Robert Finlay:
I cannot at the moment tell your Lordship.

The Commissioner:
(*To the witness.*) Is it so?
- I could not answer that.

The Commissioner:
I understood - I may be wrong - that none of the steamers of the very big lines were registered at Lloyd's.

Mr. Edwards:
My instructions are that, with the exception of the boats now controlled by this International Company, all the great lines are classified with either one or other of the three great registration societies.

The Commissioner:
I am told it is not so, but I do not know.

Sir Robert Finlay:
I understand that Lloyd's have no Rules applicable to vessels of this size, such as the "Titanic."

The Commissioner:
I am told that is so.

18802. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) I am coming to the question of Lloyd's Rules in a moment. (*To the witness.*)
When you were considering the plans of the "Titanic" with your fellow directors, had you any discussion at all as to whether you should be classified?
- No.

18803. Have you any knowledge as to the standard laid down by Lloyd's for the resisting strength of a bulkhead?
- Have I any knowledge?

18804. Yes?
- No.

18805. Have you any knowledge at all as to the standard laid down by Lloyd's or either of the other registration societies, as to the method by which watertight doors should be worked?
- I have not.

18806. Have you any knowledge as to the standard of either of the registration societies of the relative height of the bulkhead in relation to the several decks?
- I have not.

The Commissioner:
Have you any information on this point, Mr. Edwards?

Mr. Edwards:
Yes, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
I wish you would put it to him, and suggest what the provisions in the "Titanic" were as compared with the requirements of Lloyd's.

Mr. Edwards:
If this Witness has no knowledge as to the relative -

The Commissioner:
But I want your knowledge.

Mr. Edwards:
At the right time, My Lord, if evidence has not been forthcoming I shall be in a position to submit -

The Commissioner:
No, but cannot you tell me now?

Mr. Edwards:
What counsel says, My Lord, is not evidence.

The Commissioner:
Never mind that. I want to know: Can you tell me what the actual strength of the bulkheads in this vessel was, and what the requirements of Lloyd's are? Do you know?

Mr. Edwards:
I shall be able through the necessary expert witnesses to do that.

The Commissioner:
No; but can you do that?

Mr. Edwards:
I should not attempt to do it, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
Does that mean you cannot. I am asking if you can do it?

Mr. Edwards:
With great respect, your Lordship -

The Commissioner:
You decline?

Mr. Edwards:
I propose conducting the cross-examination of this Witness in accordance with the Rules, and not putting forth the particular evidence upon which my instructions are based.

The Commissioner:
You call it a cross-examination, and I rather agree with you that it is. I do not think it ought to be. I think it ought to be an examination conducted for the sole purpose of informing the Court, and when you ask him whether he knows the difference between the "Titanic" and the requirements of Lloyd's I want you to assist me by telling me, if you can, what the difference is?

Mr. Edwards:
At the right time, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
But this is the time I want it. I suspect you do not know.

Mr. Edwards:
I shall not attempt to cross-examine you as to the foundation for that suspicion.

The Commissioner:
There is plenty of foundation for it.

18806a. (*Mr. Edwards - To the witness.*) You neither considered with your Board the relative standards of the different registration societies, nor are you in a position to say what those relative standards are?
- I have already said so.

18807. (*The Commissioner.*) Will you let me ask him a question. (*To the witness.*) Can you tell me whether you insure these vessels?
- Yes, we do.

18808. Is there any other line of steamers that get their property insured at a less premium than yours?
- No.

The Commissioner:
Perhaps you do not appreciate what I am asking.

18809. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) Yes, My Lord, and I will follow it up with this further question. (*To the witness.*) Is there any other line of steamers that offers to bear so large a proportion of the initial loss as your line of steamers?
- I could not answer that.

18810. Am I right in saying that on the "Titanic" the initial loss which your Company bears is something like a quarter of a million?
- I do not think it is quite so large; I think it is £200,000.

The Commissioner:
If so, it shows the confidence that they have in their boats.

18811. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) Yes, My Lord; and it also shows that they appreciate the kind of element that would appeal to the insurers to enable them to get excellent terms of insurance. (*To the witness.*) Can you tell me any other company that even approximates to your Company in the high proportion of initial loss the Company are prepared to bear before coming on the insurers?
- I have no idea what the other steamship companies do in regard to their insurance.

18812. When the plans were considered by you and your co-directors, do you remember any discussion taking place as to the number of lifeboats that you should carry?
- No, I do not.

18813. Do you know whether there was any discussion at all as to the extent to which safety might have been interfered with or militated against by the extra large decks on the top?
- No, I certainly do not.

18814. Have you and your co-directors at any time considered the relation between the luxurious equipment of a ship of this kind and the safety of the crew and the passengers?
- I do not understand your question.

18815. If there had been less of those high decks, take a deck - there would have been greater safety, probably, would there not?
- I should not think so.

18816. May I put this to you? If the bulkheads in the "Titanic" had gone much higher than they did, there would have been greater safety?
- I presume there would.

18817. And if the bulkheads had been taken higher they would have interfered somewhat with the luxury of the super decks?
- You mean to say, if they had been taken right away to the top? How high are you going to take them?

18818. I will put it this way; we will take it in stages. As I understand, the bulkheads go to Deck E?
- They are shown on the plan.

18819. (*The Commissioner.*) Are you a ship constructor?
- No, I am not.

The Commissioner:
I think you had better wait until the evidence of the expert comes. You are suggesting to him, as I understand, that the bulkheads ought to have been carried higher?

Mr. Edwards:
Yes, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
I can perfectly understand that.

Mr. Edwards:
If I may say so, My Lord, with respect, as I understand the position from this Witness, it is this - that the plans of the "Titanic" are submitted to him and his co-directors, and they, in the last resort, decide what is to be the character of the ship.

The Witness:
In conjunction with the shipbuilders.

Mr. Edwards:
And my question is as to whether the directors, when deciding upon those plans, did direct their attention at all to the question of the effect that those plans, if adopted, was likely to have upon the safety of the people who were to be carried in the ships.

The Attorney-General:
I mean to call a Witness who can answer that.

The Commissioner:
All I am suggesting is this. This gentleman is not the constructor of the ship, nor is he a naval architect, as far as I understand; and I think it would be better if you waited until Witnesses of that character are called before asking these questions.

Mr. Edwards:
With respect, My Lord, I agree.

The Commissioner:
You are right to put the questions, but I suggest to you that you will probably find some witnesses far better qualified to answer them.

The Attorney-General:
I prefaced the questions I put to Mr. Ismay by saying that I was not going to ask him questions on construction, because Mr. Sanderson is going to be called, and Mr. Wilding will be called, and they are the gentlemen who will answer any questions, with regard to the suggestions of my friend. I understood that Mr. Ismay, although he knows something about the plans, was not the gentleman who could probably deal with construction.

18820. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) I am obliged to the Attorney-General. (*To the witness.*) I understand you to say that there are no printed instructions issued to your captains?

- In regard to what?

18821. In regard to the sailing directions?

- No; they have a book of general instructions. Every captain and Officer has a book of these general instructions.

18822. (*The Commissioner.*) That is the red book, is it not?

- Yes.

The Commissioner:
Have you had a copy of it, Mr. Edwards?

Mr. Edwards:
I have not, My Lord.

The Commissioner:
I think you ought to have one.

18823. (*Mr. Edwards - To the witness.*) Is that the book to which you refer?
- Yes.

Mr. Edwards:
I do not think it has been formally put in.

The Commissioner:
I think it was not; it was handed up to me by Sir Robert Finlay.

Sir Robert Finlay:
I think it was on the second day of the Enquiry.

The Commissioner:
This is Ship's Rules and Uniform Regulations.

Mr. Edwards:
Perhaps Mr. Ismay will formally produce it to the Court.

18824. (*The Commissioner - To the witness.*) This is the book that you call the Rules issued to Officers?
- That is right.

18825. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) Just one other question. You stated your view was - and I presume it was the view of your Company - that the "Titanic" was unsinkable?
- We thought she was.

18826. I am only going to ask you one question upon that, and that is this: What was the ground upon which you based that belief?
- Because we thought she would float with two of the largest compartments full of water, and that the only way that those compartments were at all likely to be damaged was in case of collision - another ship running into her and hitting her on the bulkhead.

18827. I only want to get it for the purpose of future witnesses; you based the belief of her unsinkability upon what was said to you by building experts?
- Absolutely.

18828. Now I will come to the question of the "Baltic" telegram. Did you before that particular Sunday know what was the practice with regard to Marconigrams received by the Officers on the ship relating to the navigation of the ship? Did you know what it was the practice to do with those marconigrams as soon as they had been received?
- I believe the practice was to put them up in the chart room for the Officers.

18829. Did you know that on Sunday, April the 14th?
- Yes.

18830. Was not the marconigram from the "Baltic" essentially a message affecting navigation?
- Yes.

18831. Then will you say why, under those circumstances, with that knowledge, you put that Marconigram into your pocket?
- Because it was given to me, as I believe now, just before lunchtime, and I went down and had it in my pocket.

18832. And you suggest that you put it in your pocket simply in a fit of absent-mindedness?
- Yes, entirely.

18833. And had it occurred to you when you were talking to Mrs. Ryerson that you had absentmindedly put this message into your pocket?

- It had not.

18834. It had not occurred to you?

- No.

18835. And you still retained it in your pocket until it was asked for by Captain Smith late in the evening?

- Ten minutes past seven, I think it was, he asked me for it.

18836. That is to say, it had been in your possession for something like five hours?

- Yes, I should think so.

18837. And you seriously say it was put into your pocket in a fit of absentmindedness and retained for five hours?

- Yes.

18838. Although you were discussing it with two of the lady passengers?

- I was not discussing it with them.

18839. You mentioned it?

- I mentioned it.

18840. And took it out and read it?

- Yes.

18841. If you had not taken the view that the "Titanic" was unsinkable, would you have insisted in the plans for provision being made for a larger number of lifeboats?

- No, I think not. She conformed to the Board of Trade requirements; in fact she was largely in excess of the Board of Trade requirements.

18842. I think you are sufficiently familiar with the Board of Trade regulations to know that the number of boats is treated in relation to the number of bulkheads, and bulkheads are treated in the regulations in relation to safety or unsinkability?

- Yes.

18843. If you had not taken the view that the "Titanic" was unsinkable, would you or would you not have insisted upon provision being made for a larger number of boats?

- I do not think so.

18844. So that the number of boats, in your view, had nothing at all to do with the relative sinkability of the "Titanic"?

- The "Titanic" had more boats than were necessary by the Board of Trade regulations.

18845. Will you answer the question?

- What is the question?

18846. The question was this, that according to your view the number of boats had nothing to do with the relative sinkability of the "Titanic"?

- No; I do not think so.

18847. So that if you had taken the view that the "Titanic" was not unsinkable you would not have had more boats provided?

- No, I do not think so.

18848. You were one of those, as the managing Director, responsible for determining the number of boats?

- Yes, in conjunction with the shipbuilders.

18849. When you got into the boat you thought that the "Titanic" was sinking?

- I did.

18850. Did you know that there were some hundreds of people on that ship?

- Yes.

18851. Who must go down with her?

- Yes, I did.

18852. Has it occurred to you that, except perhaps apart from the Captain, you, as the responsible managing Director, deciding the number of boats, owed your life to every other person on that ship?

- It has not.

The Commissioner:

I do not think that is a question to put to him; that is an observation which you may make when you come to make your speech. It is not a question for him.

Mr. Edwards:

I thought the witness ought to have an opportunity of answering before I attempted to make the observation.

The Commissioner:

You will make that observation, if you think it worthwhile, when the time comes.

18853. (*Mr. Edwards - To the witness.*) According to your statement you got into this boat last of all?

- I did.

18854. So that if a Witness says that you, in fact, got into the boat earlier and helped the women and children in, that would not be true?

- It would not.

18855. I suppose you know that it has been given in evidence here by Brown?

- Yes.

The Commissioner:

What evidence?

18856. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) The evidence of Brown was that Mr. Ismay got into this particular boat some time earlier. On page 219, at Question [10520](#), the question was: "Was Mr. Bruce Ismay taking any part in connection with that boat? - (A.) Yes, he was calling out for the women and children first. He helped to get them into that boat, and he went into it himself to receive the women and children." That is not true?

- No, it is not.

18857. Now, it has been given in evidence here that you took an actual part in giving directions for the women and children to be placed in the boats. Is that true?

- I did, and I helped as far as I could.

18858. If you had taken this active part in the direction up to a certain point, why did you not continue and send to other decks to see if there were passengers available for this last boat?

- I was standing by the boat; I helped everybody into the boat that was there, and, as the boat was being lowered away, I got in.

18859. That does not answer the question. You had been taking a responsible part, according to the evidence and according to your own admission, in directing the filling of the boats?

- No, I had not; I had been helping to put the women and children into the boats as they came forward.

18860. I am afraid we are a little at cross purposes. Is it not the fact that you were calling out "Women and children first," and helping them in?

- Yes, it is.

18861. Is it not the fact that you were giving directions as to women and children getting in?

- I was helping the women and children in.

18862. Please answer my question. Is it not the fact that you were giving directions in helping them?

- I was calling for the women and children to come in.

18863. What I am putting to you is this, that if you could take an active part at that stage, why did you not continue the active part and give instruction, or go yourself to other decks, or round the other side of that deck, to see if there were other people who might find a place in your boat?

- I presumed that there were people down below who were sending the people up.

18864. But you knew there were hundreds who had not come up. That is your answer, that you presumed that there were people down below sending them up?

- Yes.

18865. And does it follow from that that you presumed that everybody was coming up who wanted to come up?

- I knew that everybody could not be up.

18866. Then I do not quite see the point of the answer?

- Everybody that was on the deck got into that boat.

The Commissioner:

Your point, Mr. Edwards, as I understand is this: That, having regard to his position, it was his duty to remain upon that ship until she went to the bottom. That is your point?

Mr. Edwards:

Yes, and inasmuch -

The Commissioner:

That is your point?

18867. (*Mr. Clement Edwards.*) Frankly, that is so; I do not flinch from it a little bit. But I want to get it from this Witness, inasmuch as he took upon himself to give certain directions at a certain time, why he did not discharge the responsibility even after that, having regard to other persons or passengers?

- There were no more passengers to get into that boat. The boat was actually being lowered away.

18868. That is your answer?

- Yes.

Examined by Mr. HOLMES.

18869. You have told us at the conversation between you and the Chief Engineer the Captain was not present?

- He was not.

18870. And that you had no conversation with him during the voyage about speed?

- Absolutely none.

18871. Then will you tell us how it was he was to become aware of your decision to increase the speed on the Tuesday?

- I think the Engineer would probably have spoken to him.

18872. Did you make any arrangement with the Engineer about that?

- I did not.

18873. Then as far as you know the Captain was not aware that you were going to make this increase in speed?
- No.

18874. Do you know under whose instructions those extra boilers were put on on a Sunday morning?
- I do not.

18875. Is that a thing the Chief Engineer would be likely to do on his own account?
- I should say so.

18876. Unless he had had instructions from the Captain that the speed was to be increased?
- I think he would if he was going to work up to 78 revolutions.

18877. At all events, you had no conversation with the Captain about it?
- Absolutely none.

18878. We have been told that amongst the Junior Officers of this ship the two-watch system was in force?
- It was.

18879. That is to say, they never have longer than four hours off before they have to go on watch again?
- That is right.

18880. Do you consider that that is conducive to their being able satisfactorily to perform their duties on that ship?
- I think a Junior Officer can quite well. He has no watch to keep.

18881. Four hours from the time he leaves his watch till he goes back again?
- Yes.

18882. Have you had any complaints from your Officers about that?
- An Officer spoke to me coming home on the "Adriatic" about it.

18883. Have your directors generally had any petition or memorial from your Officers in this or other ships?
- A requisition came from the Officers of the American Line, who, in the olden times, kept four hours on and eight hours off. We changed that to two on and four off.

18884. You still consider that four hours is quite sufficient for them to come off watch and have their sleep and go on watch again?
- For a Junior Officer, yes.

18885. When you saw these boats 3, 5 and 7 being lowered, did you hear any orders given to the individual boats by any Officer or the Captain?
- No, I did not.

18886. No orders at all?
- No.

18887. Nothing as to coming back?
- No, I did not.

18888. You are still of opinion that it is perfectly good seamanship for your captains to go full speed ahead provided they can see far ahead enough to clear the ice?
- Yes.

18889. Can you suggest any reliable method by which they can say whether the weather is such as to enable them to see the ice in time?
- No.

Examined by Mr. LEWIS.

18890. How many first trips have you taken part in?

- Three, I think.

18891. Is it a fact that attempts have been made to make a record on trial trips?

- Never.

18892. Do you think your presence on board would encourage the Officers to make special efforts?

- I do not think it had the slightest effect.

18893. Can you tell me with regard to the boats, do you think more men could have been utilised to have got the lifeboats down quicker? I understand they went from boat to boat to lower them. Do you think more men could have been used?

- No.

18894. Did you see anything of the firemen; were they mustered up at all?

- No, I did not see them.

18895. When you were on the "Carpathia" can you tell me whether you were consulted by the Captain or by the marconi operator with regard to the sending of names of the passengers or of the crew?

- I was not.

18896. Not in any way?

- No.

(The Witness withdrew.)

Day 17

Testimony of Joseph B. Ismay, recalled

Examined by Sir ROBERT FINLAY.

18897. You were asked about the arrangements between the American Company, as it has been called, and the Company here?

- Yes.

18898. Has the American Company ever interfered with regard to the management on this side of the water of the White Star Line?

- No.

18899. With whom does that rest?

- The management of the White Star Line?

18900. Yes?

- With the managers in Liverpool.

18901. And they have never interfered on the other side of the water with them?

- No.

18902. You have, I suppose, repeatedly crossed the Atlantic before?

- I have.

18903. In your own vessels?

- Yes, and in others.

18904. Have you ever on any occasion attempted to interfere with the Captain as regards the navigation of the vessel?

- Never.

18905. If I rightly followed the drift of some questions put to you yesterday, it was suggested that you, when you heard of ice, ought to have said something to the Captain with regard to what precautions were to be taken.

Would that be in accordance with the practice you have always followed?

- It would be absolutely outside my province.

18906. And you have never done so?

- I have never done so.

The Commissioner:

Will you ask him why the Captain handed him the marconigram?

Sir Robert Finlay:

If your Lordship pleases.

The Witness:

I think he handed it to me simply as a matter of information, a matter of interest.

18907. Not as asking your advice?

- Certainly not.

18908. Now we have heard about a number of other messages, some of which have been proved, and others not. Your Lordship has seen the additional printed document which contains the same messages, which have not yet been proved. Were any other messages except the message from the "Baltic" handed to you?

- No.

18909. You did not see any of them?

- I did not.

18910. Did you have any conversation with any of the Officers or with the Commander with regard to them?

- No.

18911. You knew nothing about them?

- Absolutely nothing.

18912. Now will you tell us exactly in your own way what took place when the Captain handed you this message from the "Baltic"?

- I was talking to some passengers on deck when he handed me this message.

18913. Which deck were you on?

- I was on A deck: I was talking to some passengers, and he handed me this message, and I looked at it casually.

18914. Did he say anything?

- No, he said nothing at all.

18915. He simply handed you the paper?

- He simply handed me the paper and I looked at it and put it in my pocket.

18916. Did he stop when he handed you the paper?

- No.

18917. Did he walk away without saying anything?

- Yes, he went away.

18918. You looked at it?

- Yes.

18919. And you put it in your pocket?

- Yes.

18920. I think you said you were going down to lunch at the time?

- To the best of my recollection the lunch bugle went almost immediately and I went down to lunch.

18921. That is your recollection?

- That is my best recollection.

18922. Was anything said, apart from the two ladies you have told us about, about this, until Captain Smith asked you for the message some considerable time later?

- No.

18923. You have told us that you realised that you would be getting near the ice region from something said by the Doctor at dinner?

- Yes.

18924. He said that you had turned the corner?

- He said that we had turned the corner.

18925. Did you know whether you had run further south than the corner which is usually adopted would have taken you?

- No, I knew nothing at all about that.

18926. Then your conclusion that you were getting near the region of ice was from putting together the intimation that you had turned the corner which would take you on a less Southerly course than you had been following, and the "Baltic" having sent a message which partly related to ice? That is what led you to infer that it would be somewhere on the ordinary track?

- Yes.

18927. As I understand you, you did not realise from the latitude and longitude mentioned in the "Baltic's" message, the exact position of the ice relative to the vessel?

- No.

18928. The "Baltic," I think, was one of your vessels?

- Yes.

18929. Now, passing from that matter, when you left the deck to go into the collapsible boat, did you hear the Officer calling out for more women?

- I do not think I did.

18930. Just let me recall to you what was said by another Witness on the point on page 395; it begins at Question [17627](#) and runs on for two or three questions and answers. This is Rowe's evidence: "Later on were you saved in the starboard collapsible boat? - (A.) I was. (Q.) And did Captain Smith tell you to go into it? - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Were you told to take charge of it? - (A.) No, I was not told to take charge because I was in charge. (Q.) Who got into that boat? - (A.) The boat was partially full when I got into it; I had 53 women and 3 children in the stern. Chief Officer Wilde was asking for more women. There were none forthcoming, and two gentlemen got in. (Q.) Who were the two gentlemen who got in? - (A.) One was Mr. Ismay. (Q.) And who was the other? - (A.) I never saw the man before." Did you hear Mr. Wilde asking for more women?

- No, I do not remember that particular occasion. I heard of it so often that I cannot remember whether I did then or not.

18931. It was put to you that one witness, Brown, said that you helped the women to get into the boat and were standing in the boat and helping them in?

- I think he was mistaken.

18932. Is that a mistake?

- I think so.

18933. You never got into the boat till the last moment?

- That is so.

The Commissioner:

What is the reference to that?

Mr. Laing:

Page 219.

18934. (*Sir Robert Finlay.*) If your Lordship pleases, I should like to read that. It is Question [10519](#): "Did you then proceed to fill it up with women and children?" That is the collapsible boat. - (A.) Yes. (Q.) Was Mr. Bruce Ismay taking any part in connection with that boat? - (A.) Yes he was calling out for the women and children first. He helped to get them into that boat, and he went into it himself to receive the women and children. (Q.) Was that boat filled? - (A.) It was filled." You say that is not correct as regards your getting into the boat?

- No, not to my memory.

18935. You helped the women and children in, but not from inside the boat?

- That is so.

18936. And you did not go into it until the last moment, as you have told us?

- Not till she was leaving, at the last moment.

18937. Now, I want you to tell me about this light that you rowed for. Your impression is that that was not the light of the "Californian"?

- That is my impression.

18938. Now, will you just give me your reasons for that?

- Because it was a dull white light.

18939. On which side of the "Titanic"?

- When we left the ship it would be on the starboard side.

18940. Did the light continue to be visible as you rowed on in its direction?

- We rowed on, and we thought the light became more distinct, and then it seemed to draw away from us again.

18941. Did you see anything of the light on the port side of the "Titanic" which has been so much referred to?

- I did not.

18942. Anyhow, in your judgment, that is not the same light which has been referred to as on the port side?

- I do not think so.

18943. (*The Commissioner.*) I am afraid I misunderstood the answer that you gave yesterday - have you any doubt, having heard the evidence, that the "Californian" did see the rockets from the "Titanic"?

- Have I any doubt that the "Californian" saw them?

18944. Yes, saw the rockets from the "Titanic"?

- Judging from the evidence, I should say not.

18945. Judging from the evidence you would say -?

- That our rockets were seen by the "Californian."

18946. I thought yesterday I misunderstood you. Your opinion is that the rockets sent up from the "Titanic" were seen by the people on board the "Californian"?

- Yes, from what I have read.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I thought there had been a little misapprehension.

The Commissioner:

Yes.

18947. (*Sir Robert Finlay.*) It is perfectly clear now. (*To the witness.*) Now, a question with regard to one point. Are you aware that there is considerable difference of view with regard to the use of glasses by the look-out men?

- Yes.

18948. Some commanders approve and others do not?

- Yes.

18949. And you always supply glasses for the look-out men if the commanders desire it?

- Certainly.

18950. And you have left it in that way?

- Absolutely.

18951. Now, you were asked about the instructions you gave to your Officers with regard to the navigation of the vessel and so on, whether there were any specific directions about ice. Now, the instructions, I think, are contained partly in the "Ships' Rules" - that book which has been handed in - partly in the letter which is given to the Officer on appointment to the vessel?

- Yes.

18952. And partly also in a notice which is stuck up in the chart room?

- Every ship is supplied with one of those printed notices. It is framed and put up in the chart room.

18953. I will not stop to read these just now; they can be read afterwards. Some part certainly ought to be read, but I wish to identify the documents. This is the book of Rules, which, of course, requires no further identification. Then is this (*Handing a paper to the witness.*) the letter given to every commander on appointment?

- Yes.

(*The same was handed in.*)

18954. And is this the notice which is stuck up in every chart room (*Handing same to the witness.*)?

- Yes.

(*The same was handed in.*)

18955. There is nothing specifically directed to the question of ice in any of these regulations?

- No.

18956. That is left to the discretion of the Commander?

- Certainly.

18957. How long had Captain Smith been known to you and to your Company?

- He had been in the service 32 years, I think.

18958. Had you seen a good deal of him?

- I had.

18959. Had you had opportunities for forming an opinion as to his judgment and capacity for conducting a vessel?

- He was a man in whom we had entire and absolute confidence.

18960. And you showed it by appointing him to the "Titanic"?

- Yes. I think he had been in command for 24 years; I think that is the right number of years.

18961. Had anything ever occurred in the slightest degree to shake your confidence in him?

- No.

18962. Something was said by one of the gentlemen who examined you with regard to instructions given by the Canadian Pacific Company to their steamers with reference to field ice?

- Yes.

18963. That is with reference to the Canadian traffic?

- Yes.

18964. You have also some share in the Canadian traffic, have you not?

- We have.

18965. And do you give special instructions with regard to vessels engaged in the Canadian traffic?

- We do.

18966. Is this an extract from the instructions in regard to field ice (Handing same to the witness.)?

- Yes.

18967. I will read it. This is only an extract. The whole document, of course, can be produced: "Extract from the instructions given to Commanders in the Canadian Service respecting field ice. Field ice may be met off the Eastern edge of the bank, across the bank, and along the south Coast of Newfoundland. This ice is often very heavy and should not be entered unless it is obviously in loose patches. Lanes in the ice often come to an end, and it is unwise to enter them unless clear water can be seen beyond. It is usually the safest course to go South to get round the field ice, and Commanders have permission to use their discretion to deviate from the track under such circumstances." Were any such instructions necessary with reference to the tracks which we have been considering in this Enquiry?

- I think not.

18968. (*The Commissioner.*) This Canadian track, I suppose, is much to the North of the track to America - to New York?

- Yes.

18969. (*Sir Robert Finlay.*) Yes, that is shown by the localities specified at the beginning of this extract: "Field ice may be met off the Eastern edge of the bank, across the bank, and along the south Coast of Newfoundland." This field ice is much commoner there, of course?

- Yes.

18970. And you, yourselves, issue the instructions which have just been read with regard to field ice in those localities?

- We do.

18971. (*The Commissioner.*) Is the ordinary track to Canada across what they call the Great Bank of Newfoundland?

- I am afraid I could not answer that.

The Commissioner:

It appears to be marked.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I am told in reference to the question your Lordship has just put to Mr. Ismay that the ordinary route to Canada, unless it be the belle Isle route, is always across the bank.

The Commissioner:

The "Mount Temple" went South of the track?

The Attorney-General:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

In fact she went South of the track to New York - slightly South.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

And she was therefore south of any indicated field ice, as distinguished from icebergs, I mean.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes, that is so. Those instructions, of course, with regard to field ice that I was referring to are issued with regard to the ordinary route where field ice is much more commonly met with than further south.

The Commissioner:

But the instructions, as I recollect them from your reading them, gave permission to deviate.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Certainly, My Lord. "It is usually the safest course to go South to get round the field ice, and Commanders have permissions to use their discretion to deviate from the track under such circumstances."

The Commissioner:

Now have you similar directions given by the Canadian Pacific Railway to the "Mount Temple"?

Sir Robert Finlay:

I have not got a copy, My Lord. I do not know whether Mr. Hamar Greenwood can give us one.

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

I can supply you with a copy of the instructions issued.

The Commissioner:

Do you know the contents of the directions?

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

They are rather voluminous, but I know the essentials of them.

The Commissioner:

What I want to ask you - perhaps you can tell me now - is whether they are substantially the same as these instructions issued.

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

They are rather more detailed instructions in reference to ice.

The Commissioner:

Are they substantially the same, although more detailed?

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

I should say yes; substantially the same.

The Commissioner:

Then it comes to this, that the White Star Company issue to their boats engaged in the Canadian trade, instructions somewhat similar to, though not identical with, the instructions issued by the Canadian Pacific Railway to their steamers engaged in the same trade?

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

It is difficult for me to answer that, because I have only heard this one extract read by Sir Robert Finlay.

The Commissioner:

Then perhaps you had better look at this and at your own papers - the papers which you say you can get - and tell me afterwards whether there is substantial agreement. I do not want all the details.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Perhaps my friend, Mr. Hamar Greenwood, will let us have a copy of the instructions which are issued by the Canadian Pacific?

Mr. Hamar Greenwood:

Certainly.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I only refer to it because one of my friends in cross-examining put a question to Mr. Ismay with reference to the Canadian Pacific's instructions as to field ice, and it was desirable to make it clear that under the same circumstances the White Star issue similar instructions.

The Commissioner:

The reason I was putting the question was this: that the Commander of the "Mount Temple," who gave evidence, told us that he had invariable instructions on this point from the Railway company, and I rather gathered until you asked Mr. Ismay these questions, that the White Star Company did not give such instructions. Apparently they do.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Oh, they do. Instructions of that kind are necessary when you are dealing with a route which takes you through a latitude where a good deal of field ice is often to be found.

18972. (*To the witness.*) Then a good deal has been said about the tracks?

- Yes.

18973. They are called the North Atlantic Lane Routes, I think?

- Yes.

18974. And they were agreed upon in consultation between the Lines using that trade?

- Yes.

18975. As far back as 1898, I think?

- Yes.

18976. Is that a copy (*Handing a paper to the witness.*)?

- Yes.

(*The same was handed in.*)

The Commissioner:

You can perhaps procure for us the instructions that are issued by other large transatlantic lines such as the Cunard, with reference to ice.

Sir Robert Finlay:

We will endeavour to get them, My Lord; I am sure we can.

The Commissioner:

And I am anxious, if I can get them, to have the corresponding instructions given by the German lines.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Certainly: I think we shall be able to get all those instructions by the English lines and the German lines. Does your Lordship include in that the Canadian trade or the New York?

The Commissioner:

I should like both, if I could have them.

Sir Robert Finlay:

And any French instructions also, if there are any French lines?

The Commissioner:

Yes, certainly.

Sir Robert Finlay:

In fact, all the information that can be got with reference to lines of repute using that route will be obtained and laid before your Lordship.

The Commissioner:

You see my view as to whether the "Titanic" took all proper precautions, having regard to the knowledge that they had at the time, would no doubt be influenced by what other large lines were doing in the same circumstances.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Now I have handed up to your Lordship the copy of the memorandum as to the North Atlantic Lane routes, as they are called. That was agreed upon in 1898?

The Witness:

Yes.

Sir Robert Finlay:

It is a memorandum which I have handed up, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Beginning "West-bound."

Sir Robert Finlay:

Both ways.

The Commissioner:

"West-bound, East-bound," and so on.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes. There is a chart inside it.

The Commissioner:

Yes; what is the document?

Sir Robert Finlay:

It is a memorandum of what was agreed upon with regard to the routes to be adopted westward and eastward, agreed upon at a conference held between all the companies engaged in that trade.

The Commissioner:

Do you mean foreign companies as well as English companies?

18977-8. (*Sir Robert Finlay - To the witness.*) Were there any foreign companies?

- I think so; the agreement is signed.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I think your Lordship will see on the last page that it is signed - The Hamburg-Amerika, I see, and the Norddeutscher Lloyd; the Compagnie Generale trans -Atlantique; the American Line; and then the other companies are the Atlantic Transport Company, Elder Dempster and Co., the Cunard, the Furness Line, W. Johnston and Co., Limited, the National Steamship Co., Limited, the Red Star Line, the Wilson Line and the White Star Line.

18979. (*The Commissioner - To the witness.*) The White Star Line means the Oceanic Company?

- Yes, the Oceanic Steam Navigation.

18980. (*Sir Robert Finlay.*) The chart gives the substance of the regulations agreed upon, showing the route from August to January. From August to January they can go further north with propriety, because, owing to the action of the heat of the summer the ice has by that time been melted in the southern latitudes to which it has drifted. I need not stop to read this, My Lord. (*To the witness.*) Now, with regard to ice, your Company gets notice from other companies, I suppose, as to ice having been sighted by any of their vessels?

- Yes, there is a system of interchange - of information between the Captains; we pass it on to one another.

18981. Just describe what that arrangement is. Every notice of ice received by any company is sent on to the other companies?

- Yes.

18982. Do you supply to your Commanders before they start on any voyage all the information up to date that has been received with regard to ice in that way?

- Certainly.

18983. Now, one question with regard to another matter, Mr. Ismay, if you please. You were asked some questions as to a design for 40 boats for the "Olympic" or the "Titanic." Did you ever hear of such a design?

- No.

18984. You know nothing whatever about it?

- No, I have no recollection of it whatever.

The Commissioner:

You asked about that, Mr. Scanlan.

Mr. Scanlan:

Yes, I did, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Can you tell me - do not hold back your information till some later period, but tell me now, if you can - whether you have made any enquiries with reference to the communication to the "Daily Mail."

Mr. Scanlan:

I have, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

Very well; now will you tell me the result?

Mr. Scanlan:

The result satisfies me that the design which I referred to was submitted by the builders to the Company which Mr. Ismay represents, and I suggest that the designer should be called to give evidence.

The Commissioner:

Who was the designer?

Mr. Scanlan:
The gentleman who gave the interview to the "Daily Mail."

The Commissioner:
Do you mean Mr. Carlisle?

Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.

Sir Robert Finlay:
I have made enquiries about that and evidence may be given later. What I say is merely a statement of what I have been told will be proved. There was some discussion about it, not with the Company at all, but a discussion in view of the advisory committee of the Board of Trade requiring a greater number of boats. Your Lordship remembers there was an Advisory committee appointed, which reported in July, 1911, and while that Committee was sitting it was thought possible that they might insist upon a larger number of boats; and there was some discussion, not with the "Oceanic" at all, but there was some discussion between the designer, I think, for Messrs. Harland and Wolff and another gentleman who had a patent with reference to the working of davits for these boats - Mr. Welin - as to how, if the advisory committee should recommend a larger number of boats, special arrangements might be made for getting these boats into the water with rapidity. One idea was by having the davits so that they could be put at a slope - bent over - and so enable those davits to get four boats into the water one after the other.

The Commissioner:
Is that the substance of what you have heard, Mr. Scanlan?

Mr. Scanlan:
No, My Lord, it is not quite in accordance with what I am instructed are the facts. I am instructed that, according to the facts, for the "Olympic" and the "Titanic" a special design by the builders was submitted to the owners.

The Commissioner:
Yes, but that is not quite the point. Was that special design made in view of the possibility of the Board of Trade requiring a larger number of boats?

The Attorney-General:
It cannot have been, on that statement.

Mr. Scanlan:
As far as my information goes the design was for the purpose of supplying those boats, the "Olympic" and the "Titanic," with additional accommodation.

The Attorney-General:
Then it must have been before July, 1911.

Sir Robert Finlay:
I think Mr. Wilding, who will be called - I think my friend is going to call him -

The Attorney-General:
I am going to call him, but at the same time it is desirable that this should be cleared up.

The Commissioner:
I want it cleared up now.

The Attorney-General:
My friend, Mr. Scanlan, attributes some importance to it. We will take care that Mr. Carlisle, as far as we can, shall be called before the Court, and then we can get the answers from him. I know nothing about it at the present moment, except that I have heard the suggestion, and did mean to put some questions to Mr. Ismay about

it, not as to 40 boats, but as to a larger number of boats having been at one time spoken of and shown in plans for the "Titanic" or the "Olympic."

The Commissioner:

You were pointing out that when this vessel was constructed, this Advisory committee did not exist.

The Attorney-General:

No, not quite. What I said was this: Mr. Scanlan said his point was that this related both to the construction of the "Olympic" and the "Titanic," and I said if that was the case then it cannot have been in consequence of the recommendation from the advisory committee, which was not made till July, 1911.

Sir Robert Finlay:

It was not in consequence of it.

The Attorney-General:

Nor in anticipation of it, because it was not appointed till April, 1911.

The Commissioner:

But although not appointed it may have been in contemplation.

The Attorney-General:

To some extent it is always in contemplation; that a Committee may be appointed is always in contemplation.

The Commissioner:

But a Committee on this particular matter?

The Attorney-General:

I think your Lordship will see there have been a good many.

Sir Robert Finlay:

My information is what I have given here. I am not sure that I was right in saying four boats; it may have been two boats, double -banking.

The Attorney-General:

I have heard of two.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Two on each side; and it was purely in view of its being required.

The Commissioner:

Have you a copy of the letter that you say you read?

Mr. Scanlan:

In the "Daily Mail," my Lord?

The Commissioner:

Yes.

Mr. Scanlan:

What I referred to yesterday was an interview, and I have it here.

The Commissioner:

That is what I mean.

The Attorney-General:

That is an interview with Mr. Carlisle?

Mr. Scanlan:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
Will you let me have it?

Mr. Scanlan:
Certainly, My Lord.

(The same was handed in.)

The Commissioner:
Have you any other information besides that contained in this letter or communication?

Mr. Scanlan:
I hope your Lordship will accept the statement I have made. Some of the information I have is quite confidential, but the information I have enables me, with a sense of responsibility, to make the statement.

The Commissioner:
I quite accept that; but I thought your information was to be found in this document which you have handed up.

Mr. Scanlan:
No, it is not all there.

The Commissioner:
It does not seem to bear it out. Perhaps you have not seen it, Sir Robert.

Sir Robert Finlay:
No.

The Commissioner:
"When working out the designs of the 'Olympic' and the 'Titanic'" (this is what Mr. Carlisle is reported to have stated.) "I put my ideas before the davit constructors" (who they are I do not know.) "and got them to design me davits which would allow me to place, if necessary, four lifeboats on each pair of davits, which would have meant a total of over 40 boats. Those davits were fitted in both ships, but though the Board of Trade did not require anything more than 16 lifeboats, 20 lifeboats were supplied." Now, I understand that to mean this: "I did ask the davit constructors to design me davits which would hold or accommodate 40 boats, and they did it, and those davits were, in fact, supplied to the 'Olympic' and the 'Titanic,'" and there the matter stops. He says nothing more. That is right, is it not, Mr. Scanlan, as far as it goes?

Mr. Scanlan:
That is the interview there, My Lord.

18985. *(Sir Robert Finlay - To the witness.)* Did you ever hear anything of that kind?
- No.

18986. It is quite new to you?
- It is.

18987. Now then, with regard to the number of boats. You are familiar with the Board of Trade Rules?
- Yes.

18988. And with the recommendations which were made by the advisory committee which reported in July, 1911?
- Yes, I think I know the figures.

18989. Can you tell us how the number of boats on board the "Titanic" compared with either the Board of Trade Regulations or the Recommendations of that Advisory committee in July, 1911?
- In the cubic capacity?

18990. Yes?

- The Board of Trade, I think, would call for 9,500 cubic feet. We had 11,300 or 11,400 cubic feet. Owing to the construction of the "Olympic" and the "Titanic," the bulkheads being carried and the wireless installation, I think the Board of Trade would have asked us to supply 7,500 cubic feet, whereas we had 11,300 cubic feet.

The Commissioner:

What has it to do with the marconi installation?

Sir Robert Finlay:

I suppose the facilities for calling help, My Lord. Perhaps your Lordship will allow the witness to answer. I was about to make my own suggestion.

18991. (*The Commissioner.*) Perhaps you will repeat it to me, and I shall then understand it.

The Witness:

The Board of Trade take the ordinary emigrant ship and the "Titanic" size.

The Attorney-General:

I think I may make this observation in public which I had made to my friend. I understand from my friend's question now put to Mr. Ismay that Mr. Ismay is asked to give information to the Court with reference to the boat accommodation and the Board of Trade Rules and compliance with the Board of Trade Rules. That, of course, involves to some extent the construction. I understood from Mr. Ismay himself, and from what has been suggested to us, that Mr. Ismay was not able to speak to these matters, that they did not come into his department, and that he did not enquire into them, and therefore we purposely refrained from putting questions to him; but if he is put forward as a gentleman who does know, then we must go through the whole matter with him.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I was only asking Mr. Ismay very generally. Mr. Sanderson knows a great deal more about the details.

The Attorney-General:

It is a little unfortunate to ask him generally.

The Commissioner:

Would it be more convenient for me to wait until Mr. Sanderson comes?

Sir Robert Finlay:

If your Lordship pleases, certainly.

The Attorney-General:

It means I must go into it, if my friend does.

The Commissioner:

Very well, I will wait.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I merely say what I think your Lordship will find will be proved by Mr. Sanderson, that the accommodation on board the "Titanic" was considerably in excess of that required by the Board of Trade Rules, and was considerably in excess of that that would have been required under the recommendations of the Committee which reported in July, 1911.

The Attorney-General:

I agree it is in excess of the Board of Trade requirements.

Sir Robert Finlay:

And of the recommendations of that Advisory committee in July, 1911, as applicable to a vessel with such watertight compartments as the "Titanic" had.

The Attorney-General:

Yes.

Sir Robert Finlay:

That is, as I understand it, what Mr. Sanderson will say.

The Attorney-General:

That is what I opined - that it carried more boats than were required by the Board of Trade Regulations.

18992. (*Sir Robert Finlay - To the witness.*) Now, since this deplorable accident, I think a number of rafts have been carried as well as more boats?

- Yes, I believe that is so.

18993. Rafts with air tanks below, so as to be able to carry a number of people upon them, and boats?

- Yes.

18994. You were asked a question on a very important subject, that was the desirability of securing continuous service by the same crew approximately for a series of voyages in the same vessel?

- Yes.

18995. Has your Company taken steps to endeavour to secure that end?

- Some years ago we were very anxious to try to get the men to stick to the Company and to stick to the ships. With that in view, we offered a bonus of £2 10s to every sailor who could show ten V.G. discharges in the year, and to every fireman and trimmer we offered a bonus of £5 if he could show ten V.G. discharges in the year. That we continued for certainly three years, but, the result was so unsatisfactory that we eventually gave it up, so few of the men ever earned the bonus.

18996. Were your Company most anxious to secure such continuous service if it could be achieved?

- That was the object we had in view in offering the bonuses to the sailors and the firemen and trimmers to remain by the ship and with the Company.

18997. And are you still anxious to secure it if it can be done?

- Certainly.

18998. The difficulty is not with you?

- Not at all.

18999. To what extent have you been successful in securing continuous service; do you know?

- No, I could not answer that.

19000. Now, I think there is only one other matter I want you to tell me about. You were asked about a conversation with Mr. Bell that took place at Queenstown?

- Yes.

19001. And it was suggested, if I followed the questions, that you had given some orders to Mr. Bell as to the speed?

- No, I had given no orders.

19002. Will you just repeat again exactly what took place between you and Mr. Bell?

- Mr. Bell came into my room, and I spoke to him with regard to the coal which he had on board the ship. I also said that there was no chance of the ship arriving in New York on the Tuesday; that we had very much better make up our minds to arrive there on the Wednesday morning and be off the lightship at 5 o'clock, and if the weather was fine and right in every respect on the Monday or Tuesday we then could take a run out of the ship.

19003. Was that all?

- That is all.

19004. Did you ever contemplate that being done without communication with the Captain?

- Certainly not.

Re-examined by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

19005. I want you to direct your mind for a moment to the instructions given to the commanders in the Canadian service respecting field ice. I see from that extract which was read by my friend, Sir Robert Finlay: "It is usually the safest course to go South to get round the field ice, and Commanders have permission to use their discretion to deviate from the track under such circumstances." That is, of course, dealing with the track to Canada?

- Yes.

19006. The object of those instructions, I suppose, is to tell the Captain that he should get away from the field ice, and that he should go South in order to get away from it?

- Yes.

19007. So that if a Captain is pursuing his course along the track and is advised of field ice, he ought to go South to get away from it?

- He ought to take steps to avoid it.

19008. It is suggested here that the safest course would be to go South?

- That naturally would be the safest course.

19009. That would be the natural thing; and it is right to say that you finish up with this, that "Commanders have permission to use their discretion to deviate from the track under such circumstances"?

- Yes.

19010. You have no such instructions to commanders in the Atlantic service - that is to say from New York?

- Not in regard to field ice, but there is the general instruction.

19011. Would this document get before Captain Smith at all?

- I could not answer that question.

19012. It would not be supplied to him by your Company?

- I could not answer that.

19013. Just follow me for a minute, and either you can answer me or one of my friends - anybody representing your Company. What I am anxious to know from you, or somebody on behalf of your Company, is whether there are instructions of any kind given to your commanders on the route travelling from New York to the United Kingdom with reference to ice. Are there any instructions of any kind? If so, I should like to see them?

- Not that I know of.

The Commissioner:

I thought you said coming from the United States to the United Kingdom. You mean both ways?

The Attorney-General:

What I meant to say was trading between.

Sir Robert Finlay:

There are no such special instructions; that is left to the judgment of the Commander.

The Attorney-General:

I understood that was the case from what Mr. Ismay said yesterday, but I was not quite sure from some of the questions today whether it might be suggested that similar instructions, or those instructions were given to the commanders.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Oh, no; I said expressly that those instructions with regard to field ice were for vessels going further North on the Canadian route, and that as regards the routes with which we are dealing there were no special instructions with regard to ice.

19014. (*The Attorney-General.*) Very well; that makes it quite clear. (*To the witness.*) It is in contemplation that on a voyage from the United Kingdom to New York an ice-field might be met?

- So far as I am aware, it has hardly ever been known for field ice to come down there.

19015. "Hardly ever been known" means it has been known?

- It may have been known, but I cannot give you any reliable information with regard to that.

The Commissioner:

The chart does not indicate such a thing.

The Attorney-General:

As what?

The Commissioner:

As field ice as far south as the track.

The Attorney-General:

No, field ice not, but icebergs certainly.

The Commissioner:

Oh, yes; I thought you were dealing with field ice.

The Attorney-General:

I was on the question of ice, and the one question I was putting was on field ice, but I am directing it also to icebergs.

The Commissioner:

Icebergs are marked a good deal further south.

The Attorney-General:

Your Lordship sees "field ice between March and July."

The Commissioner:

Somewhat to the North of the track.

19016. (*The Attorney-General.*) A little to the North of the track - not much, very little; but icebergs, of course, as shown by the chart, have been seen within this line in July and August, and the line there indicated is South of the track to New York. (*To the witness.*) Are you aware of that?

- Am I aware of what?

19017. That on the chart it is indicated that icebergs have been seen within a dotted line on the chart in July and August which is South, a good deal South, of the track to New York?

- I have not seen the chart, but I have no doubt that is so.

19018. I do not want to ask you about the chart, because that is for my Lord. Why I am directing your attention to it is for this purpose: It seems to indicate, at any rate, that you may meet ice?

- Certainly.

19019. If you follow the track when you have turned the corner and follow the track to New York, you may meet ice, either field ice, I suppose - infrequently apparently - or icebergs?

- Certainly icebergs, but I should hardly think it was possible for field ice to be there.

The Commissioner:

When they are indicating icebergs South of the track, what the chart says is: "Icebergs have been seen within this line in April, May and June."

The Attorney-General:

Yes, I was looking at the one a little above it, but your Lordship is quite right. That is more southerly still.

The Commissioner:

I do not see any corresponding indication of field ice below the etched mark which is described as "Field ice between March and July."

The Attorney-General:

No, I do not think there is anything.

The Commissioner:

There is an indication on the chart that icebergs are occasionally seen South of what you may call the iceberg line. There is no indication on the chart that field ice is occasionally seen South of that.

19020. (*The Attorney-General.*) I agree that is so. (*To the witness.*) I suppose you have had reports from your vessels of meeting icebergs on the voyage to the United States before?

- Oh, yes.

19021. Had you had any during this particular year?

- Not to my knowledge.

19022. From any of your vessels?

- Not to my knowledge.

19023. Would they be brought before you in the ordinary course?

- No, they would not.

19024. Who would know about them?

- I should think either Mr. Sanderson or Mr. Buchanan.

19025. Have you enquired at all whether there were any reports of icebergs before this voyage received by your Company?

- No.

The Commissioner:

My attention is drawn to a book which is called "The United States Pilot, East Coast, Part I., 2nd Edition, 1909," in which on page 34 this passage occurs: "To these vessels" (that is to say, the larger liners crossing between America and Europe.) "one of the chief dangers in crossing the Atlantic lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice released at the breaking up of winter in the arctic regions and drifted down by the Labrador Current across their direct route." Now, that does not agree with the evidence that I have heard so far that probably compact ice will be found across the direct route. I thought it was a very rare thing.

The Attorney-General:

So far as the evidence goes I thought so too.

The Commissioner:

I am speaking of the evidence. So far as the evidence goes it surely is not the fact that you will probably meet fields of compact ice in the direct and ordinary route between England and New York.

The Attorney-General:

No, not according either to the evidence or the information that we have.

The Commissioner:

I understood the object of adopting this track was because, generally speaking, it avoids field ice.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes, in fact I am told by men who have passed a great many years there - 18 years - they have never seen field ice on this track.

The Attorney-General:

May I see the book?

The Commissioner:

Here is the book. I am told they are the Admiralty Sailing Directions. (Handing the book to the Attorney-General.) Can you tell me this: Were the routes the same at the time that these regulations were published as the routes that are followed now?

The Attorney-General:

Oh, yes, because those regulations which are referred to are November, 1898.

The Commissioner:

I have another book now, called "The Nova Scotia South East Coast and bay of Fundy Pilot, 6th Edition, 1911."

The Attorney-General:

There is no doubt the answer to the question you have put is that this book of 1909 is some nine years after that agreement as to the track which my friend read and has put in.

The Commissioner:

The one I have in my hand is published in 1911, and there is exactly the same statement in it. The Admiralty Hydrographic Office publishes it. All I can say is the paragraph in that book published by the Admiralty does not agree with the chart. It gives this startling information, Sir Robert, that a steamer following the ordinary route, the fixed route between Europe and America, will probably meet compact field ice on that route. To me it is most extraordinary.

Sir Robert Finlay:

It is contrary to all our information, and, as I gather from what my friend the Attorney-General said, it was contrary to his.

19026. (*The Commissioner.*) These books would be on board the ship, of course?

The Witness:

I do not know.

The Commissioner:

I am told these books would be on board the ship, but at present they appear to me to be quite inconsistent with the chart.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

And quite inconsistent with the evidence that I have heard, and I cannot understand how a route between Europe and America could be laid down through a region in which you will probably meet compact field ice - it is a most extraordinary thing - and that that route should be agreed by all the large lines of steamships.

The Attorney-General:

The effect of the evidence and the information, at any rate, which has been laid before the Court and which is in our possession to lay before the Court, if it had become necessary, is that you do not expect to encounter field ice

on this voyage, but you ought to, I will not say, expect, but to know, that in all probability you will encounter icebergs at this time.

The Commissioner:

Yes, that is a different matter altogether.

The Attorney-General:

That is how I think the matter stands, so far as our information goes. We have also got the monthly Meteorological Charts, which indicate facts according to the reports which have been given from time to time during the month.

The Commissioner:

By the word "probable" I understand that it is more usual than not.

The Attorney-General:

I should not have thought that.

The Commissioner:

"Probable" appears to me to mean that of 20 times you may expect to meet it, at all events, 11 times. The odd thing about it is that these paragraphs I have been reading are headed with a reference to the particular chart which I have been looking at all through.

Sir Robert Finlay:

The copy I have purports to have corrections up to 1911.

The Commissioner:

Yes.

The Attorney-General:

What is that?

Sir Robert Finlay:

The route chart - large corrections up to January, 1908, small corrections up to 1911.

The Commissioner:

Have you had this book "Sailing Directions" before you, Mr. Attorney?

The Attorney-General:

No, it is the first time our attention has been directed to it.

The Commissioner:

The paragraph I have been reading, and the pages on this subject, are all intended to explain the chart because they are headed all along, "Chart 2058, North Atlantic Route Chart." So that it is extremely desirable to read the chart with the book. My attention is drawn to this passage at page 17.

The Attorney-General:

Is that the Nova Scotia one?

The Commissioner:

The paragraph is the same in both: "It is impossible to give within the outer limits named any distinct idea where ice may be expected, and no Rule can be laid down to ensure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differ so greatly in different seasons. Everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution and skill with which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice-bearing region of the Atlantic Ocean."

The Attorney-General:

I am very much obliged to your Lordship for calling our attention to it.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Your Lordship will recollect what Captain Moore, the Captain of the "Mount Temple," said at page 197, Question [9388](#), "Was the ice further south than you had known it? - (A.) I never knew it to be so far south before. Not in my whole experience of 27 years, I never knew it so far south. (Q.) And you are constantly running backwards and forwards? - (A.) For 27 years."

The Commissioner:

I am told these books are based on an experience of over 100 years, but, at all events, the experience of a lifetime. What one may call a lifetime has not shown that ice is found ordinarily or probably in these regions.

The Attorney-General:

Field ice.

The Commissioner:

I am talking of field ice.

Sir Robert Finlay:

And icebergs not frequently.

The Commissioner:

And evidently the Attorney-General did not realise when he was opening the case, and has not since realised, that there is any reason to expect ice in the sense that it is usually found there.

The Attorney-General:

No. The case that I have made and that I have been putting before your Lordship in regard to it up to the present has been that information was given of this apparently very extraordinary occurrence of field ice being encountered on this particular track.

The Commissioner:

That is the "Baltic" telegram.

The Attorney-General:

That is the "Baltic" telegram, and therefore the view I suggested was that it involved an obligation upon those responsible for the navigation of the ship, to take extreme care when they got that report.

The Commissioner:

Of course; whatever the information of the chart may be, the information of the telegram was most specific, and referred not only to icebergs, but to field ice.

The Attorney-General:

That is the point. Your Lordship is quite right. I have not made the case that the Commander ought to have taken the precaution to discover field ice without having received any report from any other vessel. I did not suggest that. In point of fact I did not go into it, and according to the evidence that was then before me, I did not think that he would expect to encounter it. Now that I see the book, of course it may be another question; but I am upon the telegram, which seems to me to place it so much higher.

The Commissioner:

Oh, of course it does; I only want to have it cleared up, because I was quite startled when I was told that there was no occasion for a telegram, because you most probably expect ice there. That startled me, and with all respect to this book, as I understand it at present, it seems to me to be quite inconsistent with the fact that the numbers of steamship companies' liners crossing have agreed to follow this route.

The Attorney-General:

As I understand, what the book says that may be so, but at the same time you may encounter field ice in this track, and therefore must be very careful.

The Commissioner:

It does not say that; it says: "You probably will."

The Attorney-General:

I suppose it is a matter of extreme precaution; that emphasises it. I read the paragraph rather hastily, I admit, but it seems to me devised for the purpose of impressing on navigators the necessity for extreme caution when they are in these parts at this time of the year. It is not meant to do more than that, but it does that.

The Commissioner:

Well, but it says something which is not in accordance with the evidence.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, it says that with the object of impressing the necessity for caution.

The Commissioner:

It is equivalent to crying "Wolf."

The Attorney-General:

I do not know. I will not say that.

The Commissioner:

That is what you mean now, you know. In order to induce people to be extra careful they put in what is not there.

The Attorney-General:

No, I am not saying that; that is not my suggestion of it. I hear of the book, of course, for the first time for the reason I have indicated, that our case has been put on the wireless telegraphy reports, which seemed to place it beyond this category, as your Lordship agrees. But when we do examine into it and have that brought before us, in view of the fact that your Lordship is asked to answer some questions about tracks in the Enquiry, it does become of importance, and, speaking for myself, I am very much obliged to those who have called our attention to the fact that attention should be specifically directed to this point.

The Commissioner:

Quite right.

The Attorney-General:

Because, although it may not have happened for 25 years, it has happened this year, and it may happen again in another year.

The Commissioner:

My attention is drawn to the fact, and no doubt it is a fact, that the chart is based upon the book, but if the chart is based upon the book, then I do not know why the line of field ice is not South of the track.

The Attorney-General:

I find in the meteorological Charts they speak of it as a mean limit.

The Commissioner:

A mean?

The Attorney-General:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

That may explain it, possibly.

The Attorney-General:

I had not seen the meteorological Charts till this question arose, but when I look at them I see that there.

The Commissioner:
I thought it meant the usual limit.

Sir Robert Finlay:
Beyond all question that is the meaning of the legend upon this route chart, because it says "Icebergs have been seen within this line."

The Commissioner:
Yes, I was thinking rather of pack ice.

Sir Robert Finlay:
And then "Field ice between March and July" is the legend round the etched line.

The Attorney-General:
If your Lordship would look at Question 8 you would see why I think it all important now that we should direct some attention, at a later stage, of course, to it.

The Commissioner:
"What was, in fact, the track taken by the 'Titanic' in crossing the Atlantic Ocean? Did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of April? Are such tracks safe tracks at that time of year? Had the master any, and, if so, what, discretion as regards the track to be taken?"

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
Have you the sailing directions?

19027. (*The Attorney-General.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) Now, Mr. Ismay, according to what you have told us and what we have heard during the course of this Enquiry as to encountering field ice, had you been told during the course of this voyage that you would encounter field ice within 24 hours, that would have shown the necessity for extreme caution?
- Certainly.

19028. And you know, do you not, from what you have told us that when Captain Smith handed you the marconigram just about lunchtime, as you say, which had been received from the "Baltic," that did indicate quantities of field ice in the track along which you were travelling?
- About on the track, I think.

19029. So that you see the result of that would be that information was given by this wireless telegram that you would certainly within less than 24 hours be encountering field ice if you pursued the same course?
- I believe that is so.

19030. So far as you were concerned, did it strike you as a serious thing that you would encounter field ice?
- No, I do not think it did.

19031 I do not quite understand why not. That is what puzzles me. According to your view the encountering of field ice was a very serious matter?
- The only thing for the Commander to do would be to take steps to avoid the field ice.

19032. I agree?
- Therefore, it did not concern me.

19033. You thought that your Commander would take steps to avoid it?
- Certainly.

19034. And to keep off that track?

- I thought he would take steps to avoid it.

19035. And to keep off that track along which he would meet it?

- If he thought it necessary to do so.

19036. But if he thought he would meet field ice along that track would you expect him to take steps to avoid meeting it?

- Certainly.

The Commissioner:

In fact, this steamer never did encounter field ice.

The Attorney-General:

Which steamer?

The Commissioner:

The "Titanic."

The Attorney-General:

No, but she had the report.

The Commissioner:

Oh, she had the report, but in fact, she never encountered any; she encountered an iceberg.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, she came into collision with an iceberg.

The Commissioner:

As far as I know, she never encountered field ice.

The Attorney-General:

No, but the evidence is there were a good many icebergs seen in the morning; so that apparently they were coming across the track.

The Commissioner:

That is something quite different from field ice.

The Attorney-General:

I do not wish to argue it now, but your Lordship sees that there is a report of it, and a question of what he should do. Whether he encountered it or not is of importance later on. I quite appreciate what your Lordship means. The only evidence of field ice is from the "Californian," I think.

The Commissioner:

And the "Mount Temple."

The Attorney-General:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

And I am told the "Mesaba" too.

The Attorney-General:

Yes, that is wireless - I was not thinking so much about that. There is a little difficulty about the "Mesaba." We are not relying upon it so far, because we have not proved it satisfactorily.

The Commissioner:

At present my view is that the "Mesaba's" message never reached them at all.

19037. (*The Attorney-General.*) We are not referring to it for that reason. (*To the witness.*) The only thing I want to ask you about this is: When you realised that this was a serious matter - that you would be, according to this telegram, encountering field ice within less than 24 hours, did you say nothing to the Captain at all about it?
- I did not.

19038. Not ask him whether he was going to change his course?

- No.

19039. Nor he to you?

- No.

The Commissioner:

Will you tell me what the danger would be with a vessel of this size going at this speed if she encountered field ice as distinct from an iceberg? Would there be any serious danger?

The Attorney-General:

I should have thought so.

The Commissioner:

I do not know. I am asking because I should think when you approach field ice it is probably not so compact as it is in the middle of it. You see what I mean?

The Attorney-General:

Yes, you may have loose places before you get into the field.

The Commissioner:

Yes, I doubt whether there is anything like the danger in running into the edge of field ice which there is in running up against an iceberg.

19040. (*The Attorney-General.*) Well, My Lord, there are those with your Lordship who can answer that better than I can. I should have thought it was a very serious matter. There are various dangers which occur when a ship once gets amongst ice, all round it, even though it does not happen to be compact. (*To the witness.*) When the "Baltic" telegram was brought to you and handed to you by the Captain, it follows from what you have already told us, Mr. Ismay, that nothing was said; in point of fact, there were passengers to whom you were talking when the Captain passed, were there not?

- Yes.

19041. So that unless he meant to convey to passengers the information that was in that telegram, in the ordinary course he would hand it to you for you to read for yourself and not to say anything about it?

- Yes.

19042. That would explain, no doubt, why he said nothing when he handed the telegram. But what I am asking you about now is later than that, some hours later; I think you told us something like 7 or a quarter-past, when you were in the smoking room he asked you for the telegram which had been in your pocket all the time?

- He did.

19043. As I follow you, you had not had any conversation with him between those times or at that time?

- No.

19044. You simply handed him back the telegram?

- That is all.

19045. If I understand rightly what you have said this morning, leaving it to him to take such precautions as he thought right as the person responsible for the navigation of the ship?

- Absolutely.

19046. You thought that he would take precautions?

- Naturally.

19047. But what they were you left to him?

- Absolutely.

19048. There is just one question I wanted to ask you about the speed. Was the "Titanic" built to go about the same speed as the "Olympic"?

- About the same, perhaps a little bit better.

19049. A little bit better than the maximum of the "Olympic"?

- That is what was expected.

19050. I asked you some questions about this, and you were not able to give me definite information as to what the maximum speed was that you thought you would get from the "Titanic"?

- No, I could not say.

19051. But I see that you were able to tell the Court in America what the maximum speed you expected of the "Olympic" was. I just call your attention to it; you may not remember it. Senator Fletcher put to you this question: "You say you expected in the 'Titanic' the same speed that the 'Olympic' had, but you did not mention that speed?" And your answer was: "I should call the 'Olympic' a good 22-knot ship. She can do better under very favourable circumstances; I think she can work up to 22½ or perhaps 22¾ as a maximum"?

- I think that is about right.

19052. And the "Titanic"?

- We were hoping that she would do a little bit better than that.

19053. A quarter of a knot, do you mean?

- Yes, something like that, a little bit better, so we were told by our shipbuilders.

19054. According to that, then, if she was going 22 knots, that, at any rate, would be within a knot of her maximum speed in favourable circumstances?

- I should think so.

19055. I think there is only one other matter I want to ask you about. You knew, I presume, that you had not boats sufficient on the "Titanic" to accommodate all the passengers and crew?

- Yes.

19056. So that I mean, supposing all your boats did leave the "Titanic" fully loaded, there still must have been a considerable number of passengers and crew left on the ship?

- Yes.

19057. And, indeed, your boat accommodation was not sufficient to take off all the passengers, without the crew, was it?

- I believe not.

19058. (*The Attorney-General.*) I do not know whether your Lordship remembers the figures. It is 1,178 they could carry, all told, and in fact, she carried 1,316 passengers and 892 crew. The object of these questions I am putting to you, Mr. Ismay, is to draw your attention to this, that at any rate when the last boat left the "Titanic" you must have known that a number of passengers and crew were still on board the vessel?

- I did.

19059. And you have told us that you did not see any on the deck?

- I did not.

19060. At least, I think you limited that to passengers; I am not sure you were asked about the crew?

- There were no passengers on deck.

19061. And you said also that you did not see any as the boat was lowered?

- I did not.

19062. I am not sure whether you said it in answer to the Court, or whether it is only in the statement I have got from you, but at any rate that was your view; as the boat was lowered and you passed the decks you did not see any passengers on the decks?

- I did not.

19063. Where were the passengers then?

- I can only suppose the passengers had gone to the afterend of the ship.

19064. Do you mean you would not be able to see them, as your collapsible being just afore the foremost funnel you would not be able to see what was happening on the afterpart of the ship. Is that what you mean?

- Yes.

19065. That is where you would expect them to be?

- I presume they went there. I was really not thinking about it.

Sir Robert Finlay:

Then I put in the letter of instructions.

19066. (*The Commissioner.*) I want to ask a question before the witness goes. (*To the witness.*) Have you made any Enquiry as to whether any other liner was following this track in the direction of America during this day?

- I have not.

19067. Has anyone made any such Enquiry?

- I do not know.

The Commissioner:

Has such Enquiry been made, do you know, Sir Robert?

Sir Robert Finlay:

I am told, My Lord, there were others following it up.

The Commissioner:

Following the same track?

Sir Robert Finlay:

I am told so, My Lord.

The Commissioner:

I should very much like to know what those steamers were and whether they received similar warnings to that received from the "Baltic," and at what speed they were travelling?

Sir Robert Finlay:

We will endeavour to get all that information for your Lordship.

19068. (*The Commissioner - To the witness.*) Have you a note of any Enquiry as to whether, upon the receipt of warning as to ice, the German liners or the french liners slow down?

- I have no knowledge what they do, My Lord.

19069. Can any information of that kind be obtained as to the practice of these large liners when they receive notice of the existence of ice?

- We could ask for the information, My Lord.

19070. Do you think you could get it?

- I am afraid not, My Lord.

Sir Robert Finlay:

I might suggest, My Lord, that the Board of Trade would probably be able to insist upon the information from British ships as to following this line, according to our information, and what warnings they got, and so on, and I have no doubt if the Board of Trade were to apply they would get the information from the foreign lines which your Lordship has mentioned. I think the Board of Trade can do more than we can.

The Commissioner:

I would just say that if Mr. Ismay or his Company were to ask for the information, it might not be readily granted, but I think if the Board of Trade asked for it, it would be supplied.

The Attorney-General:

I said some time ago that your Lordship should have it when you asked the question some days ago.

19071. (*The Commissioner.*) Very well. (*To the witness.*) Now can you tell me, from the information you have got, in your opinion, how many of the watertight compartments were injured, that is to say, broken into, by the collision?

- I think there was water in the first four compartments, from the evidence I have read.

19072. Not the first six?

- I am not including the forepeak.

19073. Then if you included the forepeak, it would make five?

- Yes.

The Commissioner:

Mr. Asquith, will you just point out on the plan where the actual injury to the ship was - how far aft it occurred?

Mr. Raymond Asquith:

The five compartments.

The Commissioner:

Yes, counting the forepeak as one.

Mr. Raymond Asquith:

To there, counting the forepeak as one - that is to say, to No. 6.

Sir Robert Finlay:

But there was some water in No. 6.

The Attorney-General:

Yes.

The Commissioner:

I thought, Mr. Attorney, that the evidence was that there was water coming in in No. 6.

The Attorney-General:

Certainly, My Lord, that is quite right, and I may also say that we have evidence that water was coming into No. 5. Your Lordship will remember that when they came along after fetching the suction pipe from the aftermost funnel they came along, and then when they got to the aftermost door of No. 5, separating No. 4 from No. 5, that they stopped there because they knew that there was water in No. 5. We have direct evidence on that, too. That is

how it stands. May I call your Lordship's attention to one piece of evidence which I think has hitherto escaped particular observation, because our attention was not directed to this point, but it is not right to say that the evidence has only established that there were icebergs in the morning when day broke - on the morning of the 15th, that is.

The Commissioner:
No, I am aware of that.

The Attorney-General:
That is on the track.

The Commissioner:
Yes, that is on the track, but I was speaking about ice having been seen on the track before the collision. None was seen, as I understand.

The Attorney-General:
Your Lordship means none was seen by the "Titanic."

The Commissioner:
Yes, by the "Titanic."

The Attorney-General:
No, I agree on account of the iceberg, which was the first thing.

(The Witness withdrew.)

United States Senate Inquiry

Day 1

Testimony of Joseph Bruce Ismay

Source : <http://www.titanicinquiry.org/USInq/AmInq01Indx2a.php>

(Mr. J. Bruce Ismay, being duly sworn by the chairman, testified as follows:)

Senator SMITH.
Mr. Ismay, for the purpose of simplifying this hearing, I will ask you a few preliminary questions.

First state your full name, please?

Mr. ISMAY.
Joseph Bruce Ismay.

Senator SMITH.
And your place of residence?

Mr. ISMAY.
Liverpool.

Senator SMITH.
And your age?

Mr. ISMAY.
I shall be 50 on the 12th of December.

Senator SMITH.
And your occupation?

Mr. ISMAY.
Ship owner.

Senator SMITH.
Are you an officer of the White Star Line?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am.

Senator SMITH.
In what capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.
Managing Director.

Senator SMITH.
As such officer, were you officially designated to make the trial trip of the [*Titanic*](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator SMITH.
Were you a voluntary passenger?

Mr. ISMAY.
A voluntary passenger, yes.

Senator SMITH.
Where did you board the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
At Southampton.

Senator SMITH.
At what time?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think it was 9.30 in the morning.

Senator SMITH.
Of what day?

Mr. Ismay.
The 10th of April.

Senator SMITH.
The port of destination was New York?

Mr. ISMAY.
New York.

Senator SMITH.

Will you kindly tell the Committee the circumstances surrounding your voyage, and, as succinctly as possible, beginning with your going aboard the vessel at Liverpool, your place on the ship on the voyage, together with any circumstances you feel would be helpful to us in this inquiry?

Mr. ISMAY.

In the first place, I would like to express my sincere grief at this deplorable catastrophe.

I understand that you gentlemen have been appointed as a Committee of the Senate to inquire into the circumstances. So far as we are concerned, we welcome it. We court the fullest inquiry. We have nothing to conceal; nothing to hide. The ship was built in Belfast. She was the latest thing in the art of shipbuilding; absolutely no money was spared in her construction. She was not built by contract. She was simply built on a commission.

She left Belfast, as far as I remember - I am not absolutely clear about these dates - I think it was on the 1st of April.

She underwent her trials, which were entirely satisfactory. She then [proceeded](#) to Southampton; arriving there on Wednesday.

Senator SMITH.

Will you describe the trials she went through?

Mr. ISMAY.

I was not present.

She arrived at Southampton on Wednesday, the 3rd, I think, and [sailed](#) on Wednesday, the 10th. She left Southampton at 12 o'clock.

She [arrived](#) in Cherbourg that evening, having run over at 68 revolutions.

We left Cherbourg and [proceeded](#) to Queenstown. We arrived there, I think, about midday on Thursday.

We ran from Cherbourg to Queenstown at 70 revolutions.

After embarking the mails and passengers, we [proceeded](#) at 70 revolutions. I am not absolutely clear what the first day's run was, whether it was 464 miles or 484 miles.

The second day the number of revolutions was increased. I think the number of revolutions on the second day was about 72. I think we ran on the second day 519 miles.

The third day the revolutions were increased to 75, and I think we ran 546 or 549 miles.

The weather during this time was absolutely fine, with the exception, I think, of about 10 minutes' fog one evening.

The accident took place on Sunday night. What the exact time was I do not know. I was in bed myself, asleep, when the accident happened.

The ship sank, I am told, at 2:20.

That, sir, I think is all I can tell you.

I understand it has been stated that the ship was going at full speed. The ship never had been at full speed. The full speed of the ship is 78 revolutions. She works up to 80. So far as I am aware, she never exceeded 75 revolutions. She had not all her boilers on. None of the single-ended boilers were on.

It was our intention, if we had fine weather on Monday afternoon or Tuesday, to drive the ship at full speed. That, owing to the unfortunate catastrophe, never eventuated.

Senator SMITH.

Will you describe what you did after the impact or collision?

Mr. ISMAY.

I presume the impact awakened me. I lay in bed for a moment or two afterwards, not realizing, probably, what had happened. Eventually I got up and walked along the passageway and met one of the stewards, and said, "What has happened?" He said, "I do not know, sir."

I then went back into my [room](#), put my coat on, and went up on the [bridge](#), where I found [Capt. Smith](#). I asked him what had happened, and he said, "We have struck ice." I said, "Do you think the ship is seriously damaged?" He said, "I am afraid she is."

I then went down below, I think it was, where I met [Mr. Bell](#), the chief engineer, who was in the main companionway. I asked if he thought the ship was seriously damaged, and he said he thought she was, but was quite satisfied the pumps would keep her afloat.

I think I went back onto the bridge. I heard the order given to get the [boats](#) out. I walked along to the starboard side of the ship, where I met one of the officers. I told him to get the boats out -

Senator SMITH.

What officer?

Mr. ISMAY.

That I could not remember, sir.

I assisted, as best I could, getting the boats out and putting the women and children into the boats.

I stood upon that deck practically until I left the ship in the starboard [collapsible lifeboat](#), which is the last boat to leave the ship, so far as I know. More than that I do not know.

Senator SMITH.

Did the captain remain on the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.

That I could not tell you, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Did you leave him on the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

His first statement to you was that he felt she was seriously damaged?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And the next statement of the chief engineer was what?

Mr. ISMAY.
To the same effect.

Senator SMITH.
To the same effect?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
But that he hoped the pumps might keep her afloat?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have any talk with any officer other than the captain or the chief engineer and the steward that you met?

Mr. ISMAY.
Not that I remember.

Senator SMITH.
Did the officers seem to know the serious character of this collision?

Mr. ISMAY.
That I could not tell, sir, because I had no conversation with them.

Senator SMITH.
Did any officer say to you that it evidently was not serious?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
All the officers with whom you talked expressed the same fear, saying that it was serious?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not speak to any of them, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Except the captain?

Mr. ISMAY.
Except the captain and the chief engineer. I have already stated that I had spoken to them; but to no other officer that I remember.

Senator SMITH.
You went to the bridge immediately after you had returned to your room?

Mr. ISMAY.
After I had put on my coat I went up to the bridge.

Senator SMITH.
And you found the captain there?

Mr. ISMAY.
The captain was there.

Senator SMITH.
In what part of the ship were your quarters?

Mr. ISMAY.
My [quarters](#) were on B deck, just aft of the main companionway.

Senator SMITH.
I wish you would describe just where that was.

Mr. ISMAY.
The [sun deck](#) is the upper deck of all. Then we have what we call the [A deck](#), which is the next deck, and then the [B deck](#).

Mr. UHLER.
The second passenger deck?

Mr. ISMAY.
We carry very few passengers on the A deck. I think we have a diagram here that will show you these decks. Here it is, and *there* is the room I was occupying ([indicating on diagram](#)).

Senator SMITH.
What is the number of that room?

Mr. ISMAY.
B-52 is the room I had.

Senator SMITH.
You had the suite?

Mr. ISMAY.
I had the suite; I was sleeping in that room ([indicating on diagram](#)), as a matter of fact.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether there were any passengers on that deck?

Mr. ISMAY.
I have no idea, sir.

Senator SMITH.
You say that the trip was a voluntary trip on your part?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely.

Senator SMITH.
For the purpose of viewing this ship in action, or did you have some business in New York?

Mr. ISMAY.
I had no business to bring me to New York at all. I simply came in the natural course of events, as one is apt to, in the case of a new ship, to see how she works, and with the idea of seeing how we could improve on her for the next ship which we are building.

Senator SMITH.
Were there any other executive officers of the company aboard?

Mr. ISMAY.
None.

Senator SMITH.
Was the inspector or builder on board?

Mr. ISMAY.
There was a representative of the builders on board.

Senator SMITH.
Who was he?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. [Thomas Andrews](#).

Senator SMITH.
In what capacity was he?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not quite follow you.

Senator SMITH.
What was the occasion of his coming to make this trial trip?

Mr. ISMAY.
As a representative of the builders, to see that everything was working satisfactorily and also to see how he could improve the next ship.

Senator SMITH.
Was he a man of large experience?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Had he had part in the construction of this ship himself?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Was he among the survivors?

Mr. ISMAY.
Unfortunately, no.

Senator SMITH.
How old a man was he?

Mr. ISMAY.
It is difficult to judge a man's age, as you know, but I should think he was perhaps 42 or 43 years of age. He may have been less. I really could not say.

Senator SMITH.
Then, you were the only executive officer aboard representing your company, aside from the ship's customary complement of officers?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have occasion to consult with the captain about the movement of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
Never.

Senator SMITH.
Did he consult you about it?

Mr. ISMAY.
Never. Perhaps I am wrong in saying that. I should like to say this: I do not know that it was quite a matter of consulting him about it, of his consulting me about it, but what we had arranged to do was that we would not attempt to arrive in New York at the lightship before 5 o'clock on Wednesday morning.

Senator SMITH.
That was the understanding?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. But that was arranged before we left Queenstown.

Senator SMITH.
Was it supposed that you could reach New York at that time without putting the ship to its full running capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.
Oh, yes, sir. There was nothing to be gained by arriving at New York any earlier than that.

Senator SMITH.
You spoke of the revolutions on the early part of the voyage.

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Those were increased as the distance was increased?

Mr. ISMAY.
The *Titanic* being a new ship, we were gradually working her up. When you bring out a new ship you naturally do not start her running at full speed until you get everything working smoothly and satisfactorily down below.

Senator SMITH.
Did I understand you to say that she exceeded 70 revolutions?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; she was going 75 revolutions on Tuesday.

Senator SMITH.
On Tuesday?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; I am wrong - on Saturday. I am mixed up as to the days.

Senator SMITH.
The day before the accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

The day before the accident. That, of course, is nothing near her full speed.

Senator SMITH.

During the voyage, do you know, of your own knowledge, of your proximity to icebergs?

Mr. ISMAY.

Did I know that we were near icebergs?

Senator SMITH.

Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I did not. I know ice had been reported.

Senator SMITH.

Ice had been reported?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

Did you personally see any icebergs, or any large volume of ice?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; not until after the accident.

Senator SMITH.

Not until after the wreck?

Mr. ISMAY.

I had never seen an iceberg in my life before.

Senator SMITH.

You never saw one before.

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Had you ever been on this so-called [northern route](#) before?

Mr. ISMAY.

We were on the [southern route](#), sir.

Senator SMITH.

On this Newfoundland route?

Mr. ISMAY.

We were on the long southern route; not on the northern route.

Senator SMITH.

You were not on the extreme northern route?

Mr. ISMAY.

We were on the extreme southern route for the west-bound ships.

Senator SMITH.
What was the longitude and latitude of this ship? Do you know?

Mr. ISMAY.
That I could not tell you; I am not a sailor.

Senator SMITH.
Were you cognizant of your proximity to icebergs at all on Saturday?

Mr. ISMAY.
On Saturday? No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know anything about a [wireless message](#) from the [Amerika](#) to the *Titanic*-

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Saying that the *Amerika* had encountered ice in that latitude?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Were you aware of the proximity of icebergs on Sunday?

Mr. ISMAY.
On Sunday? No; I did not know on Sunday. I knew that we would be in the ice region that night sometime.

Senator SMITH.
That you would be or were?

Mr. ISMAY.
That we would be in the ice region on Sunday night.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have any consultation with the captain regarding the matter?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely none.

Senator SMITH.
Or with any other officer of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
With no officer at all, sir. It was absolutely out of my province. I am not a navigator. I was simply a passenger on board the ship.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know anything about the working of the wireless service on this ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
In what way? We had wireless on the ship.

Senator SMITH.

Had you taken any unusual precaution to have a reserve power for this wireless?

Mr. ISMAY.

I believe there was, but I have no knowledge of that myself.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know how long the wireless continued to operate after the blow or collision?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I do not.

Senator SMITH.

Did you, at any time see the operator of the wireless?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did not.

Senator SMITH.

Did you attempt to send any messages yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did not.

Senator SMITH.

Were you outside on the deck, or on any deck, when the order was given to lower the [lifeboats](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.

I heard Capt. Smith give the order when I was on the [bridge](#).

Senator SMITH.

You heard the captain give the order?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Will you tell us what he said.

Mr. ISMAY.

It is very difficult for me to remember exactly what was said, sir.

Senator SMITH.

As nearly as you can.

Mr. ISMAY.

I know I heard him give the order to lower the boats. I think that is all he said. I think he simply turned around and gave the order.

Senator SMITH.

Was there anything else said, as to how they should be manned or occupied?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; not that I heard. As soon as I heard him give the order to lower the boats, I left the bridge.

Senator SMITH.
You left the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see any of the boats lowered?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
How many?

Mr. ISMAY.
Certainly three.

Senator SMITH.
Will you tell us, if you can, how they were lowered?

Mr. ISMAY.
They were swung out, people were put into the boats from the [deck](#), and then they were simply lowered away down to the water.

Senator SMITH.
Were these lifeboats on the various decks?

Mr. ISMAY.
They were all on one deck.

Senator SMITH.
On what deck?

Mr. ISMAY.
On the [sun deck](#); the deck above this (*indicating on diagram*). I do not think it is shown on this plan.

Senator SMITH.
That is, the second deck above yours?

Mr. ISMAY.
On this [deck](#) here, on the big plan (*indicating*).

Senator SMITH.
On the sun deck?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes; on what we call the sun deck or the boat deck.

Senator SMITH.
They were on the boat deck, which would be the upper deck of all?

Mr. ISMAY.
The upper deck of all, yes.

Senator SMITH.

Was there any order or supervision exercised by the officers of the ship in loading these lifeboats?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

I wish you would tell just what that was.

Mr. ISMAY.

That I could not say. I could only speak from what I saw for myself.

Senator SMITH.

That is all I wish you to do.

Mr. ISMAY.

The boats that were lowered where I was were in charge of the officer and were filled and lowered away.

Senator SMITH.

They first put men into the boats for the purpose of controlling them?

Mr. ISMAY.

We put in some of the ship's people.

Senator SMITH.

Some of the ship's people?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

How many?

Mr. ISMAY.

That I could not say.

Senator SMITH.

About how many?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not say.

Senator SMITH.

About three or four?

Mr. ISMAY.

The officer who was there will be able to give you that information, sir. My own statement would be simply guesswork. His statement would be reliable.

Senator SMITH.

In the [boat](#) in which you left the ship how many men were on board?

Mr. ISMAY.

Four.

Senator SMITH.
Besides yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.
I thought you meant the crew.

Senator SMITH.
I did mean the crew.

Mr. ISMAY.
There were four of the crew.

Senator SMITH.
What position did these men occupy?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not know, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Were any of them officers?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator SMITH.
Or seamen?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe one was a quartermaster. [[George Thomas Rowe](#)]

Senator SMITH.
One was a quartermaster?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe so, but I do not know.

Senator SMITH.
You saw three of the boats lowered yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
And three of them loaded?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
As they were loaded, was any order given as to how they should be loaded?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator SMITH.
How did it happen that the women were first put aboard these lifeboats?

Mr. ISMAY.
The natural order would be women and children first.

Senator SMITH.
Was that the order?

Mr. ISMAY.
Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH.
That was followed?

Mr. ISMAY.
As far as practicable.

Senator SMITH.
So far as you observed?

Mr. ISMAY.
So far as I observed.

Senator SMITH.
And were all the women and children accommodated in these lifeboats?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not tell you, sir.

Senator SMITH.
How many passengers were in the lifeboat in which you left the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think about 45.

Senator SMITH.
Forty-five?

Mr. ISMAY.
That is my recollection.

Senator SMITH.
Was that its full capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.
Practically.

Senator SMITH.
How about the other two boats?

Mr. ISMAY.
The other three, I should think, were fairly loaded up.

Senator SMITH.
The three besides the one you were in?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
They were fairly well filled?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Was there any struggle or jostling?

Mr. ISMAY.
I saw none.

Senator SMITH.
Or any attempt by men to get into the boats?

Mr. ISMAY.
I saw none.

Senator SMITH.
Were these women passengers designated as they went into the lifeboat?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Those that were nearest the lifeboat were taken in?

Mr. ISMAY.
We simply picked the women out and put them in the boat as fast as we could.

Senator SMITH.
You picked them from among the throng?

Mr. ISMAY.
We took the first ones that were there and put them in the lifeboats. I was there myself and put a lot in.

Senator SMITH.
You helped put some of them in yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.
I put a great many in.

Senator SMITH.
Were children shown the same consideration as the women?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see any lifeboat without its complement of oarsmen?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see the first lifeboat lowered?

Mr. ISMAY.

That I could not answer, sir. I saw the first lifeboat lowered on the starboard side. What was going on on the port side I have no knowledge of.

Senator SMITH.

It has been intimated, Mr. Ismay, that the first [lifeboat](#) did not contain the necessary number of men to man it.

Mr. ISMAY.

As to that I have no knowledge, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And that women were obliged to row the boat.

Mr. HUGHES.

That is the second lifeboat, Senator.

Senator SMITH.

The second lifeboat; and that women were obliged to row that boat from 10:30 o'clock at night until 7:30 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. ISMAY.

The accident did not take place until 11 -

Senator SMITH.

Well, from after 11:30 o'clock at night until between 6 and 7 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. ISMAY.

Of that I have no knowledge.

Senator SMITH.

Until the [Carpathia](#) overtook them. You have no knowledge of that?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely none, sir.

Senator SMITH.

So far as your observation went, would you say that was not so?

Mr. ISMAY.

I would not say either yes or no; but I did not see it.

Senator SMITH.

When you first went on to the deck, you were only partially clothed?

Mr. ISMAY.

That is all, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And, as I understand, you went as far as to encounter an officer or steward?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And then returned?

Mr. ISMAY.
That is right.

Senator SMITH.
How long were you on the ship after the collision occurred?

Mr. ISMAY.
That is a very difficult question to answer, sir. Practically until the time - almost until she sank.

Senator SMITH.
How long did it take to lower and load a lifeboat?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not answer that.

Senator SMITH.
Can you approximate it?

Mr. ISMAY.
It is not possible for me to judge the time. I could not answer that.

Senator SMITH.
Were you on the [Titanic](#) an hour after the collision?

Mr. ISMAY.
Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH.
How much longer?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think it was an hour and a quarter.

Senator SMITH.
An hour and a quarter?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think that was it; perhaps longer.

Senator SMITH.
Did you, during this time, see any of the passengers that you knew?

Mr. ISMAY.
I really do not remember; I saw a great many passengers, but I do not think I paid much very attention to who they were. I do not remember recognizing any of them.

Senator SMITH.
Did you know [Charles M. Hayes](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you know of the presence of other Americans and Canadians of prominence?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I knew Mr. Hayes was on board the ship.

Senator SMITH.

You knew he was on the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; I have known him for some years.

Senator SMITH.

But you did not see him after the accident occurred?

Mr. ISMAY.

I never saw him after the accident; no.

Senator SMITH.

And he is unaccounted for?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

He was not among the saved?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

What were the circumstances, Mr. Ismay, of your departure from the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

In what way?

Senator SMITH.

Did the last [boat](#) that you went on leave the ship from some point near where you were?

Mr. ISMAY.

I was immediately opposite the lifeboat when she left.

Senator SMITH.

Immediately opposite?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

What were the circumstances of your departure from the ship? I ask merely that -

Mr. ISMAY.

The boat was there. There was a certain number of men in the boat, and the officer called out asking if there were any more women, and there was no response, and there were no passengers left on the [deck](#).

Senator SMITH.

There were no passengers on the deck?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; and as the boat was in the act of being lowered away, I got into it.

Senator SMITH.

At that time the *Titanic* was sinking?

Mr. ISMAY.

She was sinking.

Senator SMITH.

Where did this ship collide? Was it a side blow?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no knowledge, myself. I can only state what I have been told, that she hit the iceberg somewhere between the breakwater and the bridge.

Senator SMITH.

State that again.

Mr. ISMAY.

Between the breakwater and the [bridge](#).

Senator SMITH.

On the starboard side?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

Did you see any of the men passengers on that ship with life preservers on?

Mr. ISMAY.

Nearly all passengers had life preservers on.

Senator SMITH.

All that you saw?

Mr. ISMAY.

All that I saw had life preservers on.

Senator SMITH.

All of them that you saw?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; as far as I can remember.

Senator SMITH.

Naturally, you would remember that if you saw it? When you entered the lifeboat yourself, you say there were no passengers on that part of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

None.

Senator SMITH.

Did you, at any time, see any struggle among the men to get into these boats?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator SMITH.
Was there any attempt, as this boat was being lowered past the other decks, to have you take on more passengers?

Mr. ISMAY.
None, sir. There were no passengers there to take on.

Senator SMITH.
Before you boarded the lifeboat, did you see any of the passengers jump into the sea?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not.

Senator SMITH.
After you had taken the lifeboat did you see any of the passengers or crew with life-saving apparatus on them in the sea?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
What course was taken by the lifeboat in which you were after leaving the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
We saw a light some distance off to which we attempted to pull and which we thought was a ship.

Senator SMITH.
Can you give the direction of it?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not give that.

Senator SMITH.
But you saw a light?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
And you attempted to pull this boat toward it?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
How long were you in the open sea in this lifeboat?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think about four hours.

Senator SMITH.
Were there any other lifeboats in that vicinity?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
How many?

Mr. ISMAY.
That I could not answer. I know there was one, because we hailed her. She had a light, and we hailed her, but got no answer from her.

Senator SMITH.
You got no answer?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see any rafts in the open sea?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; none.

Senator SMITH.
Were there any other rafts on the *Titanic* that could have been utilized?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe not.

Senator SMITH.
Were all of the lifeboats of one type?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; there were four that are called [collapsible boats](#).

Senator SMITH.
What were the others?

Mr. ISMAY.
Ordinary wooden boats.

Senator SMITH.
How many were there?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think there were 20 altogether.

Senator SMITH.
Including both designs?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. Sixteen wooden boats and four collapsible boats, I think. I am not absolutely certain.

Senator SMITH.
When you reached the *Carpathia*, was your lifeboat taken aboard the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.
That I do not know.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see any other lifeboats taken aboard the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not.

Senator SMITH.
What was the method of getting you aboard the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.
We simply walked up a Jacob's ladder.

Senator SMITH.
What was the condition of the sea at that time?

Mr. ISMAY.
There was a little ripple on it, nothing more.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether all the lifeboats that left the *Titanic* were accounted for?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe so. I do not know that of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH.
I think it has been suggested that two of them were engulfed.

Mr. ISMAY.
Of that I know nothing.

Senator SMITH.
You would know if that were true, would you not?

Mr. ISMAY.
I have had no consultation with anybody since the accident with the exception of one officer.

Senator SMITH.
Who was that?

Mr. ISMAY.
[Mr. Lightoller](#). I have spoken to no member of the crew or anybody since in regard to the accident.

Senator SMITH.
What was Mr. Lightoller's position?

Mr. ISMAY.
He was the second officer of the *Titanic*.

Senator SMITH.
How many officers of the ship's crew were saved?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am told four.

Senator SMITH.
Can you give their names?

Mr. ISMAY.
I can not.

Senator SMITH.
Or their occupation?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not. The only one I know is Mr. Lightoller, who was the second officer.

Senator SMITH.
I understand they are here.

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe so; I do not know.

Senator SMITH.
Mr. Ismay, what can you say about the sinking and disappearance of the ship? Can you describe the manner in which she went down?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not see her go down.

Senator SMITH.
You did not see her go down?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
How far were you from the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not know how far we were away. I was sitting with my back to the ship. I was rowing all the time I was in the boat. We were pulling away.

Senator SMITH.
You were rowing?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes; I did not wish to see her go down.

Senator SMITH.
You did not care to see her go down?

Mr. ISMAY.
No. I am glad I did not.

Senator SMITH.
When you last saw her, were there indications that she had broken in two?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
When did you last see her?

Mr. ISMAY.
I really could not say. It might have been 10 minutes after we left her. It is impossible for me to give any judgment of the time. I could not do it.

Senator SMITH.
Was there much apparent confusion on board when you saw her last?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not look to see, sir. My back was turned to her. I looked around once only, to see her red light - her green light, rather.

Senator SMITH.
You never saw the [captain](#) again after you left him on the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have any message from him?

Mr. ISMAY.
Nothing.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know how many wireless operators there were on board the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not; but I presume there were two. There is always one on watch.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether they survived?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am told one of them did, but I do not know whether it is true or not. I really have not asked.

Senator SMITH.
Were any of this crew enlisted men in the English Navy?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not know, sir. The ship's articles will show that.

Senator SMITH.
Can you tell us anything about the inspection, and the certificate that was made and issued before sailing?

Mr. ISMAY.
The ship receives a Board of Trade [passenger certificate](#); otherwise she would not be allowed to carry passengers.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether that was done?

Mr. ISMAY.
You could not sail your ship without it; you could not get your clearance.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether this ship was equipped with its full complement of lifeboats?

Mr. ISMAY.

If she had not been, she could not have sailed. She would not have received her passenger certificate; therefore she must have been fully equipped.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether these [lifeboats](#) were the lifeboats that were planned for the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not quite understand what you mean, sir. I do not think lifeboats are ever built for the ship. Lifeboats are built to have a certain cubic capacity.

Senator SMITH.

I understand that; but I mean whether these lifeboats were completed for the ship coincident with the completion of the ship, or whether the lifeboats, or any of them, were borrowed from the other ships of the White Star Line?

Mr. ISMAY.

They certainly would not be borrowed from any other ship.

Senator SMITH.

Do you recollect whether the [lifeboat](#) in which you left the ship was marked with the name *Titanic* on the boat or on the oars?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no idea. I presume oars would be marked. I do not know whether the boat was marked or not. She was a [collapsible boat](#).

Senator SMITH.

Can you recollect whether that was so?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did not look to see whether the oars were marked. It would be a natural precaution to take?

Senator SMITH.

Mr. Ismay, do you know about the boiler construction of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I do not. May I suggest, gentlemen, if you wish any information in regard to the construction of the ship, in any manner, shape, or form, that I shall be only too pleased to arrange for one of the Harland & Wolff's people to come here and give you all the information you require; the plans and everything.

Senator SMITH.

We are much obliged to you. There has been some suggestion by passengers who left the ship in lifeboats, that an explosion took place after this collision. Have you any knowledge on that point?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely none.

Senator SMITH.

Do you think you would have known about that if it had occurred?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; I should. Do you mean to say before the ship went down?

Senator SMITH.
Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely.

Senator SMITH.
Mr. Ismay, do you know anything about the action of the amidship [turbine](#); the number of revolutions?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Mr. UHLER.
The [reciprocating engines](#), you say, were going at 75 or 72 revolutions at one time?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Mr. UHLER.
Have you any knowledge as to how many revolutions the amidship turbine was making?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir. Those are all technical questions which can be answered by others, if you desire.

Senator NEWLANDS.
What speed would 75 revolutions indicate?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think about 21 knots.

Senator NEWLANDS.
What is that in miles?

Mr. ISMAY.
It is in the ratio of 11 to 13; about 26 miles, I think.

Senator NEWLANDS.
Mr. Ismay, did you have anything to do with the selection of the men who accompanied you in the last boat?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator NEWLANDS.
How were they designated?

Mr. ISMAY.
I presume by the officer who was in charge of the boat.

Senator NEWLANDS.
Who was that?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. Wilde. [[Henry T. Wilde](#)]

Senator NEWLANDS.
And he was what officer?

Mr. ISMAY.
Chief officer.

Senator NEWLANDS.
Was that done by lot or by selection?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think these men were allotted certain posts.

Senator NEWLANDS.
Indiscriminately?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; I fancy at the time they had what they called, I think, the boat's crew list. That is all arranged beforehand.

Senator SMITH.
Can you describe those rafts?

Mr. ISMAY.
There were none on board the ship.

Senator SMITH.
Did you see any rafts actually in service?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Is it customary for the White Star Line to carry rafts?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe in the olden days we carried rafts.

Senator SMITH.
Recently that has not been done?

Mr. ISMAY.
Not in the recent ships; no, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Why?

Mr. ISMAY.
I presume because they are not considered suitable.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know what water capacity there was on that ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not, sir.

Senator SMITH.
I mean, when she was stove in, how many compartments could be flooded with safety?

Mr. ISMAY.

I beg your pardon, sir. I misunderstood your question. The ship was especially constructed to float, with two compartments full of water.

Senator SMITH.

She was constructed to float with two compartments full of water?

Mr. ISMAY.

The ship was specially constructed so that she would float with any two compartments full of water. I think I am right in saying that there are very few ships - perhaps I had better not say that, but I will continue, now that I have begun it - I believe there are very few ships today of which the same can be said.

When we built the *Titanic* we had that especially in mind. If this ship had hit the iceberg stem on, in all human probability she would have been here today.

Senator SMITH.

If she had hit the iceberg head on; in all probability she would be here now?

Mr. ISMAY.

I say in all human probability that ship would have been afloat today.

Senator NEWLANDS.

How did the ship strike the iceberg?

Mr. ISMAY.

From information I have received, I think she struck the iceberg a glancing blow between the end of the [forecastle](#) and the [captain's bridge](#), just aft of the [foremast](#), sir.

Senator SMITH.

I understood you to say a little while ago that you were rowing, with your back to the ship. If you were rowing and going away from the ship, you would naturally be facing the ship, would you not?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; in these boats some row facing the bow of the boat and some facing the stern. I was seated with my back to the man who was steering, so that I was facing away from the ship.

Senator SMITH.

You have stated that the ship was specially constructed so that she could float with two compartments filled with water?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

Is it your idea, then, that there were no two compartments left entire?

Mr. ISMAY.

That I can not answer, sir. I am convinced that more than two compartments were filled. As I tried to explain to you last night, I think the ship's bilge was ripped open.

Senator NEWLANDS.

The ship had 16 compartments?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not answer that, sir.

Senator NEWLANDS.
Approximately?

Mr. ISMAY.
Approximately. That information is absolutely at your disposal. Our shipbuilders will give it to you accurately.

Senator NEWLANDS.
She was so built that if any two of these compartments should be filled with water she would still float?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; if any two of the largest compartments were filled with water she would still float.

Senator SMITH.
Mr. Ismay, what time did you dine on Sunday evening?

Mr. ISMAY.
At 7:30.

Senator SMITH.
With whom?

Mr. ISMAY.
With the doctor. [[Dr. William O'Loughlin](#)]

Senator SMITH.
Did the [captain](#) dine with you?

Mr. ISMAY.
He did not, sir.

Senator SMITH.
When you went to the [bridge](#) after this collision, was there any ice on the decks?

Mr. ISMAY.
I saw no ice at all, and no icebergs at all until daylight Monday morning.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether any people were injured or killed from ice that came to the decks?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not, sir. I heard ice had been found on the decks, but it is only hearsay.

Senator SMITH.
I think I asked you, but in case it appears that I have not, I will ask you again: Were all of the women and children saved?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am afraid not, sir.

Senator SMITH.
What proportion were saved?

Mr. ISMAY.
I have no idea. I have not asked. Since the accident I have made very few inquiries of any sort.

Senator SMITH.

Did any of the [collapsible boats](#) sink, to your knowledge, after leaving the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator NEWLANDS.

What was the full equipment of [lifeboats](#) for a ship of this size?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not tell you that, sir. That is covered by the Board of Trade regulations. She may have exceeded the Board of Trade regulations, for all I know. I could not answer that question. Anyhow, she had sufficient boats to obtain her [passenger certificate](#), and therefore she must have been fully boated, according to the requirements of the English Board of Trade, which I understand are accepted by this country. Is not that so, General?

Mr. UHLER.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

Mr. Ismay, did you in any manner attempt to influence or interfere with the wireless communication between the [Carpathia](#) and other stations?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. I think the [captain](#) of the *Carpathia* is here, and he will probably tell you that I was never out of my room from the time I got on board the *Carpathia* until the ship docked here last night. I never moved out of the room.

Senator SMITH.

How were you dressed? Were you completely dressed when you went into the [lifeboat](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.

I had a suit of pajamas on, a pair of slippers, a suit of clothes, and an overcoat.

Senator SMITH.

How many men, officers and crew, were there on this boat?

Mr. ISMAY.

There were no officers.

Senator SMITH.

I mean the officers of the ship.

Mr. ISMAY.

How many officers were there on the ship?

Senator SMITH.

Yes, and how many in the crew?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think there were seven officers on the ship.

Senator SMITH.

And how many in the crew?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not know the full number of the crew. There were seven officers - or nine officers; there are always three officers on watch.

Senator SMITH.

And how many men were in the lifeboat with you?

Mr. ISMAY.

Oh, I could not tell. I suppose nine or ten.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know who they were?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not. [Mr. Carter](#), a passenger, was one. I do not know who the others were; third class passengers, I think. In fact, all the people on the boat, as far as I could see, were third class passengers.

Senator SMITH.

Did they all survive, and were they all taken aboard the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.

They all survived, yes.

Senator SMITH.

You have indicated your willingness to supply the committee with any data or information that may be necessary regarding the construction and equipment of this vessel?

Mr. ISMAY.

Any information or any data the committee may wish is absolutely at their disposal.

Senator SMITH.

And you have indicated your willingness to meet our full committee?

Mr. ISMAY.

At any time you wish, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And I suppose this includes the surviving officers?

Mr. ISMAY.

Certainly, sir. Anybody that you wish is absolutely at your disposal.

Senator SMITH.

What are your own immediate plans?

Mr. ISMAY.

I understand that depends on you.

Senator SMITH.

I thank you, in behalf of my associates and myself, for responding so readily this morning, and for your statements; and I am going to ask you to hold yourself subject to our wishes during the balance of the day.

For the convenience of the captain of the *Carpathia* I am going to call him at this time.

Mr. ISMAY.

I am entirely at your disposal at any time, sir.

Senator SMITH.

The committee has decided to call the captain of the *Carpathia* as the next witness.

Day 11

Testimony of Joseph B. Ismay, cont.

Senator SMITH.

[Mr. Ismay](#), you were sworn in New York.

Mr. ISMAY.

I was, sir.

Senator SMITH.

I desire to ask you a few questions in addition to those I asked you the other day.

I believe you said your [stateroom](#) was on A deck?

Mr. ISMAY.

On B deck.

Senator SMITH.

On B deck; No. 56?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am not sure whether I said 52 or 56; but a gentleman who was on the stand yesterday said he had 52, and if he had, I could not have had it. I must have been in 56, I think.

Senator SMITH.

How long have you been managing director of the International Mercantile Marine Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

The general manager?

Senator SMITH.

Yes; how long have you held the office you now hold?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think since about 1910, sir. I succeeded Mr. Griscom.

Senator SMITH.

In such position, what were your duties?

Mr. ISMAY.

I had general control of the steamship business of the International Mercantile Marine Co.

Senator SMITH.

And its constituent companies?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; with the exception of the Leyland Line. I think the captain of the *Californian* said I had control of the Leyland Line. That is not correct. The Leyland Line has its own general manager and its own board of directors.

Senator SMITH.

Is its stock owned by your company?

Mr. ISMAY.

Controlled - not entirely. There is a certain amount of stock held altogether by outside individuals.

Senator SMITH.

Is the majority of the stock owned by your company?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

So that you are in a position to control the Leyland Line if you care to do so?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And the steamship *Californian* is one of the ships of the Leyland Line?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

How many steamship lines are under the control of your company?

Mr. ISMAY.

There's the American Line -

Senator SMITH. (*interposing*)

In naming them, I would like to have you, if you will, name the routes or principal ports of call of these various lines?

Mr. ISMAY.

Of the whole fleet, sir?

Senator SMITH.

Of the whole fleet; yes.

Mr. ISMAY.

We have the American Line of steamers, which run between Southampton and New York. They also have service between Philadelphia and Liverpool.

We have the Atlantic Transport Line, which runs from New York to London, from Philadelphia to London, and from Baltimore to Antwerp and London. There is the White Star Line, that runs from New York to Liverpool, from New York to Southampton; from Liverpool to Australia, and from Liverpool to New Zealand; from New York to the Mediterranean, and from Boston to the Mediterranean; from Montreal to Liverpool - the White Star Line also. We have the Mississippi and Dominion Line that runs steamers from Montreal to Liverpool; and the British North Atlantic that runs steamers from Montreal to Liverpool, and from Montreal to Avonmouth.

The Leyland Line runs from Boston to Liverpool, from Boston to London, to the West Indies, and down to some South American ports, and to New Orleans. The White Star Line runs from New York to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Boston, and then down from Boston to Philadelphia and Baltimore. I think that is all, as far as I can remember.

Senator SMITH.

Have you any lines to Australia?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; the White Star Line runs from London to Australia. They go from Liverpool to Australia, and come from Australia back to London, and then on to Liverpool, calling at the Cape of Good Hope outward and inward

bound. The New Zealand steamers from London go out by the Cape of Good Hope and come home by Cape Horn.

Senator SMITH.
Have you any lines to Brazil?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Or Buenos Aires?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
I mean the Argentine?

Mr. ISMAY.
There may be tramp steamers going down there with coal, but we have no regularly established lines.

Senator SMITH.
Is there any other service other than that which you have described to the Mediterranean?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; simply from New York to the Mediterranean, and from Boston to the Mediterranean.

Senator SMITH.
Touching at all these principal ports of the Mediterranean?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; Gibraltar and Naples and Algiers, and right through to Alexandria.

Senator SMITH.
How many ships constitute this fleet?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am afraid I could not tell you. I think it amounts to about a million tons altogether, in round figures. I do not know the number. You will find the number in that report for 1910 which Mr. Franklin gave you, the International Mercantile Marine Company's report, showing the names of all the steamers and the tonnage.

Senator SMITH.
Is the investment in ships of your company its principal and only investment?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; I should think so.

All the money we have is invested in ships or works pertaining to the ships; that is, works that we keep going for the ships, repair shops and those kinds of things; nothing outside of that.

Senator SMITH.
What I was getting at was the question whether your company built any of its own vessels.

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir. We would only do the ordinary repairs; what we call the voyage repairs.

Senator SMITH.

I think the record shows that the capitalization and bonded indebtedness of your company aggregates about \$153,000.000?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir. Mr. Franklin gave that in his testimony.

Senator SMITH.

Is this the amount represented, so far as you are able to say, by the property you have described?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Are you interested personally or is your company interested in the shipbuilding firm of Harland & Wolff?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

They were the builders of the *Titanic*, were they not?

Mr. ISMAY.

Messrs. Harland & Wolff of Belfast, built the *Titanic*; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Have they built other ships for your company?

Mr. ISMAY.

They built practically the whole fleet of the White Star Line.

Senator SMITH.

Including the *Olympic* and the *Baltic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

The *Olympic* and the *Baltic* and all those ships.

Senator SMITH.

Under whose immediate supervision has that work been done?

Mr. ISMAY.

Lord Pirrie is the chairman of the company.

Senator SMITH.

He is chairman of the building company?

Mr. ISMAY.

He is chairman of the building company.

Senator SMITH.

Has [Mr. Andrews](#) held -

Mr. ISMAY. (*interrupting*)

He was one of the directors of Harland & Wolff.

Senator SMITH.
He himself was a builder?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Was he an engineer?

Mr. ISMAY.
I would not call him an engineer. He was more of a designer, and was superintending the building of the ships.

Senator SMITH.
Did he have anything to do with the building of the *Olympic*?

Mr. ISMAY.
He had a great deal to do with designing the *Olympic*.

Senator SMITH.
And he designed the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.
And he designed the *Titanic*.

Senator SMITH.
And was one of the passengers on this ill-fated voyage?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
And he did not survive?

Mr. ISMAY.
He did not.

Senator SMITH.
I have forgotten, Mr. Ismay, whether you were at Belfast when the trial trips of the *Titanic* were made.

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir. As I came out on the first voyage of the ship, I did not go over for the trial trips.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether Mr. Andrews was there at Belfast when the trial trips were made?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe he was. I think he came around in the ship from Belfast to Southampton.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether any officer or director of your company was at Belfast when the trial trips were made?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes; Mr. Sanderson was on the ship.

Senator SMITH.
What place did he hold?

Mr. ISMAY.

He is manager of the White Star Line and a director of the White Star Line. I think he is a director of the International Mercantile Marine Co., and one of the vice-presidents. Mr. Sanderson was also on board the ship.

Senator SMITH.

He was also a director.

Mr. ISMAY.

Of the International Mercantile Marine Co.; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Did both of these directors make the voyage from Belfast to Southampton on the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; I believe so.

Senator SMITH.

But neither of them was aboard the ship on this last voyage?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

What is the relationship of the vessels of the International Mercantile Marine Co., or any of its constituent companies, to the British Navy?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am afraid I do not understand quite what you mean?

Senator SMITH.

I want to know whether any of the ships of your fleet are, by any arrangement with the British Government, auxiliary to their Navy?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

What mail contracts have you with the British Government or any other Government?

Mr. ISMAY.

We have a mail contract for carrying the mails from Southampton to New York, for which we receive a lump-sum payment of £70,000 a year; \$350,000 a year.

Senator SMITH.

£70,000?

Mr. ISMAY.

That is the maximum payment that we can receive.

Senator SMITH.

For that payment, what are you supposed to do?

Mr. ISMAY.

We carry the mails from Southampton. We pick up the mails at Southampton, and then we go on to Queenstown and pick up any mails that are there, and land them in New York.

Senator SMITH.

In that contract, is there any condition that you shall make any specific speed between Southampton and New York?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. We are supposed to use the fastest ships we have in our fleet for the conveyance of the mails, but there is absolutely no penalty attached to our not making any special speed.

Senator SMITH.

Is there a minimum?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think there is. I think there is a minimum; or we are not allowed to put the mails into ships that will go less than 16 knots, or something like that.

Senator SMITH.

Is the arrangement that you have with the British postal authorities?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

That arrangement provides that this mail shall be dispatched in the most direct and expeditious manner possible, and that you shall not loiter, at a minimum speed of less than 16 knots per hour?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think it is 16 knots, sir. The contract is printed. The contract is a public document.

Senator SMITH.

You say that you are supposed to carry these mails on your fastest ships?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

Have you any mail contracts with the Government of the United States?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. Oh, I beg your pardon; I was speaking then of the White Star Line. The American Line has a contract.

Senator SMITH.

What kind of contract is that?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think they get \$4 a mile and have to carry the mails. I do not know whether they receive any payment for the mails.

Senator SMITH.

\$4 per mile?

Mr. ISMAY.

Per mile.

Senator SMITH.

Only per mile?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Not per ton?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
There is no ton requisite?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; it is per mile.

Senator SMITH.
And is that for the mail service between New York and Southampton?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Have you any contract with the United States Government for mail service between New York or Boston and other ports than Southampton?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Is there any speed condition in the contract of the United States Government?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am really not conversant with that contract, sir.

Senator SMITH.
I think you have said you have no mail contracts with any other Governments?

Mr. ISMAY.
We have a mail contract with the Canadian Government. I think we get \$1,000 a ship for taking the mails from Quebec to Liverpool.

Senator SMITH.
Do you remember the terms of years of your British contract?

Mr. ISMAY.
It is subject to 12-months notice.

Senator SMITH.
It is perpetual, with the privilege of discontinuing on 12-months notice?

Mr. ISMAY.
Either side can give 12-months notice, and discontinue the contract at any time.

Senator SMITH.
It is subject to rearrangement?

Mr. ISMAY.

That would be the subject of negotiation between the post office and ourselves.

Senator SMITH.

Are the terms of that contract subject to readjustment from time to time?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; it is an absolutely set contract, subject to 12-months notice.

Senator SMITH.

In making that contract with the British Government, were you obliged to enter into competition with any rival line?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I do not think so, sir. I think the arrangement was made between the White Star Line and the Cunard Company and the Government.

Senator SMITH.

Was the Cunard Company the only competition that you had in that field?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes. I do not know any other British company which has a contract with the British Government for carrying mails across the western ocean, at least, so far as England and the United States are concerned.

Senator SMITH.

Then you have an arrangement between the Cunard Company and your own company with reference to this contract?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I would not say that. The Cunard Company negotiated with the Government so far as they were concerned, and we negotiated with the Government so far as we were concerned.

Senator SMITH.

Does the Cunard Company receive any division of this income; does it receive any portion of this income of \$350,000 a year?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And is that the case with the American Government; does the same situation exist with the American Government?

Mr. ISMAY.

During the winter months we do not run four White Star steamers. We have been in the habit of running two White Star steamers and two American Line steamers, and the White Star Line always credits the American Line with their share of the mail matter; so that you might divide the mail matter into 52 weeks, one boat a week.

Senator SMITH.

But there is no co-partnership arrangement of any kind?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely none.

Senator SMITH.

Or any division of this income, as the result of an understanding between the two companies?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I do not think so.

Senator SMITH.
In either contract?

Mr. ISMAY.
Of course, we simply get paid by the weight of the mail we carry from here. We have absolutely no contract with the United States Post Office Department. We are paid by weight.

Senator SMITH.
Has the question of the speed of your ships entered into this postal arrangement in any way?

Mr. ISMAY.
From England?

Senator SMITH.
From England.

Mr. ISMAY.
It must have done so; because, naturally, they would not give a contract to any ships which were slow ships.

Senator SMITH.
Is this item of \$350,000 a year regarded as a desirable part of your income?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
For that alone you would not be able to operate these big ships?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator SMITH.
But in connection with your general business -

Mr. ISMAY.
It all helps.

Senator SMITH. (*continuing*)
It all goes to make an inducement to build and operate these ships?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, but I do not think that £70,000 a year would induce anybody to build big ships.

Senator SMITH.
No; not in itself?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Has the company of which you are the head been afflicted with the loss of many ships at sea under your management?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I do not think we have had more than our share, perhaps.

Senator SMITH.

Do you now recall how many you have lost during your management?

Mr. ISMAY.

The only two that I remember are the *Republic* and the *Naronic*. I really was not the manager when the *Naronic* was lost. The only ship that has been lost since I have been manager is the *Republic*.

Senator SMITH.

Where was the *Republic* lost, do you remember?

Mr. ISMAY.

She was lost by being run into by an Italian steamer, I do not remember where; I think she was about 36 hours out of New York, but I really do not remember the place.

Senator SMITH.

Do you remember where the *Naronic* was lost?

Mr. ISMAY.

She was never heard of after leaving Liverpool.

Senator SMITH.

For what port was she destined?

Mr. ISMAY.

New York.

Senator SMITH.

And you have no means of knowing as to the latitude and longitude in which that boat was lost?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; she was practically a new ship when she was lost, and her sister ship is now running between Liverpool and Australia.

Senator SMITH.

What was her tonnage?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not remember, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Do you remember how much she cost?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I could not tell you that.

Senator SMITH.

Do you remember how high she was insured?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not think she had been insured at all, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Then you have no data by which you are able to enlighten the committee as to where she was lost, or as to her tonnage or value?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; but I will very gladly give you her tonnage and her value. So far as the insurance is concerned, I can state that she was not insured. The underwriter of the company took the whole risk concerned.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know what the average revenue per trip, gross and net, of the *Olympic* is?

Mr. ISMAY.

That would entirely depend on the time of year.

Senator SMITH.

At this time of year?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not tell you offhand, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Can you approximate it?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am almost afraid to answer the question, because it might be so very misleading.

Senator SMITH.

I will not press it, [Mr. Ismay](#).

Mr. ISMAY.

I will give it to you, gladly.

Senator SMITH.

Perhaps you can furnish us with that information.

Mr. ISMAY.

Certainly; I can give you the exact figures.

Senator SMITH.

Can you, in the same connection, give us your estimated figures upon the earning capacity of the *Titanic* at this time of the year?

Mr. ISMAY.

What profit she would have left on the voyage?

Senator SMITH.

What gross return and what net return per trip you had figured on.

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I could not give you that. We have the figures of the *Olympic*, of course, which would be on the same lines as those of the *Titanic*. The ships were practically sister ships.

Senator SMITH.

Can you tell me whether the ships or vessels of the lines of which you are managing director are classed in any of the accepted classifications or societies?

Mr. ISMAY.

Some of the ships, I believe, are classed in Lloyd's. So far as the White Star Line are concerned, they have never classed any of their ships, as the ships have always been built far in excess of any of those requirements. We have always been in the habit of taking out a passenger certificate on all our ships, which is a check on our own people that those ships have been kept absolutely up to the mark.

Senator SMITH.

In letting contracts for building your ships, and particularly the *Titanic*, was there any limit of cost placed on the contractors who built the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. We have never built a ship with Messrs. Harland & Wolff by contract at all. They have carte blanche to build the ship and put everything of the very best into that ship, and after they have spent all the money they can on her they add on their commission to the gross cost of the ship, which we pay them. We have never built a ship by contract.

Senator SMITH.

The plans that are made are made by your engineers or theirs?

Mr. ISMAY.

The plans?

Senator SMITH.

The plans, drawings, and specifications.

Mr. ISMAY.

Messrs. Harland & Wolff prepare the plans. They are then submitted to us, to the directors of the White Star Line or to the manager of the White Star Line. They are carefully gone through with the representatives from the shipbuilders. They try to make suggestions to improve those plans. They are taken back and thoroughly thrashed out again, and they are submitted, I should be afraid to say how often. You see, when you build a ship you have to start building her probably five or six years before you want her.

Senator SMITH.

Who of your company directed the Harland & Wolff Co., to build the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did, sir.

Senator SMITH.

What did you say to them?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is very difficult for me to say what I said. It would be in a conversation with Lord Pirrie, that we had decided to build the *Olympic* and the *Titanic*.

Senator SMITH.

Were both ships ordered at the same time?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

What did you say to them? Did you say, "We want the largest and best ship that you can build safely"?

Mr. ISMAY.

We would naturally try to get the best ship we possibly could. We wanted the best ship crossing the north Atlantic when we built her.

Senator SMITH.

And when you gave the order that was your instruction?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
And you made no limitation as to cost?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely none.

Senator SMITH.
You were content that they should build that ship at whatever it cost to build it?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir. What we wanted was the very best ship they could possibly produce.

Senator SMITH.
You examined this ship, I assume, on the voyage from Liverpool to the place of the accident, from time to time?

Mr. ISMAY.
I was never outside the first class passenger accommodations on board the ship, sir. I never went in any part of that ship that any other first class passenger had not a perfect right to go to. I had not made any inspection of the ship at all.

Senator SMITH.
From that do you wish to be understood as saying that you were not officially on board the ship for the purpose of inspecting?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I do not. I was there to inspect the ship and see if there were any defects in her, with the idea of not repeating them in the other ship which we are now building at Belfast.

Senator SMITH.
You are building another ship of the same type now?

Mr. ISMAY.
We are now building a sister ship to the *Olympic*.

Senator SMITH.
Did you make these observations?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I had not been around the ship.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have it in mind to do so?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. I should have gone around the ship before we arrived at New York.

Senator SMITH.
Did [Mr. Andrews](#) go about the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.
He was about the ship all the time, I believe.

Senator SMITH.
Inspecting and examining her?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think so. Naturally, in a ship of that size, there were a great many minor defects on board the ship, which he

was rectifying. I think there were probably three or four apprentices on board from Messrs. Harland & Wolff's shipbuilding yard, who were there to right any small detail which was wrong.

Senator SMITH.
On the spot?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. A door might jam, or a pipe might burst, or anything like that, and they were there to make it good at once.

Senator SMITH.
Did Mr. Andrews bring these men for that purpose?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you yourself have opportunity to confer with Mr. Andrews during the voyage from Southampton to the place of this accident?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I did not. Mr. Andrews dined with me one night. We had no conversation, really, in regard to the ship. Indeed, the only plan which Mr. Andrews submitted to me was a plan where he said he thought the [writing room and reading room](#) was unnecessarily large, and he said he saw a way of putting a stateroom in the forward end of it. That was a matter which would have been taken up and thoroughly discussed after we got back to England.

Senator SMITH.
Were you in conference with the [captain](#) during this journey from Southampton?

Mr. ISMAY.
I was never in the captain's [room](#) the whole voyage over, sir, and the captain was never in my [room](#). I never had any conversation with the captain except casual conversation on the deck.

Senator SMITH.
Were you on the [bridge](#) at any time?

Mr. ISMAY.
I was never on the bridge until after the accident.

Senator SMITH.
How long after the accident?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think it might have been 10 minutes.

Senator SMITH.
Was the captain there at that time?

Mr. ISMAY.
The captain was there; yes.

Senator SMITH.
Was that the only time you saw the captain on the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.
I saw him afterwards, when I went up the second time to the bridge.

Senator SMITH.
How long after?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think it might be 35 minutes. It is very difficult to place the time.

Senator SMITH.
After the impact?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
What, if anything, did he say to you about the collision?

Mr. ISMAY.
The only conversation I had with Capt. Smith was when I went up on the bridge. I asked him what had happened, and he said we had struck ice.

Senator SMITH.
I believe you said you dined on Sunday evening with the surgeon of the [*Titanic*](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. I was all alone, so I asked [Dr. O'Loughlin](#) to come and dine with me, and he dined with me in the [restaurant](#) at half-past 7.

Senator SMITH.
And no other person was present at that table except yourself and him?

Mr. ISMAY.
No other persons were present excepting the doctor and myself, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did the doctor survive?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know where the captain dined on Sunday evening?

Mr. ISMAY.
He dined in the restaurant.

Senator SMITH.
The same place that you dined?

Mr. ISMAY.
In the same room; yes.

Senator SMITH.
At the same hour?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not know what time he dined. I saw him in the room dining.

Senator SMITH.
With whom?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe he dined with [Mr. and Mrs. Widener](#).

Senator SMITH.
Do you know anyone else who was at the table?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think Mr. and Mrs. Karger [[Carter](#)] were there, and [Mr. and Mrs. Thayer](#).

Senator SMITH.
Was [Maj. Butt](#) there?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not see him. I could not see the whole of the table; I could see only part of it.

Senator SMITH.
In what part of the dining room were they dining, with reference to yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.
They were dining at the forward end of the restaurant.

Senator SMITH.
On which side?

Mr. ISMAY.
The starboard side.

Senator SMITH.
And you were dining -

Mr. ISMAY.
I was dining in the middle of the room on the same side of the ship. They were dining in an alcove; part of their table was in an alcove. I could not see the whole of their table. In fact, I was sitting with my back toward them.

Senator SMITH.
How long did you remain at the table?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think half or three-quarters of an hour.

Senator SMITH.
During all that time was the captain at his table?

Mr. ISMAY.
They were sitting at the table when I went out of the room, sir.

Senator SMITH.
When, with reference to his time of dining, did you next see the captain?

Mr. ISMAY.
On the bridge, sir.

Senator SMITH.
At the time just spoken of?

Mr. ISMAY.
After the accident.

Senator SMITH.
Did you dine with the captain at all on the trip from Southampton to the place of the accident?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think he dined with me on Friday night.

Senator SMITH.
Is that the only time?

Mr. ISMAY.
The only time. He left us immediately after dinner. I went into my own room with the people who were dining with me, and we sat in my room and played bridge. But I never saw the captain after we left the restaurant. He never came near my room.

Senator SMITH.
Had you known the captain of that ship some time?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes; I had known him a great many years.

Senator SMITH.
On what ships of your line had he been captain?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think he had been commander of a great many of them. The first time I remember Capt. Smith being commander of one of our ships was when he was in command of one of our cargo boats called the [Cufic](#), a great many years ago. He was in command of the [Olympic](#), he was in the [Adriatic](#), the [Baltic](#), and the old [Britannic](#). I can not remember them all, sir. We have a record in the office of every ship he has commanded.

Senator SMITH.
In this journey from Southampton to the place of the accident did he seem to be in good health?

Mr. ISMAY.
As far as I saw, sir; as far as I was able to judge, at least.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know his age?

Mr. ISMAY.
I would not like to be absolutely certain about it, but I think he was about 62.

Senator SMITH.
Do you yourself know anything about the construction of vessels; I mean technically?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; I could not say I do.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether the *Titanic* was classed 100-A according to Lloyd's register?

Mr. ISMAY.

It was in no class, so far as I know. We never classed any of the boats.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether she was fitted with an inner skin or longitudinal bulkhead between the [tank deck](#) and the waterline?

Mr. ISMAY.

She had no midship bulkhead, but she had a double bottom. She had a double bottom fore and aft.

Senator SMITH.

Fore and aft?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; the whole length of the ship.

Senator SMITH.

In ordering that vessel, did you give Harland & Wolff any special instructions with reference to her safety?

Mr. ISMAY.

We were very anxious indeed to have a ship which would float with her two largest watertight compartments full of water. What we wanted to guard against was any steamer running into the ship and hitting her on a bulkhead, because if the ship ran into her broadside on and happened to hit her right on a bulkhead, that would open up two big compartments, and we were anxious to guard against the possibility of that happening; and the *Olympic* and *Titanic* were so constructed that they would float with the two largest compartments full of water.

Senator SMITH.

You remember, I think, the statement of the wheelman, [Hichens](#), that the last thing he did before striking the iceberg was to so turn his wheel as to avoid contact directly with the bow, the extreme bow?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Do you recall that?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think he said he was told "Hard aport," and then "Hard astarboard," if I remember rightly.

Senator SMITH.

And then that threw the vessel -

Mr. ISMAY. (*interposing*)

He wanted to throw his quarter up.

Senator SMITH.

Suppose that had not been done, Mr. Ismay, and the ship had met this iceberg bows on; what would have been the effect, in your judgment?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is really impossible to say. It is only a matter of opinion. I think the ship would have crushed her bows in, and might not have sunk.

Senator SMITH.

She might not have sunk?

Mr. ISMAY.

She might not have sunk. I think it would have taken a very brave man to have kept his ship going straight on an iceberg. I think he should have endeavored to avoid it.

Senator SMITH.

What I am getting at is this, whether in the construction of this ship, which was intended for the North Atlantic and in which naturally the designers and builders had planned for such exigencies as might occur off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, she was build with special reference to her resistance at the bow?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

For that purpose?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. I think the only ships in which they do that are ships trading to the St. Lawrence. I understand that on the forward end those ships are very often fitted with double plates because they have to go through field ice.

Senator SMITH.

That has been for the purpose of concentrating sufficient resistance at the bow to stand the brunt of a collision with ice?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I think it is done for protection against the field ice.

Senator SMITH.

Against field ice only?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; at least that is my understanding.

Senator SMITH.

Do you recollect the [captain](#) of the [Carpathia](#) saying that if the *Titanic* had hit this iceberg bows on she would have been in New York Harbor instead of at the bottom of the sea?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not remember him saying that, sir.

Senator SMITH.

From your experience in building ships or in authorizing their construction, and from your knowledge of that profession or trade, would you regard a collision on a bulkhead, opening two compartments, as the most serious damage she was likely to encounter.

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And you accordingly provided against that?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

There has been considerable confusion about the cost of the [Titanic](#). I will take the liberty of asking you to state it.

Mr. ISMAY.
She cost \$7,500,000 sir.

Senator SMITH.
And for how much was she insured?

Mr. ISMAY.
For \$5,000,000, I understand, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have anything to do with the insurance?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; very little. That is done in New York; that is dealt with and handled in New York.

Senator SMITH.
I will ask you whether you know of any attempt being made to reinsure any part of the vessel on Monday, the 14th of April?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely none, sir; and I can not imagine anybody connected with the International Mercantile Marine Co. endeavoring to do such a dishonorable thing.

Senator SMITH.
I do not want you to understand me to assert that it was attempted.

Mr. ISMAY.
I know, sir; but it is such a horrible accusation to have been made.

Senator SMITH.
You would regard it as a very dishonorable thing to do?

Mr. ISMAY.
It would have been taking advantage of private knowledge which was in my possession; yes, sir. Yes, sir; I should so regard it.

Senator SMITH.
Was the knowledge of the sinking of the *Titanic* that was in your possession communicated by you to your company in Liverpool or to your offices in New York on the journey from the place of the collision to New York?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir. I sent the message on Monday morning, very shortly after I got on board the *Carpathia*. The [captain](#) came down to me and said, "Don't you think, sir, you had better send a message to New York, telling them about this accident?" I said, "Yes." I wrote it out on a slip of paper, and I turned to the commander of the *Carpathia* and I said, "Captain, do you think that is all I can tell them?" He said, "Yes." Then he took it away from the room.

I have a copy here, sir; of every Marconi message which I sent away from the *Carpathia*. I had no communication with any other ship, and there is a record of every message which I received.

Senator SMITH.
Please read them. This is over your own signature, or your cipher or the cipher or code of your company?

Mr. ISMAY.
This is a copy of every message that I sent away from the *Carpathia*. I do not think I have them exactly in the right order, because I put no dates on them; but I have the date here that they were received by Mr. Franklin.

The first message I sent was on April 15, which was on Monday morning.

Senator SMITH.
At what hour?

Mr. ISMAY.
I have not got the hour, sir, but I should think it was about 8 o'clock.

Senator SMITH.
You say that shortly after you boarded the *Carpathia* you sent this message?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
You boarded the *Carpathia* about sunrise?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think that I boarded the ship *Carpathia* at a quarter to 6 or a quarter past 6.

Senator SMITH.
Ship's time?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes. I happened to see a clock somewhere on the ship when I got on her.

Senator SMITH.
Ship's time?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

This is the message I sent, which was received by Mr. Franklin on the 17th of April, 1912. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I sent the message on the 15th of April, and it did not reach Mr. Franklin until the 17th of April.

Senator SMITH.
How are you able to say that, Mr. Ismay?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. Franklin has told me so.

Senator SMITH.
But of your own knowledge you do not know it?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Mr. FRANKLIN.
The original telegram is there, Senator Smith, with the stamp of the company on the back of it.

Mr. ISMAY.
I think you have the originals of all of these.

Senator SMITH.
They are not in evidence?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
They were introduced in bulk, were they not?

Mr. FRANKLIN.
That particular telegram was read in evidence the first day in Washington, and is in your possession. It was read yesterday a week ago here in Washington, and the telegram is in your possession, with the telegraph company's stamp on it, with the date.

Senator SMITH.
It will not take long, and I think I would like to have you read them, inasmuch as they came from you.

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; I will do so.

This is a message I sent on April 15:

Deeply regret advise you *Titanic* sank this morning after collision iceberg, resulting serious loss life. Full particulars later.

That message was signed "Bruce Ismay."

The next one I sent, but I do not know the date of it, but presumably it was received by Mr. Franklin on the 17th of April at 9 a.m. I wired:

Very important you should hold [Cedric](#) daylight Friday for *Titanic's* crew. Answer.

YAMSI.

This is a message sent by Mr. Franklin to me on April 17, 1912, at 3:30 p.m.:

So thankful you are saved, but grieving with you over terrible calamity. Shall sail Saturday to return with you.

Florence.

That was from my wife, and was forwarded to me by Mr. Franklin, who said:

Accept my deepest sympathy horrible catastrophe. Will meet you aboard *Carpathia* after docking. Is [Widener](#) aboard?

Senator SMITH.
Who signed that?

Mr. ISMAY.
That was signed "Franklin."

This is a message I sent. I have not the date of it, but it was received by Mr. Franklin on April 17, 1912 at 5:20 p.m.:

Most desirable *Titanic* crew aboard *Carpathia* should be returned home earliest moment possible. Suggest you hold *Cedric*, sailing her daylight Friday, unless you see any reason contrary. Propose returning in her myself. Please send outfit of clothes, including shoes, for me to *Cedric*. Have nothing of my own. Please reply.

YAMSI.

This is a message I received from Mr. Franklin, which was dispatched by wire on the 17th of April, 1912 at 8 p.m.:

Have arranged forward crew [Lapland](#) sailing Saturday, calling Plymouth. We all consider most unwise delay *Cedric* considering all circumstances.

FRANKLIN.

This is a message I sent -

Senator SMITH. (*interposing*)
What time was that last message?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. Franklin sent that at 8 p.m., April 17. I have no record of the time I received them.

Senator SMITH.
That was Wednesday evening?

Mr. ISMAY.
Wednesday.

Senator SMITH.
At 8 p.m.?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

I sent a message which was received by Mr. Franklin on the 18th of April, at 5:35 a.m., as follows:

Send responsible ship officer and 14 White Star sailors in two tugboats to take charge of 13 *Titanic* boats, at quarantine.

YAMSI.

That message I sent at the request of the captain of the *Carpathia*, who told him it would be impossible to dock the ship with these lifeboats on deck. He was all hampered up, and would not be able to handle his ropes and what not. I drew up that message and showed it to the captain and asked if that would answer the purpose, and he said "Yes," and I gave it to him, and he sent it, I presume.

I telegraphed Mr. Franklin, or marconied him, and he received it on the 18th of April, 1912, at 5:35 a.m.:

Please join *Carpathia* at quarantine if possible.

I sent a further message, which Mr. Franklin received on April 18, 1912, at 8 a.m., as follows:

Very important you should hold *Cedric* daylight Friday for *Titanic* crew. Reply.

YAMSI.

I sent a further message, which was received by Mr. Franklin on April 18, 1912, at 8:23 a.m.:

Think most unwise keep *Titanic* crew until Saturday. Strongly urge detain *Cedrics* sailing her midnight, if desirable.

I sent another message, which was received by Mr. Franklin on April 18, 1912, at 8:44 a.m.:

Unless you have good and sufficient reason for not holding *Cedric*, please arrange do so. Most undesirable have crew New York so long.

This is a message which Mr. Franklin dispatched to me on the 18th of April, 1912, at 4:45 p.m., and which I received when the *Carpathia* got alongside the dock in New York, which was handed to me in the room:

Concise Marconigram account of actual accident greatly needed for enlightenment public and ourselves. This most important.

FRANKLIN.

Senator SMITH.
What time was that?

Mr. ISMAY.
It was sent by Mr. Franklin on the 18th of April, at 4:45 p.m.

Senator SMITH.
That was the day you reached New York?

Mr. ISMAY.
I received it, I presume, about 9 o'clock that night, when we were alongside the dock.

Then I sent this message to Mr. Franklin, which he received on April 18, 1912, at 5:38 p.m.:

Widener not aboard. Hope see you quarantine. Please cable wife am returning *Cedric*.

YAMSI.

That is a copy of every message I sent and every message I received and I had absolutely no communication with any other ship or any shore station, or with anyone.

Senator SMITH.
Judging from the messages, it was your intention to return the night you landed, if possible, to Liverpool?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir. At that time, you understand, I had not the slightest idea there was going to be any investigation of this sort.

Senator SMITH.
When did you first learn of the investigation?

Mr. ISMAY.
Five minutes before I saw you, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Who informed you?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. Franklin. I think you came on board the ship with him, did you not, or about the same time?

Senator SMITH.
I followed very shortly.

Mr. ISMAY.
That is the first information I had that there was going to be any investigation.

Senator SMITH.

The committee has before it a special number of *The Shipbuilder*, volume 6, midsummer, 1911. This, presumably, has been examined by your engineer.

Do you know whether the committee can accept this article as a correct general description of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

I can not say, sir.

Senator SMITH.

You are not yourself personally familiar with it?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. We will be pleased to give you any drawings which you may wish to have of any part of the ship. Any information you want is absolutely at your disposal, if you will simply give us an indication of what you want - all drawings and plans, and in every incidental and detail.

Senator SMITH.

Some little confusion has arisen over your statement in your testimony as to the number of revolutions made by the *Titanic*. I understood you to say that at certain times she made 70 revolutions, at another time 75, and finally, 80. Am I incorrect?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; I do not think I said that. If I did, I had no intention of doing so.

Senator SMITH.

How would you wish to be understood on that matter?

Mr. ISMAY.

My recollection is that between Southampton and Cherbourg we ran at 60 revolutions, from Cherbourg to Queenstown at 70 revolutions, and when we left Queenstown we were running at 72 revolutions, and I believe that the ship was worked up to 75 revolutions, but I really have no accurate knowledge of that.

Senator SMITH.

How many knots per hour would that indicate at her maximum speed?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not tell you that, sir.

Senator SMITH.

How many knots per hour?

Mr. ISMAY.

The whole thing has been absolutely worked out.

Senator SMITH.

But you yourself are unable to answer.

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; that has all been worked out, the speed of the ship has been worked out at a certain number of revolutions. Her speed would depend absolutely on the slip, as I understand.

Senator SMITH.

Was she running at her maximum speed at the time she was making 75 revolutions?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. My understanding is, or I am told - because I really have no technical knowledge - that the engines were balanced, and would run their best, at 78 revolutions. They were built for 78 revolutions.

Senator SMITH.

How many knots per hour would that indicate her speed to be?

Mr. ISMAY.

I heard one gentleman here on the stand say that he expected the ship to go 25 knots, sir. All that we expected the *Titanic* to do was to have the same speed as the *Olympic*.

Senator SMITH.

You were not looking for any greater speed, and were not crowding her for that purpose?

Mr. ISMAY.

We did not expect the ship to make any better speed than the *Olympic*; no, sir.

Senator SMITH.

And you wish to be understood as saying that she was not going at her maximum speed at the time this accident occurred?

Mr. ISMAY.

To the best of my knowledge, the ship was not going at full speed. I think if you will refer to my testimony which I gave to you on Friday, you will find I then stated that, assuming all the conditions were absolutely favorable, the intention was to have a run-out of the ship on either Monday or Tuesday, at full speed, assuming that everything was satisfactory.

Senator SMITH.

Did you have any talk with the captain with reference to the speed of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

Never, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Did you, at any time, urge him to greater speed?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know of any one who urged him to greater speed than he was making when the ship was making 70 revolutions?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is really impossible to imagine such a thing on board ship.

Senator SMITH.

Did you, in your position of general manager of this company, undertake in any way to influence or direct the management of that ship, from the time she left Southampton until the time of the accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I did not. The matter would be entirely out of my province.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether the usual stability investigations were completed and curves of stability furnished the White Star Line?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; I believe that the ship was tested when she was in Southampton; I forget the proper word for it - inclined.

Senator SMITH.

She was inclined?

Mr. ISMAY.

She was inclined.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know who made those tests?

Mr. ISMAY.

Harland and Wolff's representatives; I do not know who. I believe [Mr. Andrews](#) himself was there.

Senator SMITH.

That is not a part of the tests that are made by the British Board of Trade?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

I believe you stated, in your testimony given the other day, a conversation with [Mr. Charles M. Hays](#), president of the Grand Trunk Railway.

Mr. ISMAY.

I very often talked to Mr. Hays on board the ship.

Senator SMITH.

From whom did Mr. Hays receive the assurance, after the accident, that the *Titanic* was good for 10 hours, in any event?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no idea, sir.

Senator SMITH.

He did not receive any such assurance from you?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Nor did you receive any such assurance from the [captain](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Did you hear any reports made to the captain regarding the extent of the damage?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I did not.

Senator SMITH.

Or the water that had entered the vessel?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I did not.

Senator SMITH.
And the captain made no report to you?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
When you were on the [bridge](#) with the captain, after the accident, did he say anything to you about her condition at that time?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; as I told you on Friday, when I went up to ask him what had happened, he told me we had struck an iceberg, and I asked him whether he thought the matter was serious, and he said he thought it was.

Senator SMITH.
That was the first intimation you had?

Mr. ISMAY.
That was the first intimation I had.

Senator SMITH.
Did you hear any order given to call the passengers?

Mr. ISMAY.
I did not, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Or any other alarm?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did the [chief engineer](#) of the *Titanic* state to you the extent of the damage?

Mr. ISMAY.
He said that he thought the damage was serious; that he hoped the pumps would be able to control the water.

Senator SMITH.
How long was that after the impact?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think it would be perhaps a half an hour afterwards; 35 or 40 minutes.

Senator SMITH.
Did you give any instructions to either the captain or the chief engineer of the *Titanic*, either before or after the catastrophe?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know in what manner the officers of the *Titanic* were selected?

Mr. ISMAY.

The officers of the *Titanic* would be appointed by our marine superintendent.

Senator SMITH.

Does that include all of the officers? Does that include the captain?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; not the captain.

Senator SMITH.

Was he the first commander of the *Olympic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator SMITH.

It was rather a custom, was it not, that had grown up among the officers of your company to put Capt. Smith in command of your new vessels as they appeared from time to time?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think Capt. Smith had brought out a great number of our new ships. I think he brought out the [Adriatic](#). I am not sure that he did not bring out the [Baltic](#). He was looked upon as our senior commander.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether he had had any serious trouble in the management of your ships previous to this calamity?

Mr. ISMAY.

Do you mean to say serious accident?

Senator SMITH.

Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.

Capt. Smith was a man who had a very, very clear record. I should think very few commanders crossing the Atlantic have as good a record as Capt. Smith had, until he had the unfortunate collision with the [Hawke](#).

Senator SMITH.

With the *Hawke*?

Mr. ISMAY.

The collision between the *Olympic* and the *Hawke*.

Senator SMITH.

When did that occur?

Mr. ISMAY.

It was in either August or September of last year.

Senator SMITH.

And where?

Mr. ISMAY.

In the Solent.

Senator SMITH.

Where?

Mr. ISMAY.
In the Solent; down by the Isle of Wight.

Senator SMITH.
Do you know whether he at any time had had any accidents to his ships in the North Atlantic?

Mr. ISMAY.
Not that I remember, sir. I think he had an exceptionally clear record.

Senator SMITH.
Did the collision which occurred between the *Olympic* and the *Hawke* in any way shake your confidence in Capt. Smith?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
If it had, he would probably not have been appointed as commander of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.
Quite true.

Senator SMITH.
Who was the chief engineer of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.
Mr. Bell.

Senator SMITH.
Did he survive?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; he did not.

Senator SMITH.
Did any of the engineers survive?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not think a single engineer officer survived.

Senator SMITH.
What was Mr. Bell's experience; I mean, what experience had he had as chief engineer?

Mr. ISMAY.
He had had a very long experience, and he was an extremely good man. He was with the *Olympic* practically during the whole term of her construction.

Senator SMITH.
How old was he?

Mr. ISMAY.
I should think he was a man of about 48 or 50. He was sent over to Belfast when the *Olympic* was being built, and he remained in Belfast during the whole of the time she was being built, superintending her construction, making any suggestions which he thought would lead to improvements. He brought the ship out to New York on her first voyage as chief engineer on board the ship. We put one of our other senior engineers on board the *Olympic* with Mr. Bell, a man called Mr. Fleming, so that he could have the experience of the *Olympic* and get accustomed to her, and then he took charge of her. I think they ran together for about two voyages, and we then

brought Mr. Bell again ashore, and he was present during the whole time of the construction of the *Titanic* and brought her out as chief engineer.

Senator SMITH.

How does it happen that the *Titanic* had but 20 lifeboats, including lifeboats, emergency boats, and collapsibles?

Mr. ISMAY.

That was a matter for the builders, sir, and I presume that they were fulfilling all the requirements of the board of trade.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether they were?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not know of my own knowledge, but I am convinced that they must have done so, because otherwise the ship never could have left port. We never could have gotten our clearance.

Senator SMITH.

How is the apportionment of lifeboats made, do you know?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Is it made on tonnage?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is based on tonnage.

Senator SMITH.

On tonnage entirely?

Mr. ISMAY.

On tonnage entirely, I believe.

Senator SMITH.

That would not include passenger capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; it is on the tonnage of the ship. I think the boatage is determined by the register of the ship - the tonnage register of the ship.

Senator SMITH.

Let me ask you, Mr. Ismay, whether in view of this experience you have just gone through you would not consider it desirable to have the apportionment of lifeboats based upon passenger capacity rather than tonnage?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think the result of this horrible accident is that the whole question of life-saving appliances on board vessels and ships will be very carefully gone through and receive the most full and careful consideration to see what is the best thing to be done.

Senator SMITH.

Have you yourself taken any steps in that direction since the accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, I have not. My mind has been so fully occupied with other questions that I have not; but it is a matter that will be taken up as soon as I get home with our shipbuilding friends and with our experts.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know of any changes contemplated by the British Board of Trade prior to the *Titanic* accident in the number of lifeboats to be carried by passenger steamers?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Are you familiar with a paper read at the spring meeting of the fifty-third session of the Institution of Naval Architects, March 19, 1912, entitled, "The Arrangement of Boat Installations on Modern Ships," by Axel Welin?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. I know Mr. Welin.

Senator SMITH.

You do know Mr. Welin?

Mr. ISMAY.

He is the davit man, the man who has these patent davits, is he not?

Senator SMITH.

I think he is the same man.

Mr. ISMAY.

I think they are called the Welin davits.

Senator SMITH.

Yes. Do you know him?

Mr. ISMAY.

I met him once, I think.

Senator SMITH.

I desire to read into the record a very short quotation from that article.

On the boat deck of the White Star Liner *Olympic* and also of the *Titanic* this double-acting type of davit has been fitted throughout in view of coming changes in official regulations. It was considered wise by the owners that these changes should be thus anticipated and so make it possible to double, or even treble, the number of boats without any structural alterations should such increase ultimately prove to be necessary.

Will you kindly explain, if you can, what the White Star Line had in contemplation in so arranging the davits?

Mr. ISMAY.

Nothing that I know of, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Had the *Titanic* carried double the number of lifeboats or treble the number of lifeboats, do you consider that there might have been an increase in the number of passengers and crew saved?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think that is quite probable, sir.

Senator SMITH.

I do not want to commit you to any special course in your company, and presume I will not do so, by this inquiry; but in view of all that has occurred, are you willing to say that the proportion of lifeboats should be increased to more approximately meet such exigencies as you have just passed through?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think, having regard to our experience, there is no question that that should be done; but I think it may be quite possible to improve on the construction of the ship.

Senator SMITH.

Also?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Have you given any instructions to increase the lifeboat capacity of other White Star ships?

Mr. ISMAY.

We have given instructions that no ship belonging to the I.M.M. Co. is to leave any port unless she has sufficient boats on board for the accommodation of all the passengers and the whole of the crew.

Senator SMITH.

Who gave those instructions?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did, sir.

Senator SMITH.

When?

Mr. ISMAY.

The day after I landed from the [*Carpathia*](#).

Senator SMITH.

Have you any knowledge as to whether that has been done?

Mr. ISMAY.

I know, sir, that no ship of that company will sail from any port unless she has sufficient boats to carry the number of passengers she has on board. It may be necessary, and probably will be necessary, to reduce the number of passengers in the cabins.

Senator SMITH.

But by that course you exceed the requirements of the regulations of the British Board of Trade?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely. Our ships all now conform to the board of trade regulations, without putting the additional boats on.

Senator SMITH.

I understand that. But you evidently do not regard the regulation of the British Board of Trade as sufficient to protect the lives of your passengers?

Mr. ISMAY.

Not after our unfortunate experience, sir; that is so.

Senator SMITH.

When were those regulations made?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not tell you. I could not answer that.

Senator SMITH.
Are they old regulations?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not say.

Senator SMITH.
You speak of improvements in the construction of your ships. Have you any ideas or suggestions as to improvements in the construction of ships which you would care to impart to the committee?

Mr. ISMAY.
As I have told you, I have no technical knowledge about shipbuilding, and this is a matter which we would take up with our shipbuilding friends, and also with our own marine superintendents. I do not know whether it would be feasible to carry the bulkheads up any higher; I do not know whether it would be feasible to build a ship with a double hull, anyway, up to just about water line, to carry her double bottom higher up the side of the ship. Of course, you understand that now, with the double bottom, if the ship runs on rocks and pierces the outside bottom, she will float on the inside bottom.

Senator SMITH.
Can you make any suggestions as to improvements in watertight compartments that would make more certain the ship floating?

Mr. ISMAY.
You mean to say strengthening the bulkheads?

Senator SMITH.
Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not do that, sir; because that end of it is a question of figures, is it not?

Senator SMITH.
I think in my prior examination in New York you said you entered the [lifeboat](#) from the [A deck](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.
From the [boat deck](#), sir.

Senator SMITH.
And that at the time there were no other persons around; no women, particularly?

Mr. ISMAY.
Absolutely none that I saw, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Was that the last lifeboat or the last collapsible boat to leave?

Mr. ISMAY.
It was the last collapsible boat that left the starboard side of the ship.

Senator SMITH.
Was it filled to its capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; it was not.

Senator SMITH.
Why?

Mr. ISMAY.

I understand the full capacity of one of those boats is about 60 to 65.

Senator SMITH.

Of the collapsible?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not know whether the capacity of the collapsible is the same as that of the wooden boat.

Senator SMITH.

It was not filled to its capacity?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know how many people were in it?

Mr. ISMAY.

I should think there were about 40 women in it, and some children. There was a child in arms. I think they were all third class passengers, so far as I could see.

Senator SMITH.

And this [boat](#) was from the starboard side of the [boat deck](#), or top deck, near the bridge?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

At the time you entered it, did you say anything to the [captain](#) about entering it?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I did not. I never saw the captain.

Senator SMITH.

Did he say anything to you about your entering it?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Who, if any one, told you to enter that lifeboat?

Mr. ISMAY.

No one, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Why did you enter it?

Mr. ISMAY.

Because there was room in the boat. She was being lowered away. I felt the ship was going down, and I got into the boat.

Senator SMITH.

Did you yourself see any icebergs at daybreak the following morning?

Mr. ISMAY.

I should think I saw four or five icebergs when day broke on Monday morning.

Senator SMITH.

How near the scene of the [Titanic](#) disaster?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not tell where she went down. We were some distance away from it.

Senator SMITH.

Did you see the steamship [Californian](#) that morning?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Not desiring to be impertinent at all, but in order that I may not be charged with omitting to do my duty, I would like to know where you went after you boarded the [Carpathia](#), and how you happened to go there?

Mr. ISMAY.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that my behavior on board the *Titanic*, and subsequently on board the *Carpathia*, has been very severely criticized. I want to court the fullest inquiry, and I place myself unreservedly in the hands of yourself and any of your colleagues, to ask me any questions in regard to my conduct; so please do not hesitate to do so, and I will answer them to the best of my ability. So far as the *Carpathia* is concerned, sir, when I got on board the ship I stood up with my back against the bulkhead, and somebody came up to me and said, "Will you not go into the saloon and get some soup, or something to drink?" "No," I said, "I really do not want anything at all." He said, "Do go and get something." I said, "No. If you will leave me alone I will be very much happier here." I said, "If you will get me in some room where I can be quiet, I wish you would." He said, "Please go in the saloon and get something hot." I said, "I would rather not." Then he took me and put me into a room. I did not know whose the room was, at all. This man proved to be the doctor of the *Carpathia*. I was in that room until I left the ship. I was never outside the door of that room. During the whole of the time I was in this room, I never had anything of a solid nature, at all; I lived on soup. I did not want very much of anything. The room was constantly being entered by people asking for the doctor. The doctor did not sleep in the room the first night. The doctor slept in the room the other nights that I was on board that ship. [Mr. Jack Thayer](#) was brought into the room the morning we got on board the *Carpathia*. He stayed in the room for some little time, and the doctor came in after he had been in, I should think, about a quarter of an hour, and he said to this young boy, "Would you not like something to eat?" He said, "I would like some bacon and eggs;" which he had. The doctor did not have a suite of rooms on the ship. He simply had this one small room, which he himself occupied and dressed in every night and morning.

Senator SMITH.

Did he keep his medicines and bandages there?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; he kept them in the dispensary; in the surgery.

Senator SMITH.

Right near this room?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no idea where it was. As I tell you, I was never outside of that room from the time I entered it.

Senator SMITH.

In view of your statement, I desire to say that I have seen none of these comments to which you refer. In fact, I have not read the newspapers since I started for New York; I have deliberately avoided it; so that I have seen none of these reports, and you do not understand that I have made any criticism upon your conduct aboard the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. On the contrary, I do not say that anybody has. But I am here to answer any questions in regard thereto.

Senator SMITH.

What can you say, [Mr. Ismay](#), as to your treatment at the hands of the committee since you have been under our direction?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no fault to find. Naturally, I was disappointed in not being allowed to go home; but I feel quite satisfied you have some very good reason in your own mind for keeping me here.

Senator SMITH.

You quite agree now that it was the wisest thing to do?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think, under the circumstances, it was.

Senator SMITH.

And even in my refusal to permit you to go you saw no discourtesy?

Mr. ISMAY.

Certainly not, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know of any unfair or discourteous or inconsiderate treatment upon the part of the committee of any of your officers connected with this investigation?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I do not.

Senator SMITH.

In order that I may make the record absolutely clear, have you any objection to me putting into the record your letter to me and my reply to you regarding your departure?

Mr. ISMAY.

Not the slightest.

The letters referred to are here printed in full in the record, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C., *April 25, 1912.*

HON. WILLIAM ALDEN SMITH,
Chairman, etc., Washington, D.C.

Sir: On learning of the appointment of the committee of inquiry after the arrival of the steamship *Carpathia* last Thursday night in New York, the members of the committee who met me at the steamer will doubtless recall that personally, and as managing director of the White Star Line, I welcomed this inquiry and though under severe mental and physical strain as a result of the disaster placed myself voluntarily at the disposal of your committee, and expressed the utmost willingness to give them all information in my possession to the best of my ability.

I voluntarily appeared before the committee the following day, Friday, April 19, and, though not in the best of condition to give evidence, I testified at length regarding all matters connected with the accident and offered to produce or have produced before the committee any officers or persons from our technical department, or from the technical department of Harland & Wolff, the builders, that might be thought necessary or desirable in order to enable the committee to investigate this tragic occurrence in the most complete manner.

I have regularly attended every hearing of the committee held in New York and in Washington daily since my first examination, on April 19, and have held myself in readiness continuously to answer the call of the committee to give any further testimony that might be desired, though personally I do not see that I can be of any further assistance to the committee. If, however, after the production of the technical or other evidence, the committee is of the opinion that I can help its deliberations in any manner, I shall hold myself in readiness to answer its further call, upon reasonable notice from the committee.

I am hopeful that the committee may be able to suggest ways and means for the avoidance of similar accidents in the future, and anything that I personally or that the company with which I am connected can do to further that object will be gladly done.

If the committee wishes to examine me further at the present time I hope it may be found convenient to do so promptly in order that I may go home to my family. In view of my experience at the time of the disaster and subsequently, I hope that the committee will feel that this request is not unreasonable.

The committee is also aware that an inquiry into this disaster has been started by my own Government, which has jurisdiction to deal with matters of serious importance to the interests of the company, which I understand are outside the scope of the present inquiry, and which urgently require my personal attention in England.

In these circumstances I respectfully request that if the committee wishes to examine me further it will be good enough to do so at the earliest practical moment, and excuse me from further attendance at the present time.

Respectfully,

BRUCE ISMAY

WASHINGTON, D.C., *April 25, 1912.*

Mr. J. Bruce Ismay,
Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C.

Sir: Replying to your letter of this date, just received, permit me to say that I am not unmindful of the fact that you are being detained in this country against your will, and, probably, at no little inconvenience to yourself and family. I can readily see that your absence from England at a time so momentous in the affairs of your company would be most embarrassing, but the horror of the *Titanic* catastrophe and its importance to the people of the world call for scrupulous investigation into the causes leading up to the disaster, that future losses of similar character may, if possible, be avoided. To that end, we have been charged by the Senate of the United States with the duty of making this official inquiry, and, so far as I am concerned, nothing will be left undone which may in any manner contribute to this end. As I said to you in New York on Friday evening last, when you asked to be permitted to return home, and again on Saturday night, when you made the same request, I shall not consent to your leaving this country until the fullest inquiry has been made into the circumstances surrounding the accident. This information can be fully detailed by yourself and other officers of your company and the officers and crew of your ship. I am working night and day to achieve this result, and you should continue to help me instead of annoying me and delaying my work by your personal importunities.

Trusting you will receive this letter in the spirit in which it is written, I am,

Very respectfully,

WM. ALDEN SMITH,
Chairman Senate Subcommittee Investigating the Titanic Disaster.

Senator SMITH.

You have frequently assured the committee that if, in its deliberations, it should require your presence here after we have finished with the British witnesses, you will be quite willing to hold yourself subject to the committee's orders.

Mr. ISMAY.
You mean after I get back?

Senator SMITH.
Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.
Certainly, sir. I will come back any time if you will give me a reasonable notice. I will be quite glad to come back.

Senator SMITH.
And does this include such data and information as we may desire?

Mr. ISMAY.
I will repeat, sir: All information of every nature, of every character, which you wish to have with regard to the ship or her designs or her plans, or anything else, is absolutely at your disposal. If you will simply tell us what you want, you shall have it.

Senator BURTON.
Have you experts in this country who could answer questions relating to the ship, or give suggestions for safety devices?

Mr. ISMAY.
I am afraid not, sir. We would be very glad to send anybody out from the other side, if it would be of any assistance to you.

Senator BURTON.
That is all.

Senator FLETCHER.
Mr. Ismay, I believe some passengers state that Capt. Smith gave you a [telegram](#) reporting ice.

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.
On Sunday afternoon?

Mr. ISMAY.
Sunday afternoon, I think it was.

Senator FLETCHER.
Is that true?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.
What became of that telegram?

Mr. ISMAY.
I handed it back to Capt. Smith, I should think about 10 minutes past 7 on Sunday evening. I was sitting in the [smoking room](#) when Capt. Smith happened to come in the room for some reason - what it was I do not know - and on his way back he happened to see me sitting there and came up and said, "By the way, sir, have you got that telegram which I gave you this afternoon?" I said, "Yes." I put my hand in my pocket and said, "Here it is." He said, "I want it to put up in the officers' chart room." That is the only conversation I had with Capt. Smith in regard to the telegram. When he handed it to me, he made no remark at all.

Senator FLETCHER.

Can you tell what time he handed it to you and what its contents were?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is very difficult to place the time. I do not know whether it was in the afternoon or immediately before lunch; I am not certain. I did not pay any particular attention to the Marconi message - it was sent from the [Baltic](#) - which gave the position of some ice. It also gave the position of some steamer which was short of coal and wanted to be towed into New York, and I think it ended up by wishing success to the *Titanic*. It was from the captain of the *Baltic*.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did you see any other Marconigrams that afternoon?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.

You do not remember seeing any from the [Amerika](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.

The only one I saw was this one from the *Baltic*, Senator.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did you accompany the [Olympic](#) on its first voyage?

Mr. ISMAY.

I did, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did anything out of the ordinary occur?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; nothing. I think everything worked entirely satisfactorily, if my memory serves me. I think she arrived in New York Wednesday morning.

Senator FLETCHER.

You say the captain informed you, when you went on the [bridge](#) that he had struck ice? I did not understand whether that was the first time you went to the bridge, about 10 minutes after the accident, or the second time?

Mr. ISMAY.

The first time I went to the bridge. Up to that time I had no idea what had happened.

Senator FLETCHER.

What was the result of that accident to the *Olympic*, which I believe you said occurred last August or September?

Mr. ISMAY.

The result of it?

Senator FLETCHER.

Yes, sir.

Mr. ISMAY.

She was run into by the cruiser [Hawke](#) and very seriously damaged. She had to go back to Belfast to be repaired.

Senator FLETCHER.

What was the nature of the damage?

Mr. ISMAY.

The outside of her hull was very badly damaged and the shafting was bent.

Senator FLETCHER.

It opened one of the watertight compartments?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think it did. It was in the afterend of the ship, where the compartments were all very small.

Senator FLETCHER.

Do you think Capt. Smith ever quite got over that?

Mr. ISMAY.

I have no reason to doubt it at all, sir. I saw Capt. Smith very frequently.

Senator FLETCHER.

You think his nerve was as good after as before that accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think so, sir.

Senator SMITH.

Would you not regard it as an exercise of proper precaution and care to lessen the speed of a ship crossing the Atlantic when she had been warned of the presence of ice ahead?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am afraid that question I can not give any opinion on. We employ the very best men we possibly can to take command of these ships, and it is a matter entirely in their discretion.

Senator FLETCHER.

You say you expected in the *Titanic* the same speed that the *Olympic* had, but you did not mention that speed.

Mr. ISMAY.

I should call the *Olympic* a good 22-knot ship. She can do better under very favorable circumstances. I think she can work up to 22 1/2 or perhaps 22 3/4 as a maximum.

Senator FLETCHER.

At the time of the collision of the *Olympic* was she in charge of a compulsory pilot?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; she was in the hands of a compulsory pilot.

Senator FLETCHER.

Do you know how far the double bottom of the *Titanic* extended?

Mr. ISMAY.

How far up the side of the ship?

Senator FLETCHER.

Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.

I should think the whole of the bottom, sir; the whole width of the ship.

Senator FLETCHER.

This contact with the iceberg must have been above the double bottom, must it not?

Mr. ISMAY.

My impression is that the bilge of the ship was ripped out by the iceberg; simply torn right along.

Senator FLETCHER.

The bilge is above the double bottom?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did you see the ship after you left her in the collapsible boat?

Mr. ISMAY.

I saw her once.

Senator FLETCHER.

What was her position then?

Mr. ISMAY.

She was very much down by the head; her starboard light was just about level with the water.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did she break in two, so far as you could see?

Mr. ISMAY.

I never looked around again.

Senator FLETCHER.

Were there any women and children in the vicinity of the [collapsible boat](#) when you got in?

Mr. ISMAY.

None, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.

How far did you have to lower the collapsible boat from the boat deck to the water?

Mr. ISMAY.

It was very difficult to judge, because we had considerable difficulty in getting our boat down at all.

Senator FLETCHER.

You did not have enough men?

Mr. ISMAY.

The ship had quite a list to port. Consequently this canvas boat, this collapsible boat, was getting hung up on the outside of the ship, and she had to rub right along her, and we had to try to shove her out, and we had to get the women to help to shove to get her clear of the ship. The ship had listed over that way.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did the tackle work all right?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely.

Senator FLETCHER.

Did you have enough help from the crew of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.
Oh, yes; they lowered the boat away.

Senator FLETCHER.
How many men were in the boat?

Mr. ISMAY.
Three - four. We found four Chinamen stowed away under the thwarts after we got away. I think they were Filipinos, perhaps. There were four of them.

Senator FLETCHER.
Were those oarsmen?

Mr. ISMAY.
I believe one was a cook, another was the butcher, and another was the [quartermaster](#).

Senator FLETCHER.
Did you handle the oars?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; I was rowing from the time we got into the boat until we got out, practically.

Senator FLETCHER.
You had experience in handling oars?

Mr. ISMAY.
Oh, yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.
You did not have any more men than you needed to take care of the boat?

Mr. ISMAY.
No.

Senator FLETCHER.
Were you under the care of a physician and under treatment after arriving on the [Carpathia](#)?

Mr. ISMAY.
I was, more or less; yes. He took care of me. The [captain](#) sent down and offered me the use of his room on board the *Carpathia*.

Senator FLETCHER.
What was the name of the surgeon of the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.
I really forget his name. I wrote to him before I left the ship. I forget what his name was. McKee, was it?

Senator FLETCHER.
[Mr. Carter](#), of Philadelphia, was in that collapsible boat also, was he not?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes, sir; he was.

Senator FLETCHER.
Were there any more men you recall now?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.
That is all.

Senator PERKINS.
I will ask one question, if you please.

You have stated that the *Titanic's* displacement was 45,000 tons?

Mr. ISMAY.
That was her gross tonnage, I think.

Senator PERKINS.
Do you know what her weight of cargo was, including coal?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; I could not tell you that.

Senator PERKINS.
Approximately? Was she loaded down to the plimsoll mark?

Mr. ISMAY.
Leaving Southampton?

Senator PERKINS.
Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.
No, we only had 6,000 tons of coal leaving Southampton.

Senator PERKINS.
And how much of cargo?

Mr. ISMAY.
I do not remember. We might have had eight or nine hundred tons of cargo weight.

Senator PERKINS.
What cargo would it require to load her down to the plimsoll mark?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not tell you that. She could carry over 9,500 tons of coal and then not be down to the plimsoll mark.

Senator PERKINS.
She had about 6,000 tons of coal?

Mr. ISMAY.
She had about 6,000 tons of coal leaving Southampton.

Senator PERKINS.
Sufficient to make the voyage to New York and return to Southampton?

Mr. ISMAY.
No; but sufficient coal to enable her to reach New York, with about two days spare consumption.

Senator PERKINS.
What is her daily consumption?

Mr. ISMAY.
At full speed?

Senator PERKINS.
Ordinary speed.

Mr. ISMAY.
At 70 revolutions?

Senator PERKINS.
Yes.

Mr. ISMAY.
I think perhaps 620 to 640 tons.

Senator PERKINS.
In increases in what ratio up to 75 revolutions?

Mr. ISMAY.
I could not tell you. On full speed she burns about 820 tons.

Senator PERKINS.
That is all.

Senator BURTON.
Did you have any conversation with a passenger on the *Titanic* about slackening or increasing speed when you heard of the ice?

Mr. ISMAY.
No, sir; not that I have any recollection of. I presume you refer to what [Mrs. Ryerson](#) said. I testified in New York, the day after we arrived, that it was our intention on Monday or Tuesday, assuming the weather conditions to suit, and everything was working satisfactorily down below, to probably run the ship for about four or six hours full speed to see what she could do.

Senator PERKINS.
You did not have any conversation on that Sunday about increasing the speed, did you?

Mr. ISMAY.
Not in regard to increasing the speed going through the ice, sir.

Senator BURTON.
That is all.

Senator SMITH.
Did you have any talk with Capt. Rostron from the time you went on board the *Carpathia* was that he came to me and told me he had a Marconi message from Capt. Haddock to say that he was coming to him. At that time the *Carpathia* was bound for New York. The captain of the *Carpathia* came to the conclusion there was no use in the *Olympic* coming to the *Carpathia*, because he could render absolutely no assistance, and he thought it was very undesirable that the unfortunate passengers from the *Titanic* should see her sister ship so soon afterwards. That is the only conversation I had with the captain, except that he asked me to send a message to our office in New York to have the tug boats and some White Star sailors at quarantine to relieve him of those boats about his deck.

Senator BURTON.

But you yourself did not attempt to put any embargo upon news of any kind while you were on board the *Carpathia*?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely none, sir; and I asked for no preferential treatment for any messages that I sent. I do not know that any was given.

Senator SMITH.

You spoke of 820 tons as being the amount of coal required to get the maximum speed of the ship. Is that 820 tons per 24 hours?

Mr. ISMAY.

It would be 820 tons on the day. It would all depend on whether you were going east or west. If you are going west, your day is 24 hours, and if you are going east your day is 23 hours - 23 hours and some minutes.

Senator SMITH.

It would include a day?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.

That is, the day's consumption, the maximum?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; I think it is a day.

Senator SMITH.

From noon to noon?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; from noon to noon. I will be very glad to give you a copy of the *Olympic's* engine room log if you would like to see it and to have it.

Senator SMITH.

Have we got it?

Mr. ISMAY.

I hope not.

Senator SMITH.

Have you got it?

Mr. ISMAY.

Not here, sir.

Senator SMITH.

I would like very much to have it as part of our record.

Mr. ISMAY.

This is information we would not want to have sent out broadcast. We have competitors in the trade, and any information we would give to you we would like to have treated with consideration.

Senator SMITH.

This, however, will become public, if you give it to us.

Mr. ISMAY.

If you ask me for it, I must give it to you.

Senator SMITH.

I do not want to ask for anything -

Mr. ISMAY. (*interrupting*)

I think those gentlemen behind you will know what it is.

Senator SMITH.

I do not want to ask for anything that is private property, but if you deem it proper that we should have it, and that kind of information can be made public, in view of what will probably be said before the committee regarding the speed of this ship, I think perhaps it might become important.

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not know that there is anything in it. If you want a copy of the log, we will give it to you and you can put it in your record.

Senator SMITH.

I neglected to ask whether you were on board the *Titanic* with a view of improving the ship in her technical details or with a view of improving her passenger conveniences?

Mr. ISMAY.

It would be more the passenger conveniences. My practice has always been, during a voyage, to make notes in regard to anything that occurred to me on the voyage, and when I got back to Liverpool to take the matter up with our associates and with our marine superintendents and with our superintendent of engineers, and discuss the whole matter with them.

Senator SMITH.

The reason I asked that question is because I asked you in New York if you were officially aboard the *Titanic*, and you said no.

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I was not officially aboard.

Senator SMITH.

You said that you made the journey as a matter of personal convenience to yourself?

Mr. ISMAY.

Simply with the idea of looking around and seeing if there was anything which suggested itself to my mind which would be an improvement in any future ship we built.

Senator SMITH.

Do you know whether the Cunard Line had a mail contract with the British Government?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not quite know what their arrangement is. Of course great changes were made between the British Government and the Cunard Co. at the time of the formation of the International Mercantile Marine Co.

Senator SMITH.

I think that is all.

Senator FLETCHER.

What became of the lifeboats of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think they are in New York, sir. They were put out at the end of one of the White Star docks and are probably there now, so far as I know.

Senator FLETCHER.

Were all of them saved except the one that sank?

Mr. ISMAY.

There are 13 of them there now.

Senator FLETCHER.

The captain of the *Carpathia* let some of them go adrift?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think he did. I think his decks were pretty well lumbered up when he got them all on board, because he had no idea of the trouble he was going to have.

Senator NEWLANDS.

How many compartments were there in this ship, the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think about 16. I am not sure.

Senator NEWLANDS.

You say the ship was so designed that if two of those compartments were filled with water the ship would float?

Mr. ISMAY.

Two of the largest.

Senator NEWLANDS.

Where were the largest?

Mr. ISMAY.

Amidships, I think.

Senator NEWLANDS.

Was it your idea that either of these compartments was affected by this accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not think that anybody can state exactly what did happen to her. My own impression is that the bilge of the ship was ripped out.

Senator NEWLANDS.

Does that include these two large compartments?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; I think it ripped the ship up, right along the side.

Senator NEWLANDS.

You referred to pumps. Those pumps were to be used, in case any of these compartments had water in them, for clearing any of those compartments?

Mr. ISMAY.

For clearing them of water; yes.

Senator NEWLANDS.

For clearing them of water in case there was a leakage?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; or in case of accident.

Senator NEWLANDS.

Or in case of accident?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator NEWLANDS.

You say that one of the officers said he thought you could keep the ship afloat by the use of the pumps? The idea was that these pumps would keep these compartments, or some of them, relieved of water?

Mr. ISMAY.

That they would keep the water in check.

Senator NEWLANDS.

That they would keep the water in check. The pumps were used, were they not?

Mr. ISMAY.

So far as I know. They were put on at once, I think.

Senator NEWLANDS.

Did any officers of the ship tell you that they were being used?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; but [Mr. Bell](#) told me they hoped they could keep the water in check with the pumps.

Senator NEWLANDS.

That is all.

Senator SMITH.

Senator Bourne was anxious to interrogate you, Mr. Ismay, but he has not been able to be present this morning. If possible, I wish you would attend the afternoon session, and we will now take an early adjournment, so that Senator Bourne may then have the privilege of questioning you.

Mr. ISMAY.

I am entirely at your disposal, sir.

(Witness Excused.)

Day 11

Testimony of Joseph B. Ismay, recalled

Senator BOURNE.

[Mr. Ismay](#), will you explain, please, of what the White Star Line consists? Is it a corporation, a firm, or a trademark?

Mr. ISMAY.

The legal name of the line is the Oceanic Navigation Co. (Ltd.).

Senator BOURNE.

Was there ever a White Star Line of sailing ships?

Mr. ISMAY.

I believe that years ago there was a White Star Line of sailing ships which ran to Australia. My father, many years ago, bought the White Star flag.

Senator BOURNE.

So that it is simply a trade-mark?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; simply the flag.

Senator BOURNE.

In buying that trade-mark did any property go with it?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; simply the flag.

Senator BOURNE.

No vessels went with it?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; simply the right to use the flag.

Senator BOURNE.

Then the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. was the real owner of the *Titanic*?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

That is an English corporation?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; that is an English corporation.

Senator BOURNE.

Is the stock of that corporation held by the public, or is all the stock, or if not all, then what proportion of it, held by the International Mercantile Marine Co. (Ltd.), which company, as I understand, is the holding company of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

The capital stock of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. is £750,000. Practically all of those shares are owned by the International Mercantile Marine Co.

Senator BOURNE.

£750,000?

Mr. ISMAY.

The capital of the White Star Line, or the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., is £750,000.

Senator BOURNE.

That company owned the *Titanic*, which cost £750,000, did it not?

Mr. ISMAY.

It cost £1,500,000, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

Yes; I mean £1,500,000.

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
Are there any bonds of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes; there is an issue of £1,250,000 of 5 percent bonds, I think they are.

Senator BOURNE.
The International Navigation Co. owns all of the stock of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.
The International Mercantile Marine Co.

Senator BOURNE.
Does the International Navigation Co. own all of the stock of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
It owns all of it?

Mr. ISMAY.
I think all, except about six shares which are in the hands of individuals.

Senator BOURNE.
The International Navigation Co.'s stock is owned by the International Mercantile Marine Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
All of it?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
The International Mercantile Marine Co. is an American company, is it not?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
A New Jersey corporation?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.
They have about \$1,000,000,000 of stock, in round numbers?

Mr. ISMAY.
Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

And \$52,000,000 of 4 1/2 per cent bonds and \$7,000,000 of underlying bonds, as I understand?

Mr. ISMAY.

I believe that is it.

Senator BOURNE.

The bonds have no votes at all?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

Is the stock held principally in the United States, or is it widely disseminated throughout the world?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not think anybody has any idea where the stock is held.

Senator BOURNE.

The stock books would certainly show who has the right to vote?

Mr. ISMAY.

The stock is in the names of voting trustees.

Senator BOURNE.

Oh, it is?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

Pooled for how long?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think until this October. I think it was extended last time for three years or five years.

Senator BOURNE.

It is an American flotation, is it not?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir; absolutely.

Senator BOURNE.

Built on the plan of the absorption of other companies?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

Or the transfer of its securities for their securities?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

Then the financial policy of the International Mercantile Marine Co. is dictated, I assume, from this country, is it not?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; practically.

Senator BOURNE.

The majority of the directors live in this country?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; I think the only directors who live over on the other side are Lord Pirrie, Mr. Sanderson, and Mr. Grolson, and myself. There are five.

Senator BOURNE.

You are the manager of the International Mercantile Marine Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am president of the International Mercantile Marine Co.

Senator BOURNE.

What is your official connection with the International Navigation Co., if any, and with the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., if any?

Mr. ISMAY.

Of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. I am chairman and managing director.

Senator BOURNE.

And you are the president of the International Mercantile Marine Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes.

Senator BOURNE.

Is the policy of the company directed by you or by a board of directors?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is really directed by a board of directors.

Senator BOURNE.

You are the administrator of the policy as indicated by the board of directors?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I might indicate the policy and get it approved by the board of directors, and then I would carry it out.

Senator BOURNE.

Then the policies would initiate with you, and would be affirmed by them?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; largely, with my associates and myself. We would discuss matters and talk them over and settle on a line of policy, to which we would get the approval of the board of directors, and then it would be our duty to carry it out when it had once been approved.

Senator BOURNE.

Do you, in your office, ever or usually give instructions to the masters of your ships, before they sail, as to the course or route they shall follow?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; it is absolutely laid down. They have a [northern track](#) which they use in the winter months, and during the summer months they use the [southern route](#).

Senator BOURNE.

It is laid down by whom, by custom?

Mr. ISMAY.

The track was originally agreed to many years ago by all the steamship companies in conference.

Senator BOURNE.

Has the captain any right to deviate from that, or is the regulation or custom or law followed absolutely?

Mr. ISMAY.

If the commander in his discretion thought that it was advisable to depart from the track, there would be no reason why he should not do so. It is a matter entirely in his hands.

Senator BOURNE.

Do you ever indicate the speed that the ship is to make, or to try to make?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

You never indicate the time that you wish the ship to reach New York or Liverpool?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely not, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

Are you in communication with the ship by wireless during the voyage, in any way, or is your office?

Mr. ISMAY.

No; I do not think we ever have any wireless communication with a ship, unless there is some matter which has gone wrong on the ship. Suppose any little accident happened in the engine room and they wanted some little piece of machinery to be ready for them on their arrival; they would marconi to us that they wanted such and such a thing, and that would give us an opportunity to get that thing ready for them by the time they reached the other side. There is communication between the ships in regard to passengers. A very large number of our passengers have to be forwarded to Norway and Sweden and Scandinavia, and we have to make all those arrangements before the ship arrives, and they will marconi to us the number of passengers. If the ship is going to Liverpool and they are going to London, they will marconi to us so as to enable our people to arrange for the trains for them, and matters of that kind.

Senator BOURNE.

You give the captain, then, no direct specific instructions? He follows entirely his own volition with respect to the ship after he leaves the shore?

Mr. ISMAY.

When the captain left Liverpool or Southampton, he would know that he had to follow either the southern or the northern route. Our instructions to the commanders are that they are not to do anything which will in any way imperil the ships or the lives that are on the ship. I think that our instructions in regard to that matter are very clear, and I think they are already on the record.

Senator BOURNE.

As I understand, it has already been brought out in the testimony that the life-saving boats and paraphernalia have been based heretofore on tonnage instead of on the number of passengers?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes; on the tonnage of the ship.

Senator BOURNE.

You think it would be a decided improvement in law or regulation to base the same on passengers rather than on tonnage, do you?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think so. I think the most important thing to do will be to try to build a safer ship probably, with bulkheads extended, or to have a ship with a double hull. But I do not know whether that is practical or not. I have not got the technical knowledge.

Senator BOURNE.

You are not a practical builder?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I am not.

Senator BOURNE.

Or a practical navigator?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I know nothing whatever about navigation.

Senator BOURNE.

What deductions, in your own mind, Mr. Ismay, have been made, from the experience that you have just passed through, in the way of the catastrophe to the *Titanic*, as to improvements, and where they could be made, and the probabilities of a repetition of such a catastrophe being minimized by the adoption of your improvements?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think probably there should be an extension of the bulkheads, carrying them up higher; but I do not know whether it will be possible to bring the double bottom of the ship higher up. I do not know whether they can extend the double bottom, which we have now, up the sides of the ship. It may be desirable, and probably will be very desirable, to increase the boatage capacity, and it may be also desirable to carry a certain number of life rafts which, in the event of the ship going down, will float off of the ship. I think that in this case many of these people might have been saved if there had been some life rafts, which would have floated off the ship.

Senator BOURNE.

I do not know where I received it, but the impression is in my mind that immediately after the catastrophe you issued orders to the ships of the lines which you represent to increase their number of lifeboats; is that true?

Mr. ISMAY.

That is absolutely true. We have issued instructions that none of the ships of our lines shall leave any port carrying more passengers and crew than they have capacity for in the lifeboats. The result of that will be, of course, that we shall have to very largely reduce the number of passengers we carry.

Senator BOURNE.

I also have an impression that I have seen somewhere, or heard, that the davits that they had on the *Titanic* were capable of handling three boats instead of one, and that there was no question about those davits being able to handle twice the number of boats that they did handle; is that true?

Mr. ISMAY.

I could not express any opinion in regard to that, Senator Bourne. I do not know anything about it.

Senator BOURNE.

Were you at all familiar with the boiler rooms?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; I had never been down in the boiler rooms.

Senator BOURNE.

When the plans were submitted to you by the naval architect, did the question come up of bulkheads between the boilers and the skin of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

Your attention has not been directed, then, to that point, as to whether the ship could be made more nonsinkable by having airtight or watertight bulkheads between the boilers themselves and the skin of the ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; that matter was never discussed. You mean to make the coal bunkers watertight?

Senator BOURNE.

Yes; I mean the coal bunkers.

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; that was never discussed. Of course we have bulkheads in the boiler rooms, right across the ship.

Senator BOURNE.

How about the searchlights on the ship? Have you come to any conclusion in your own mind as to whether the safety of the ship would be better insured by carrying searchlights?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am not competent to express any opinion on that.

Senator BOURNE.

I did not know but you might have talked over the matter with some of your practical men.

Mr. ISMAY.

I have not had an opportunity of doing it. You see, we have all of our superintendents over on the other side. But I have heard the matter discussed here amongst certain nautical gentlemen, and I think you will probably find as many would be against it as would be in favor of it. That is very often the unfortunate position a shipowner finds himself in. He will have a lot of people advising him to do a thing and an equal number advising him not to do it, and it is very difficult to arrive at any conclusion.

Senator BOURNE.

As a business man handling large affairs, in a case of that kind what would you do, where there was a difference of opinion among experts? You would rest on the demonstration incident thereto, would you not?

Mr. ISMAY.

I would probably make a trial of it, and would not be a good deal influenced by the gentlemen who were in favor of it or those who were against it.

Senator BOURNE.

Are your ships built subject to naval inspection?

Mr. ISMAY.

I believe some of the Cunard ships are, sir.

Senator BOURNE.

What inspection do your ships receive other than that of your own representatives? Do they receive any?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; we have no inspection outside, unless it is by Harland & Wolff.

Senator BOURNE.

And no other lines have, either, except the Cunard, which, as I understand you to say, is subject to naval inspection?

Mr. ISMAY.

Of course the Cunard Co. are, in a way, different from what we are. The Government advances them a very large sum of money and the Government has really a controlling vote in the Cunard Steamship Co.

Senator BOURNE.

That is the reason -

Mr. ISMAY.

The Government advanced the Cunard Line the money that enabled them to build the *Lusitania* and the *Mauretania*.

Senator BOURNE.

Are any of your ships receiving a mail subsidy from the British Government?

Mr. ISMAY.

We receive £70,000 a year for carrying the mails. That is the maximum sum we can receive from the Government.

Senator BOURNE.

Had the *Titanic* survived, how large a subsidy would she have received per year?

Mr. ISMAY.

The £70,000 which we received would be divided amongst the three or four ships.

Senator BOURNE.

On a tonnage basis?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir. We could apportion that any way we saw fit.

Senator BOURNE.

The company gets the gross amount for the contract, and then you make your own apportionment or allotment? It is simply a matter of bookkeeping?

Mr. ISMAY.

Absolutely. We get paid by the British Government on a poundage basis; but as soon as the payments have reached £70,000 we have to carry the mails for the balance of the year for nothing. That is the maximum payment we receive.

Senator BOURNE.

Is it your opinion that you have as good naval architects as the navy themselves would have, and that you would gain nothing except, possibly, in good will - public sentiment - by naval inspection in the construction of your ships?

Mr. ISMAY.

I do not think, from the mercantile marine point of view, any supervision or inspection by the admiralty authorities would be of any service to us whatever; the types of ships, and the construction of the ships, are so absolutely different.

Senator BOURNE.

Really, the naval architect would not be an expert on the type of ship which you are constructing?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think he could advise in regard to the ship, but I should be very sorry to have to operate a merchant ship which had been designed by a naval constructor. I mean to say they would approach the whole thing from an entirely different standpoint.

Senator BOURNE.

It is your impression, is it not, or your conviction, that legislation could be enacted which would give greater safeguards to the traveling public in that direction, or rules and regulations could be issued by the large companies themselves that benefits can accrue from the experience you have just gone through, in the way of an improvement in the construction or in the equipment of ships?

Mr. ISMAY.

I think you can take it, sir, that it will be the endeavor of every shipowner to do everything he possibly can to guard against such a horrible catastrophe.

Senator BOURNE.

And you think the demonstration has been made that it is impossible to construct a nonsinkable ship?

Mr. ISMAY.

I would not like to say that, because I have not sufficient knowledge to make any statement with regard to that.

Senator BOURNE.

That is all.

Senator FLETCHER.

You stated, Mr. Ismay, that you were president of the International Mercantile Marine Co. and chairman and managing director of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir.

Senator FLETCHER.

What is your official relation with the International Navigation Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

I am a director of the International Navigation Co.

Senator FLETCHER.

You have no other office than that?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir; none.

Senator FLETCHER.

What is the relation of the International Navigation Co. with these other two companies?

Mr. ISMAY.

It is controlled by the International Mercantile Marine Co. in exactly the same way that the White Star Line is controlled.

Senator SMITH.

Did I ask you the other day, Mr. Ismay, about the firm of Ismay, Imrie & Co.?

Mr. ISMAY.

Ismay, Imrie & Co. were the managers for the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.

Senator SMITH.

Is that a corporation?

Mr. ISMAY.

No, sir.

Senator SMITH.

A copartnership?

Mr. ISMAY.

Yes, sir. There is nobody left in the firm except myself. It is practically a dead letter now to all intents and purposes.

Senator SMITH.

That is all, Mr. Ismay, and I want to thank you for your courtesy to the committee and for the information which you have given us. So far as the committee is concerned, you are no longer under its restraint, and I only ask you to respond to any further efforts upon our part to acquire information regarding the causes leading to this catastrophe.

Mr. ISMAY.

I will be glad to give you any information I possibly can, any time you call upon me for it.

(Witness Excused.)

LINER DID NOT SPEED, ISMAY DECLARES

New York Times

Friday 19 April 1912

Not the Custom of the White Star Line to Try to Break Records

TOOK LAST BOAT, HE SAYS

Awakened by Crash

Doesn't Know About Bulkheads

Ship Sank in 2 Hours and 25 Minutes

J. Bruce Ismay was asked at the pier last night whether he did not desire at this time to answer the charges that have been made that on the first trip of great liners it is the custom to speed in order to obtain the advertising which is bound to follow the saving of time.

"That statement is absolutely false," replied Mr. Ismay with more animation than he showed at any time during the interview. "I can speak for the White Star Line that such a proceeding is not the case, and that the Titanic at no time during her voyage had been at full speed."

Mr. Ismay was asked to tell something about the accident. "I was asleep at the time. I came on deck. The officers were doing their duty. Capt. Smith I did not see."

He was asked a number of questions, to which he replied that he did not see the things he was questioned about.

"The ship sank in two hours and twenty-five minutes after the collision," said Mr. Ismay. An interviewer broke in to ask:

"Is it not true that she remained afloat long enough to save all if there had been enough boats?"

"I decline to answer," replied Mr. Ismay.

Mr. Ismay was then asked what boat, in their order of departure, he left the ship in, and,

misunderstanding the question, he replied:

"I went in the starboard collapsible boat."

"Did you go in the first or the second boat?"

Mr. Ismay thought for a second and then said:

"I went in the last boat."

Can't Tell About Bulkheads

"Mr. Ismay, there has been much discussion as to the efficacy of the modern bulkhead and the automatically closing doors. Did the bulkhead doors work on the Titanic, and what was the reason for the rapid sinking of the vessel?"

"As to the bulkheads, I do not know how they held. I was in my room when the collision came. I believe that in this case the whole bilge of the ship was torn as she struck a glancing blow."

Mr. Ismay was asked how long after the collision the lights remained lighted.

"It was not twenty minutes," he replied. "It was not long after that."

Mr. Ismay said that he did not see the ship go down and heard no explosion. He was asked what the first sensation was, and he replied that, while there had been no great shock, he was, nevertheless, awakened.

"I woke and it felt as though the Titanic had struck a glancing blow and the ship was going heaving up."

Mr. Ismay could offer no suggestion as to the delay in sending wireless messages and he said he knew nothing of the Carpathia's refusal to answer questions from President Taft.

His Wireless Delayed

"I sent a message, a brief summary of the fact, telling that the vessel had been in collision and had sunk. This was at 11 A. M. on Monday."

P. A. S. Franklin, Vice President of the International Mercantile Marine here, broke in to say that that message was only received yesterday morning.

Makes Formal Statement

Then Mr. Ismay declined to answer any questions outside of a formal statement, excusing himself from discussing the wreck on the ground that the matter was now in the hands of the United States Senate committee. His statement reads:

"In the presence of and under the shadow of a catastrophe so overwhelming my feelings are too deep for expression in words. I can only say that the White Star Line and its officers and employees will do everything possible to alleviate [sic] the sufferings and the sorrow of the survivors and their relatives and friends. The Titanic was the last word in shipbuilding, and every requirement prescribed by the British Board of Trade had been lived up to. The master, officers, and seamen were the most efficient in the British service.

"I am informed a committee of the United States Senate has been appointed to investigate the wreck. I heartily welcome an exhaustive inquiry, and any aid that I or my associates or navigators can render is at the service of the public and the Governments of the United States and Great Britain. Under these circumstances I must respectfully defer making further statement at this time."

But after he left the ship and was on the pier with Vice President Franklin, he was again surrounded and asked the question as to "how he happened to be in a lifeboat when so many men were drowned."

In response to the first volley of questions he replied:

"The Titanic sank about midnight, or some little time after, and I think her bilge was ripped open."

Then the question was asked how he happened to be one of the "mostly women and children" who were saved, as some one [sic] put it. He talked in reply of the magnificent behavior of the crew and expounded on how brave they acted.

Again he was asked how he happened to be among the survivors, and Mr. Franklin broke in and said that Mr. Ismay was distraught with the excitement and shock and that such a question was unfair. Mr. Ismay suffered himself to be led away.

Senator Smith was asked whether Mr. Ismay had described what had occurred.

"Yes, he went into detail, but I prefer to have him tell you rather than myself," replied the Senator.

Courtesy of Mark Baber

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